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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis engages in analysis and interpretation of certain ideas within the 
critical theory of Theodor W. Adorno (1903-1969).  These analyses are placed 
into a constellational relationship with some filmic works of Andrei Tarkovsky 
and Michael Haneke.  In doing so, I aim to highlight the ongoing relevance and 
validity of at least some core elements of Adornian theory in a contemporary 
context.     
 
The thesis consists of four substantive chapters.  The first chapter functions as 
an extended introduction to and justification for the thesis as a whole, and it 
provides the theoretical background to the project before explicating the idea of 
a constellational method.  The second chapter explores the notion of mimesis in 
Adorno’s thought and Tarkovsky’s films as a crucial rejoinder to the prevailing 
‘communicative’ paradigm instituted in large part by Jürgen Habermas’ work.  
The third chapter considers the importance of marginality to the task of social 
critique by analyzing Adorno’s theoretical reflections on the matter and how 
these can be related to and supported by Haneke’s filmic work.  The fourth and 
final chapter examines the relationship between humanity and nature within two 
preeminent ecological discourses, in contrast to Adorno’s critical theory and 
some of Tarkovsky’s films, with the intention of showing how the latter offer a 
more nuanced and dialectical understanding of this relation. 
 
Throughout the analyses herein, I defend and demonstrate the fertility and 
pertinence of Adornian theory, for both the interpretation of film and robust 
criticism of extant social and political conditions.  The thesis shows that by 
constellating Adorno’s critical theory with film one may bring out important 
insights that enhance and enable people’s capacity to critically respond to the 
woefully inadequate status quo.      
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The point from which I set out to write this thesis appears simultaneously distal 
and proximal. In terms of temporality and topic, the origin feels distant, since 
the project has undergone a number of major changes over an extended period 
of time. Yet, in terms of its final configuration and content, the thesis feels 
absolutely proximal, as if its varied mutations were but a natural outgrowth of 
its origin and could not have been otherwise. Despite this ostensible 
reconciliation of origin and outcome, it is, nonetheless, worthwhile explaining 
some of the developments that have resulted in the thesis taking its present 
form. The initial point of departure and scheduled destination have proven to 
be markedly unfixed and ungraspable, like tiny fragments immersed in water, 
flitting about unpredictably as one tries repeatedly in vain to capture them. My 
project began with the idea of examining some of the problems involved in the 
theory and practice of social critique, with a view of advocating a form of 
critical social theory that went beyond the malaise of postmodernist discourse 
and its related political impasse. But, having passed through the countless 
vistas that connect such diverse people, objects and ideas (such as I have been 
fortunate enough to experience along the way), my initial aims were 
continually refocused and refined before ultimately taking shape in the form 
offered herein. What may look to be a radical shift in direction and focus is 
rather nothing but an uncoerced and, one might even say, ‘natural’ progression 
of thought. At the core of my thinking is the desire to seek out the potential of 
critical consciousness, wherever it might be found, with a view to better 
understanding the woefully imperfect social world in which we live. I take it as 
read that in recounting such a desire an entire history of critical thought is 
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invoked. Within this rich history there has been no single predominant 
approach towards the goal of achieving socio-critical insight, and I believe this 
to be a reflection of the contextual dynamics that drive and force critical 
thought to ever new vantage points.   
 
Since my first substantive encounters with the critical theory of Theodor W. 
Adorno (1903-1969), I have found myself drawing upon certain of his ideas in 
responding critically to the social world. In reiterating and refreshing one of 
Adorno’s own theoretical claims, I would argue that today it is not only 
valuable but absolutely necessary that we look towards artworks (and, in 
particular, the perpetually evolving medium of film) as providing a potential 
foothold from which we may surmount the formidable face of rarefied political 
discourse, push-button political activism, cynicism, irony, distanciation, 
ubiquitous media spin, and the insidious general propensity for judging people 
and ideas solely or primarily on the basis of brute quantification and, as the 
current egregious vernacular ceaselessly insists, ‘impact’.   
 
In times such as these, I believe it appropriate, if not indeed a matter of principle, 
to call into question such myopic practices and try to expand the possible 
avenues for thinking and acting in ethically and politically responsible ways. 
For just such reasons, this project will not take the form of a traditional political 
or sociological treatise. Instead, I undertake to analyze particular concepts 
within the critical theory of Adorno and relate (and constellate) these concepts to 
filmic artworks, in a manner which, I hope, can provoke socially critical insights 
and interpretations. The analyses herein aim to operate dialectically, inasmuch 
as not only will they attempt to show how Adornian theory can aid the practice 
of film interpretation, but also how certain filmic artworks may enact and 
illuminate important elements of Adornian theory. Thus, the analytical process 
should move in both directions, from Adorno to film and vice versa.         
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The scope of the thesis is necessarily limited. Adorno’s philosophical concerns 
are extraordinarily wide-ranging and it would be impossible to examine them 
with anything like the requisite detail in a single work. However, this evident 
impossibility does not pose as great a problem as it may at first appear. For, 
despite his somewhat perplexing claim that in a philosophical text “all the 
propositions ought to be equally close to the centre” (MM, §44, p. 71), there are 
particular concepts in Adorno’s works that, if not occupying a more central 
position as such, at least are treated more frequently and rigorously than others. 
Moreover, since critical theory (and the interpretation thereof) is an actively 
historicist pursuit, to the extent that thought and its presentation must be 
considered in concrete socio-historical contexts, one should not hesitate in 
discarding certain of Adorno’s arguments that, for the present time at least, 
retain negligible relevance or truth-content. For instance, while this thesis will 
be engaging with cultural artefacts (films), I will not be retreading the well-
worn paths of Adorno’s influential ‘culture industry’ thesis, since the thesis is, 
in my view, less socially and politically significant than the concepts on which I 
have chosen to focus. The concepts to be explored, interpreted and ultimately 
defended here have been selected on account of what I take to be their critical 
potential amid the contemporary social, cultural, economic and political 
climate. The structure of the thesis will take the following form.   
 
In the opening chapter, I seek to situate my project within the current 
theoretical climate. The chapter commences with an overview of some of the 
typical approaches to contemporary Adornian studies, as well as their potential 
limitations (section 1.1). I then move on to consider the ways in which Adorno’s 
critical theory has been ignored in the recent disciplinary stalemate between 
political economy and cultural studies, respectively, and attempt to address this 
costly oversight (section 1.2). The chapter then acknowledges the problematic 
and dismissive views on film expressed throughout Adorno’s corpus, before 
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defending the validity of and value in exploring filmic works with and through 
Adornian theory – in other words, deploying Adorno’s critically potent 
concepts against or in spite of himself (section 1.3). The chapter concludes with 
an outline of the underlying methodology of the thesis, which I refer to as the 
‘constellational method’ (section 1.4). This approach is elucidated with recourse 
to the work of Walter Benjamin and Adorno’s (qualified) appropriation of his 
friend’s ideas.   
 
Chapter II explores the complex concept of mimesis by constellating the 
theoretical work of Adorno and the filmic work of Tarkovsky, in a bid to offer a 
much needed counterweight to the prevalent communicative paradigm 
instituted by one of Adorno’s junior Frankfurt colleagues, Jürgen Habermas. 
The latter’s self-defined move from the ‘philosophy of consciousness’ to 
‘linguistic philosophy’ has, in the process, almost completely eradicated 
mimesis as a critical concept. My argument here will be that mimesis is an 
indispensible and timely alternative to the leading conceptions of rationality, 
namely, instrumental and communicative. The chapter begins with an exploration 
of the early uses of mimesis in Adorno’s thinking (section 1), before moving on 
to consider Habermas’ ‘communicative turn’ (section 2). I also map the further 
development of Adorno’s conception of mimesis and contrast this to the unduly 
dismissive Habermasian reading with a view to rescuing mimesis from critical-
theoretical oblivion. The final part of the chapter (section 3) looks to 
Tarkovsky’s films as an aesthetic complement to and enactment of an Adornian 
understanding of mimesis.   
 
Chapter III examines the social critique at work in Adorno’s thought and 
Haneke’s films, and argues for the importance of marginality for both the theory 
and practice of effective criticism. The first section considers the macro-level 
critique of Adornian theory and makes the case for reading both Adorno and 
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Haneke as anti-psychological social critics (sections 1.1 and 1.2). This argument 
precedes a discussion of the apparent absence of a collective revolutionary 
subject and the implications this has for a critical social theory (section 1.3). The 
second half of the chapter is dedicated to developing the idea of what I refer to 
as marginal subjectivity. The first of two subsections defends the legitimacy of 
estrangement as part of such marginal subjectivity (section 2.1), while the 
second explores the dialectic of ‘bourgeois coldness’ and analyzes the ways in 
which this functions as a crucial catalyst for critique in both Adorno’s social 
theory and Haneke’s films (section 2.2).             
 
Chapter IV concerns the mediation of humanity and nature. The chapter 
commences with an overview of the core tenets of two influential ecological 
discourses, namely, ‘deep ecology’ (section 1.1) and ‘social ecology’ (section 
1.2). Despite having in common the aim of altering human interactions with the 
natural world, the relationship between the discourses of deep ecology and 
social ecology has been greatly hostile and antagonistic. After rehearsing some 
of their central arguments, I offer some criticisms of each in turn (section 1.3), 
before exploring Adorno’s complex invocations of nature in his critical theory 
(section 2). Having presented and defended an Adornian understanding of the 
dialectic between humanity and nature, I conclude the chapter by constellating 
this reading with the film aesthetics of Tarkovsky (section 3). 
   
Chapter I 
Adorno, Film, and Constellations 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In this opening chapter, I will present the rationale behind the thesis – in terms 
of its particular structure, content and method – as well as the contribution I 
hope it will make to the existing literature on Theodor W. Adorno. The chapter 
is divided into four sections. The first (1.1) provides a review of some of the 
Anglophone commentary on and reception of Adorno’s work. The second (1.2) 
examines the various ways in which Adornian theory has been neglected in the 
recent disciplinary standoff that has emerged between cultural studies, on the 
one side, and political economy, on the other. In the third section (1.3), I offer 
some reflections on Adorno’s relationship to film and give reasons for my 
decision to bring the two together, since the plausibility and desirability of 
making this link are not self-evident. In the final section (1.4), I explain the 
manner in which I will use Adornian theory and film, in other words, the 
methodological approach of the thesis. This will entail an explanation and 
defence of, what I will call, a ‘constellational method’, which, on my reading, 
offers an interpretive, provocative and speculative approach to the critical 
analysis of cultural objects – indeed, a method which, in my view, moves 
cultural theory beyond the aforementioned theoretical stalemate between 
political economy and cultural studies.          
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1. WHY ADORNO AND FILM? 
 
There are many reasons that draw (or return) one to Adorno’s thought. 
Whether it is the inimitable style and form of his often bristly prose, or the 
virtuosity exhibited in his interpretations and appropriations of the most varied 
cultural artefacts, or the bracing breeze arising from the pages of his austere 
negativity, Adorno’s critical theory is without doubt a most fertile ground for 
philosophical reflection, social critique and aesthetic interpretation. His works 
not only span but actively flout disciplinary boundaries as a matter of routine, 
in a way that acknowledges the dialectics of the fragment and totality, the 
individual and society, the particular and the general, the subject and object, 
immanence and transcendence. Adorno’s reflections frequently betray the 
precise gaze of a specialist combined with a panoramic vision for social and 
political criticism. Yet, it is perhaps this combination of perspectives – reading 
the fragment through the totality, and the totality out of the fragment – that has 
caused an under-appreciation of the unbreakable connection between Adorno’s 
cultural analyses and his philosophical ideas. There are seldom any existing 
works on Adorno’s critical theory that seek to draw upon his substantive social 
philosophy and relate this to cultural forms (let alone film). Instead, a number of 
competing ‘Adornos’ appear, and in and through these variations certain 
influences, leanings and projects are emphasized or downplayed, depending 
largely on the person doing the interpreting. I do not suppose that this present 
work will be entirely free of such ‘subjective’ projections in its readings of 
Adorno, but I do hope that, in what follows, I can demonstrate the continuing 
relevance of particular aspects of Adorno’s critical theory not only on their own 
terms but also in constellation with existing cultural forms (specifically, the 
films of Andrei Tarkovsky and Michael Haneke).   
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In this opening chapter, then, I will first consider some trends and possible 
limitations of the existing literature on, and interpretations of, Adorno, before 
examining the debilitating disciplinary divide that has been erected between 
political economy and cultural studies. I will also argue the case for utilizing 
film as a valid object of study, particularly in relation to Adorno whose views of 
the medium are frequently disparaging. Finally, I will outline the underlying 
methodology of the thesis, which can be said to be constellational. In doing so, I 
aim to highlight the necessity for further scholarly investment in Adorno’s 
corpus, and in particular the ways in which his philosophical reflections should 
be read through, or at least linked more closely with, culture and aesthetics. The 
latter phenomena demand greater social and political emphasis and, in my 
view, cannot be simply lobbed off, as it were, from Adorno’s critical theory lest 
much of the critical and political intent of his thought be diminished.             
 
1.1  Rendering Adorno 
 
When dealing with a writer whose interests and ideas extend far beyond the 
usual boundaries of disciplinary segregation, the threat of projecting into the 
work one’s own perspectives and desires is almost unavoidable. Adorno’s 
critical theory flouts such scholarly conventions and disciplinary lines so freely 
as to make the very act of reading and interpreting it feel like, despite one’s best 
efforts, a coercive and violent act of reductionism. The constellation of 
influences that feed into Adorno’s thought is richly varied and, while this 
makes his texts intriguing to read, it also confounds the task of interpretation. A 
list of influences would include (though not exhaustively) Kant, Hegel, Marx, 
Nietzsche, Freud, Weber, Lukács, Kracauer, Horkheimer and Benjamin. One 
could add here the names of numerous thinkers with whom Adorno 
profoundly disagreed – such as Husserl, Heidegger, Mannheim, Popper, to 
name but a few – to the extent that these authors also played a significant part 
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in the development of Adorno’s critical theory, if only by way of negation or 
confrontation. In acknowledging the sheer breadth of these intellectual 
influences, and the fact that their presence can be detected in the various texts 
of Adorno’s oeuvre, it appears that the works themselves are highly conducive 
to just the kind of projection and selective emphasis that have come to 
characterize much of the secondary literature. Espen Hammer makes reference 
to this plethora of emphases and influences in posing the following questions: 
 
Is Adorno a kind of Nietzschean Marxist? Or is he a modified Hegelian 
with a Kantian sense of finitude and limitation? How pervasive is the 
influence of Lukács and Weber? And what effect does the Judaic impulse, 
mediated by Rosenzweig and Benjamin, actually have? (2006, p. 4) 
 
These kinds of questions perpetually circle the mind of Adorno’s readers and 
interpreters, particularly those who exist within the highly specialized confines 
of academia. This mild obsession with categorization – aptly symptomatic of 
what Adorno refers to as ‘identity-thinking’ – is reflected in existing 
commentaries, which are replete with readings that routinely shift emphasis, 
usually with the aim of constructing a coherent ‘Adorno’, while in the process 
seeking to iron out ostensible contradictions and resolve undesirable paradoxes. 
Later, I will explain why this kind of rendering of Adorno is understandable 
but problematic. For now though, it is worth giving an overview of some such 
‘selective’ readings.   
 
Simon Jarvis’ critical introduction, though utterly indispensible for Adornian 
studies, plays its part in propagating the divided approaches to Adorno’s work 
that move along diverse and often conflicting paths. As David Ayers notes in 
his review of the book, Jarvis gives an almost exclusively philosophical rendering 
of Adorno’s thought, with a particularly keen focus on Kant. This reading 
contributes significantly towards the sidelining of other major facets of the 
critical theorist’s corpus – most notably, the continual and complex interrelation 
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with the thought of Walter Benjamin, and Adorno’s dialectical cultural criticism 
(Ayers, 1999, p. 38). While certain aspects of Adornian theory are well 
introduced and explicated for an interested but not necessarily expert reader, 
the author’s desire to produce a provocative philosophical account of Adorno’s 
thought eventually exceeds and subsumes these broader aims of what is, after 
all, supposed to be an ‘introductory’ text. Jarvis also, on the very first page, 
refers to what he sees as the “startling inner coherence of [Adorno’s] thought” 
(1998, p. 1).1 Yet, a couple of pages later, he duly notes that, in light of the 
expansiveness of Adorno’s concerns, thoughts and interests, any exposition of 
his work entails “doing some violence to it” (ibid., p. 3). While these two claims 
are not necessarily contradictory, they do, however, point to a potential 
problem: for might it be the case that the supposed ‘inner coherence’ of 
Adorno’s thought can only be rendered precisely by ‘doing some violence to it’?  
In other words, the theoretical coherence Jarvis identifies may only appear after 
the interpreter’s influence has been imparted.  
 
Following the belief that “True thoughts are those alone which do not 
understand themselves” (MM, p. 192), my reading of Adorno attempts to draw 
upon the coherence of certain ideas in his critical theory, rather than supposing 
there to be a consistent totality of thought.2 As a staunchly anti-systematic 
thinker, it would seem to be appropriate to read Adorno in such a fragmentary 
and constellative form, brushing up against the unsmoothed edges of his 
thought as opposed to overzealously sanding them down to fit into a pre-
existing frame. I will have more to say on the constellational method (see 
                                               
1 See also: “[All of Adorno’s arguments] share a philosophical idiom which gives his work its internal 
coherence” (1998, p. 3). 
2 Interestingly, just prior to completing this thesis, I discovered that Adorno followed just such an 
interpretive procedure during his readings of Kant: “I, on the contrary, am much more interested in the 
inconsistencies, the contradictions in Kant. I regard these inconsistencies and contradictions as providing 
far more compelling evidence of Kant’s greatness than any harmonious system. This is because they 
express the life of truth, whereas smoothing over the contradictions and creating a superficial synthesis is 
an easy task” (KCPR, p. 80).    
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section 1.4). For now, let us consider other secondary works on Adorno and 
their potential limitations.    
 
In contrast to the idea of their being multiple Adornos, it may be more telling to 
note the different subgenres of Adornian scholarship that have emerged 
recently. A provisional typology of these subdivisions might include: ethical 
readings; poststructuralist readings; aesthetic readings; historical readings; 
cultural readings; political readings. Of course, the boundaries between some of 
these approaches are porous and allow for some crossover. For example, many 
political readings draw out the ethical implications of Adorno’s thought, while 
poststructuralist appropriations often also engage Adorno’s aesthetics. 
Furthermore, despite the general air of neutrality and objectivity one finds in 
historical approaches to Adorno’s work, such efforts must always be 
understood as (at least in part) constituting a political intervention.3 It is not 
necessary here to go into great detail with regard to existing literature, since my 
aim is to avoid producing a reading of Adorno that comfortably fits in to these 
existing typologies. However, it will be worthwhile acknowledging the variety 
of positions and how they have construed and constructed Adorno’s critical 
theory along very different interpretive lines.   
 
The most significant contributions to the development of an ethical Adorno 
come from Jay Bernstein. Over the past two decades, Bernstein has produced 
three notable book-length studies that deal with, firstly, Adorno’s aesthetic 
modernism as an ethical critique of instrumental reason that, on Bernstein’s 
account, is lacking in deconstructionism (Bernstein, 1992), secondly, the 
                                               
3 See the recent biographies of Adorno by Detlev Claussen (2008 [2003]) and Stefan Müller-Doohm (2009 
[2003]), as well as the mainstay historical studies of the Frankfurt School undertaken by Martin Jay (1973) 
and Rolf Wiggershaus (1995). See also Jay (1984b), which combines biographical details with all too brief 
introductory remarks on Adornian theoretical concepts: the inadequacies of Jay’s prefatory text in 
combination with Jarvis’ idiosyncratic introduction have given due cause for more measured and 
standard, if less thought-provoking, entry-level assessments of Adorno (see, for example, Cook, 2008; 
Thomson, 2006).  
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shortcomings of Habermasian discourse ethics (Bernstein, 1995), and thirdly, 
the task of sketching out a normative ethical theory from Adorno’s work 
(Bernstein, 2001). This latter text is the single most substantial attempt at 
bringing Adorno’s ethics out into the open. From a poststructuralist angle, 
Drucilla Cornell (1992) has also examined the fruitfulness of an Adornian 
understanding of non-identity and its contribution to an ethical form of 
deconstruction. She reads Adorno with Derrida and Levinas in an attempt to 
theorize the positing of ‘limits’, and suggests how a deconstructionist ethics can 
do justice to the excluded other, the inevitable ‘beyond’ of any posited limit. In 
her appropriation of Adorno, Cornell sides with other poststructuralists in 
accentuating Adorno’s critique of Western reason, logocentrism, progress, 
teleology, the myth of coherent subjecthood, and so forth (see Nägele, 1986). 
Peter Dews (1989) offers an important tempering of this influential 
deconstructive trend in Adornian interpretation.          
 
In a more political vein, the likes of Robert Hullot-Kentor (2006) and Fredric 
Jameson (1990) have attempted to defend (elements of) Adorno’s critical theory 
as an authentic and timely development in the course of Marxist thought that 
exhibits a profound pertinence for contemporary social and political critique. 
While Hullot-Kentor remains positively aloof to the categories of 
postmodernism and instead defends the dialectical and materialist thinking of 
Adorno, Jameson is more accepting of the ostensible ‘postmodern turn’ but 
upholds the legitimacy and aptness of Adorno’s theory for the postmodern 
epoch. Both accounts (re)insert Marx firmly at the heart of Adorno’s thinking 
and follow the general historical trajectory of Western Marxism.   
 
There is little doubt that the work of Jürgen Habermas has done more than 
most to shape – some might say disfigure – the legacy of Adorno’s critical 
theory. For nearly three decades now, Habermas’ version of critical theory has 
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held a privileged position amid the critical-theoretical imagination, producing 
en route a caricatured, outdated and irrationalist image of Adorno. Habermas’ 
critiques of Adorno in the 1980s played a pivotal role in preparing the way for 
the significant paradigm shift towards ‘communicative action’. Habermas 
aligns Adorno (and Horkheimer) with ‘irrationalist’ thinkers like Sade and 
Nietzsche, claiming that such totalizing social critique is untenable, unhelpful 
and outdated. In its place Habermas calls for greater faith in the resilient and 
self-reflective reason, which through language and discourse ethics moves 
towards enlightened emancipation. As a counterweight to the deconstructive 
readings, the communicative turn takes a reconstructive and rational approach 
to critical theory, viewing modernity and enlightenment as an ‘unfinished 
project’. Influential junior colleagues of Habermas, namely, Axel Honneth and 
Albrecht Wellmer, also continue this reconstructive line of defence. Despite 
offering more balanced readings of Adorno and first-generation critical theory 
generally, Honneth and Wellmer still follow Habermas’ call for a move beyond 
Adorno. 
 
Alongside the paradigmatic Habermasian critique, cultural studies readings of 
Adorno are extremely prominent within the contemporary academic context. In 
such readings, Adorno is cast in the depressingly familiar light of an elitist 
mandarin with nothing but disdain for popular culture and an anachronistic 
belief in the ideals of (high) modernism. Jim Collins’ (1987) work is one of the 
shrillest dismissals of Adorno’s critical theory in general and the culture 
industry thesis in particular, seeing in it a typical case of Marxist economic 
reductionism and misplaced romanticism that are, so the argument goes, 
simply inappropriate for and inadequate to the diversity of cultural forms 
within our contemporary postmodern landscape. A similar line of attack is 
taken by John Thompson who – following most readings of Adorno in media 
and cultural studies – centres his critique on the culture industry thesis, 
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charging it with overemphasizing cultural production and overestimating “the 
extent to which individuals have been integrated into the existing social order” 
(1990, p. 108). Tania Modleski (1986), Douglas Kellner (1989; 1995), Robert 
Miklitsch (1998) and Robert Witkin (2003) also adopt a cultural studies 
approach to Adorno’s thought, yet these commentators at least manage to 
avoid falling into a one-sided dismissal of a caricatured Adorno and instead try 
salvaging something from his work.                    
 
The fecundity of Adorno’s corpus clearly provides ample seeds from which a 
variety of specialist readings and interpretations can grow. Yet, the risk may be 
that in rendering Adorno in a specific singular light – be it ethical, political, 
philosophical, aesthetic, cultural, and so on – one fails to appreciate the 
interconnectedness of his core concepts. While I will organize my research 
around three themes – (1) mimesis; (2) marginality and critique; (3) nature and 
humanity – in choosing to constellate these themes from Adorno’s critical 
theory with filmic artworks, it is my aim to avoid singling out concepts and 
considering them in isolation, since, as Adorno controversially puts it, “in a 
philosophical text all the propositions ought to be equally close to the centre” 
(MM, §41, p. 71). In this regard, approaching Adorno’s work can at times feel 
like partaking in a game of theoretical Kerplunk. In trying to concentrate on and 
subsequently extract a single conceptual ‘straw’, at each turn we risk collapsing 
the whole lot, since each concept rests upon and feeds into the others. The 
integrity of critical thought, on Adorno’s account, relies upon the overlaying 
and intertwining of concepts, not in their abstract separation. For these reasons, 
as will be evident throughout the thesis, my rendering of Adorno will try to 
respect and uphold the anti-systematic and non-hierarchical forms of his own 
thinking by moving into and between philosophical, aesthetic, sociological, 
cultural and political themes without necessarily being reducible to any one of 
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these approaches. This is also part and parcel of what I will later call the 
constellational method.           
 
In addition, while the existing approaches to Adorno’s work are worth 
pursuing – since in trying to reconstruct a consistent theory or theorist we can 
better uncover certain conflicts or tensions within Adorno’s thought – I believe 
that in trying to render a coherent body of thought out of Adorno’s voluminous 
output such readings are in danger of ossifying or stultifying the movement that 
is characteristic of his dialectical thinking. That ideas are dynamic and store up 
(or have sedimented within them) historical meanings, transitions, suffering 
even, is in part what guarantees the future of thought itself. Without allowing 
Adorno’s ideas to speak to us anew at different times and in different contexts, 
we run the risk of reducing the critical potential of his varied theoretical 
reflections and making of them a mere museum piece, a relic of intellectual 
history, gazed upon with nothing more than a passing curiosity and a 
reassuring curatorial guide.   
 
In Minima Moralia, Adorno notes how “we” (which, in this passage at least, 
appears to refer to intellectuals, although its use is rather ambiguous) forget the 
art of “reading a text from Jean Paul as it must have been read in his time” 
(MM, p. 27). This point may seem redundant or even trite to today’s intellectual 
historians, for whom the task of contextual reading is so well entrenched as to 
have become second nature. Yet, in a sense, this is precisely part of the problem 
with existing readings of Adorno. Excessive attention to biographical details 
and personal idiosyncrasies tends to empty the work of its political intentions, 
neutralizing it within and tethering it to a particular time and place, namely, 
that of its origin. In Adorno’s case, since the political intent of his work serves to 
provoke further thought and change, not only at the time of its writing but in 
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ever new contexts, it is better to avoid a simplistic historical appreciation and 
instead return to or actualize certain ideas in relation to our present conditions.   
 
One should bear in mind Adorno’s own pronouncements on socio-historical 
context and its relation to philosophy. The temporality of thinking cannot be 
reduced to the either/or dichotomies of future-past, progression-regression; 
instead, Adorno’s thinking might be best understood along the lines of 
Benjamin’s well-known interpretation of Klee’s Angelus Novus. Moving 
helplessly forward yet all the while facing backwards, surveying the ruins of 
the past as they mount ever higher. Adorno’s philosophy lives on in 
anticipation of a future redemption, yet such redemption can only come by way 
of making amends for the suffering, pain and destruction of the past: “The task 
to be accomplished is not the conservation of the past, but the redemption of the 
hopes of the past” (DE, p. xv). This complex temporality within philosophy 
itself marks an interesting distinction between Adorno’s critical theory and 
more recent trends in Continental thought, most notably, poststructuralism, 
which deals routinely in futural notions (for example, deferral, the not-yet, 
democracy-to-come, constant becoming, post-humanism, and so on). Even 
when Adorno seems to invoke similarly futural phrases (for example, 
‘messages in a bottle’, an ‘imagined witness’, and ‘one day in the messianic 
light’), important differences remain. These Adornian phrases all exhibit the 
backward-looking perspective mentioned previously with reference to Klee’s 
angel. Messages in a bottle, while set in motion originally in the hope of finding 
a future recipient, are actualized, if at all, by their historically sedimented 
content and a retrospective reader whose task is to decipher the meaning(s) of 
the message, in relation to either the conditions of its original creation or the 
present. Moreover, the imagined witness and futural messianic light are also 
backward-looking critical tools, for they do not concretely prefigure a future 
state of perfection, but instead seek to distance us from and negate our present 
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reality through the imagined witness of another time, looking back to the (soon-
to-be) ruins of our present. The redemptive light does not lead us towards a 
utopian future, but rather emanates from an unspecifiable non-place (a literal 
utopia) in the future back to our present, revealing the latter’s extant injustices 
and failures:  
 
The only philosophy which can be responsibly practised in face of despair 
is the attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves 
from the standpoint of redemption. Knowledge has no light but that shed 
on the world by redemption (MM, §153, p. 247)   
 
In addition, another key difference between poststructuralism and Adornian 
philosophy, respectively, exists in the form of affirmation and celebration, on 
the one hand, and negation and lamentation, on the other. Where 
poststructuralism (gleefully) excels in its role of bringing forward the future 
possibilities of humanity almost to within touching distance, Adorno’s 
philosophy is, by contrast, melancholic4 and focused more on the missed 
opportunities and untimely survivals of the past than on imagining a fantastical 
future. Adornian thought often evokes a sense of belatedness and a concern for 
that which is passing away before our very eyes, without having yet enjoyed 
any substantive or meaningful existence at all. Rather than a premonition of a 
new and fulfilled life to come, Adorno’s work marks a lament over wasted or 
‘wrong’ life, that is to say, the life that is efficiently asphyxiated under the 
weight of the existent.   
 
It is not simply a matter of reading Adorno’s texts as they would have been 
read in his time, though doubtlessly interesting such readings can be. Rather, 
the dual tasks of reading and interpreting are to be continually taken up anew 
in diverse but not wholly unrelated social and political situations. For these 
                                               
4 Adorno himself famously uses this adjective in the Dedication in Minima Moralia: “The melancholy 
science from which I make this offering [. . .]” (MM, p. 15). This phrase was also used by Gillian Rose in 
her introductory study of Adorno (see Rose, 1978). 
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reasons, in this thesis I will give less attention to trying to render a singular 
‘Adorno’. Instead, I will explore and utilize some theoretical ideas of his that in 
the present time deserve our attention, since when constellated with certain 
filmic artworks, these ideas attest to the potential for critical insight into the 
woefully inadequate status quo. Before outlining the relation between Adorno 
and film, it will be useful to further situate my use of Adornian theory in 
contradistinction to a pervasive and, in my view, unhelpful disciplinary 
division that has arisen between political economy and cultural studies.     
             
1.2  Beyond the Divide: Political Economy versus Cultural Studies 
 
While composing notes and ideas for this project, one of the initial impetuses 
for returning to Adorno’s work came via recognition of the conspicuous 
absence of critical theory within contemporary cultural studies. On further 
investigation, the sense of this absence was confirmed and accounted for in the 
disciplinary division that has developed between political economy and cultural 
studies, respectively, over the course of the past couple of decades or so. The 
main battle lines between the two camps stem from both methodological and 
theoretical differences, but it is the latter which have proven to be most divisive 
if not irreconcilable.   
 
Between its establishment in 1964 and its administratively-enforced closure 
amid widespread controversy in 2002, the Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies (CCCS) at Birmingham University was at the forefront of socio-cultural 
analysis as well as audience- and text-based research. Originally under the aegis 
of Richard Hoggart and later Stuart Hall, what came to be known as the 
‘Birmingham School’, while ostensibly drawing from a (neo) Marxist heritage 
and broadly Leftist political stance, ushered in an age of domination for 
‘reception studies’. Such studies included empirically based audience research, 
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which sought to quantitatively and qualitatively analyze the behaviour of 
cultural consumers and the (supposedly) manifold and active ways in which 
they receive, interpret and experience culture in its various forms. Drawing on 
the then ultra fashionable poststructuralist ideas emanating from France – 
primarily engaging with thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and 
Roland Barthes – the Birmingham School were also at pains to show the 
polysemic content of cultural products, in addition to the fragmented, malleable 
and even oppositional nature of the individual recipient. Indeed, Stuart Hall’s 
pithy assertion that “Ordinary people are not cultural dopes” (1981, p. 232) can 
be seen not only as a guiding principle of the British cultural studies movement 
but also as a backhanded criticism of the (rarely mentioned) Frankfurt School.   
 
The Birmingham school’s approach was seen to serve as an antidote to the 
crude and overly materialistic accounts of culture so common to (Marxist) 
theorists of political economy, as well as the lamenting and scornful derisions of 
perceived decadence so prevalent in conservative cultural criticism. In contrast 
to these approaches, cultural studies view the economic as but one factor amid 
a complex myriad of social determinants for contemporary identity in the West 
(factors such as race, gender, power, religion, etc.). In addition to 
deemphasizing the economy, cultural studies – following its interest in and 
taking influence from poststructuralism – signal a shift in focus, now centring 
round the notion of signification. Drawing on the work of Roland Barthes, 
cultural studies practitioners counter what they regard as reductionist accounts 
of culture (based upon limited and limiting categories such as ‘class’, ‘mass’, 
‘economy’, and so forth), instead opting to insist on the inherently malleable 
nature of language and meaning, and the complex processes of consumption 
which produce symbolic meaning and significations in and through diverse 
cultural ‘texts’. This focus on individual agency and the polysemic meaning of 
cultural texts is in direct contrast to the approach of political economy, since the 
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latter looks to the productive processes and organization of media ownership 
that contribute to the creation, distribution and control over the reception of 
cultural objects. Political economy examines culture in relation to its wider 
context – that is to say, society and its market economy – and aims to show how 
cultural artefacts operate within this context, while cultural studies looks to 
individual artefacts, creators, and consumers, in its analyses of culture and 
everyday life. The political economy-cultural studies dualism is marked by 
argumentative circularity, in a manner that bears some resemblance to the 
somewhat crude readings of the conflict between Hegelian idealism and 
Marxist materialism. In both cases, one side privileges consciousness over 
material, the other vice versa. Political economy gives precedence to material 
factors – such as the forces, conditions and relations of production, ownership 
and organization, physical labour, and so on – deeming other elements 
designated as ‘cultural’, ‘symbolic’ and ‘mental’ to be merely dependent and 
secondary phenomena. Meanwhile, cultural studies invert this perspective and 
prioritize the cultural, symbolic and mental aspects of culture over and above 
material economic factors.         
 
The place of Adorno’s work amid the theoretical chasm between the two 
research programmes remains largely uncharted. This is surprising given the 
considerable amount of work Adorno contributed to the field of cultural theory 
and research, not to mention critical theory’s rigorous engagement with Marxist 
thought – the latter also constituting an important and openly avowed influence 
in both political economy and cultural studies. On closer inspection, however, 
possible explanations as to this relative lack of attention to or engagement with 
Adorno’s work begin to emerge.   
 
Firstly, in relation to political economy, after examining some of the arguments 
arising from one of the field’s leading exponents, Nicholas Garnham, it appears 
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as if the charge of economic reductionism is not unfounded. In its strict 
adherence to Marx’s base/superstructure dichotomy, as well as its privileging of 
the economy and imparting of agency to the market (and/or capitalism) in its 
ability to determine and subordinate all other human activity, the political 
economy approach simply cannot adequately theorize culture and its relation to 
complex signifying practices.5 Political economy reduces culture to a mere 
epiphenomenon of the market. As Garnham puts it, the “structure of social 
[that is, material and productive] collaboration is the form through which 
individual social agents are shaped and relate to one another” (1995, p. 64). The 
link between the base and superstructure, to which Garnham explicitly refers 
(ibid.), is constituted by the “material interest” dictated by relations of 
production. On the political economic view, it is this material interest which 
also shapes consciousness.   
 
Secondly, with regard to cultural studies, indicative of the failure thus far to 
engage with Adorno’s work is the fact that, to my knowledge, only one paper 
examining the relevance of critical theory to culture has ever been produced 
under the banner of the CCCS. The paper, authored by Phil Slater and entitled 
‘The Aesthetic Theory of the Frankfurt School’ (1974), contains a cursory 
dismissal of Adorno, making the (by now commonplace) claim that the latter’s 
overly deterministic view of the manipulated masses at the whim of an 
omnipotent culture industry signals the irrelevance of his critical theory. 
Indeed, in broader terms, the level of meaningful engagement with the works of 
the Frankfurt School in the development of cultural studies is decidedly low in 
quality. At times, critical theory appears as nothing but a historical footnote in 
the story of cultural studies’ formation, while at other times it is presented in 
shorthand or caricatured form in order to speedily dismiss its (again) 
                                               
5 Interestingly, Lawrence Grossberg (a leading cultural studies theorist) has also fallen into the reductionist 
trap of construing the economy and capitalism as having agency and autonomy of their own. At one point 
he even employs the phrase, “the agency of capitalism” (1992, p. 356).   
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‘pessimistic’ and politically paralyzing conclusions. In any case, such severe 
oversights and misreadings are regrettable, for they not only forestall the 
possibility for an effective dialogue between critical theory and cultural studies, 
but they also contribute greatly to the ongoing theoretical standoff between 
political economy and cultural studies.   
 
What both disciplines – political economy and cultural studies – have in 
common is a tendency to hypostatize the categories of ‘economy’ and ‘culture’, 
resulting in a recurrent and stagnant debate in which each side reinforces the 
binary split between the two categories. In both approaches, the economy is 
posited as the arena of material activity, while culture is designated as the 
idealist scene of meaning-making and signification. Within this dichotomy 
there is no overlap or interaction between the two realms. That is to say, both 
disciplines assert that the economy is material (and not signifying), and culture 
signifying (and not material). The limited horizons of each approach already 
begin to point towards possible reasons as to why Adorno hardly features in 
the ongoing debate. In light of the arguments put forth by Garnham, it becomes 
less surprising that the wealth of resources in Adorno’s work has remained 
untapped by political economic theorists of culture, for such a reductive view of 
culture is nowhere to be found in the Frankfurter’s voluminous output. Rather 
than dismiss culture out-of-hand as nothing more than grist to the capitalists’ 
mill, Adorno takes seriously not only the context and relations of its production 
but also the integral character of the cultural object itself, the potential 
ideological or pacifying effects it may contain or transmit, as well as the social 
conditions of its distribution and reception.6 Moreover, Adorno also remains 
aware of the conspicuous and problematic position of the critic in relation to 
culture and refuses to simplify his analyses for the sake of easy comprehension. 
                                               
6 Such issues can only have grown in importance amid the rapid technological innovations that have taken 
place over the past couple of decades and beyond. 
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The resulting theoretical complexity is not only appropriate to the object of 
study but is also absent from accounts of culture that merely take their cue from 
either political economy or cultural studies. Adorno’s work can be seen to 
transcend the disciplinary divide, inasmuch as it neither reduces culture to a 
mere function of the economy, nor holds culture to be nothing but a site for 
meaning-construction and signification. His theoretical work can be seen as an 
attempt at dialectical cultural criticism. The concept of dialectical criticism is, 
admittedly, not easily elucidated and no direct definitions will be found in 
Adorno’s writing. However, some initial impressions can be gleaned from the 
‘Cultural Criticism and Society’ essay.   
 
The dialectical critic must simultaneously participate and not participate in the 
object of study (i.e. culture). This dialectic of participation becomes clearer if we 
relate it to the dualism of political economy and cultural studies. In political 
economy, there is a total negation of participation on the part of the critic, since 
cultural objects are read as nothing but commodities like everything else, 
created according to the predominant market forces and exchanged as things. 
Meanwhile, in cultural studies, one finds a complete immersion and 
participation in culture, in all its many forms, languages, interpretations, 
significations, and so forth. Yet, both approaches will prove inadequate to the 
demands of a more substantive cultural criticism, for neither can theorize the 
mediation(s) between participation and non-participation, individual and 
society, subject and object, the material and the symbolic, economy and culture. 
Dealing only with their respective areas of interest, theorists working either side 
of the self-erected fencing that separates political economy and cultural studies 
exhibit and reinforce symptoms of the division of labour characteristic of so 
much scholarly work.7 In an effort to challenge and move beyond such 
                                               
7  Indeed, when political economy theorist Garnham asks where in cultural studies today one might find 
any analysis of cultural producers, organizational sites and practices, the exercising of corporative power, 
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unhelpful divisions, on Adorno’s account, the dialectical critic of culture must 
situate himself [sic] in the position of such mediations – subject-object, 
individual-society, economy-culture, and so forth – for “[o]nly then does he do 
justice to his object and to himself” (P, p. 33).   
 
In contrast to the alleged totalizing and undifferentiated critique contained in 
the culture industry thesis, Adorno calls for a more detailed, dialectical and 
sociological approach to culture. The twin tendencies of, on the one hand, 
simply equating culture with ideology (false consciousness, justification for the 
existent, and so on), and, on the other, affirming culture as resistant to the 
dominance of exchange, should be avoided. This is not to detract from the 
seriousness of Adorno’s criticisms of the culture industry, for it is clear that he 
does view the majority of culture as nothing but ideological support for the 
status quo. Yet, tempering such overarching claims is the following important 
recognition:  
 
[T]o act radically in accordance with this principle [construing culture as 
pure ideology] would be to extirpate, with the false, all that was true also, 
all that, however impotently, strives to escape the confines of universal 
practice [. . .] To identify culture with lies is more fateful than ever, now 
that the former is really becoming totally absorbed by the latter, and 
eagerly invites such identification in order to compromise every opposing 
thought (MM, §22, p. 44)   
 
In other words, the necessary task facing the contemporary theorist involves 
active engagement with culture but not strictly on its own terms, that is, not in a 
passive or affirmative sense but remaining critical and negative throughout our 
cultural interaction.8 Criticism must aim to shed light on the relation between 
an individual cultural artefact and the social, political and organizational 
                                                                                                                                         
and suchlike, cultural studies theorist Grossberg replies by simply reinforcing the extant disciplinary 
division of labour: “I’m tempted to answer that they are in political economy; that is, after all, what 
political economists do and why should they want cultural studies to do it?” (1995, p. 72).   
8 Jameson follows this Adornian line of thinking when he argues that we must denounce culture while we 
continue to perpetuate it, and perpetuate it while continuing to relentlessly denounce it (1990, pp. 47-48).   
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context of its production, dissemination and reception, giving due attention to 
not only the object’s form and content but also the social trends and practices 
sedimented within it. As Adorno writes, the task of criticism must be 
 
not so much to search for the particular interest-groups to which cultural 
phenomena are to be assigned, but rather to decipher the general social 
tendencies which are expressed in these phenomena and through which 
the most powerful interests realize themselves. Cultural criticism must 
become social physiognomy (P, p. 30)  
 
Such dialectical criticism is unlikely to be achieved within the limited analytical 
frameworks provided by the reductive models of political economy and 
cultural studies, respectively.   
 
In addition, a dialectical cultural criticism would not only dissect, describe and 
criticize the particular object, but would also enact a self-constituting moment 
that would be situated in the mediation between critic (as subject) and cultural 
commodity (as object). While there is clearly no shortage of ‘critics’ within our 
contemporary media landscape – particularly in the limitless scope of online 
content and blogging services – invariably their restless activity amounts to 
little more than elaborate descriptions and conclusions that revolve around and 
reflect the critic’s (usually narrow and genre definable) preferences. Some might 
argue that this lack of substance in criticism simply mirrors that of the cultural 
artefacts about which most prominent critics write, an argument which reverts 
to the conservative cultural criticism discussed earlier. Such a view, however, 
not only does a disservice to contemporary culture by dismissing it out-of-hand 
without sufficient analysis (non-participation in effect), but also fails to 
acknowledge the critic’s own role (participation) in the process of cultural 
criticism. This is yet another oversight that characterizes work both in political 
economy and cultural studies, where the former overlooks the specificity of a 
cultural object, while the latter focuses on the agency, signification, meaning-
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construction, and other recipient-centred activities which continue apace 
regardless of culture’s material manifestations. Adorno’s critical theory of 
culture, however, is neither so myopic nor restricted, for he acknowledges the 
(necessity of) mediation between critic and culture, without which no dialectical 
account of culture can hope to even commence. In addition to this, the 
allowance of one’s preferences to influence cultural criticism is surely a major 
hindrance to effective critique, since ‘taste’ – which, in our relativistic and 
parodic cultural context in which ‘anything goes’, largely seems to relate to 
what a person does or does not enjoy, either genuinely or with a knowing irony 
– is by no means a measure of culture’s worth. Indeed, the prevalence of taste in 
contemporary cultural criticism only serves to reinforce the principle of 
exchange and the ubiquity of identity-thinking, which on Adorno’s account 
further aids the reification of consciousness. The kind of cultural criticism 
Adorno calls for does not entail the proscribing and management of art, 
advising people as to why they should like x and not y. Culture, if it is to 
remain faithful to its own concept, must extend beyond itself. And part of this 
movement is the role of criticism and the critic-culture relation. If critics act as 
cultural reporters, as it were, merely objectifying culture, they hasten the latter’s 
disappearance or, at the very least, its obsolescence and subservience to the 
existing social world. As Adorno puts it, culture is the suspension of 
objectification (P, p. 22).   
 
Acknowledging the intertwinement of criticism and culture helps to explain 
why any culture which is objectifying in its form and content will in turn tend 
to produce objectifying critics. Thus, what is required of contemporary cultural 
theory to move past stagnant disciplinary division is, in my view, an Adornian 
inflected criticism, which actively engages with culture in a manner that neither 
reduces its object to a mere thing, a fetish, nor celebrates the omnipotence of 
creative signifying practices and meaning construction without due regard to 
22 
 
material influences. Culture is not appropriate to the dominant material-
symbolic dualism, since it is both material and symbolic. Its material presence 
affects ideas, representations, interpretations, meaning and language, while at 
the same time these processes of signification, symbolic appropriation, value 
investment, and so on, are no less material than labour, social intercourse and 
production. This dialectic passes without adequate analysis within the narrowly 
defined terms of political economy and cultural studies. However, through a 
careful reading of Adorno’s critical theory, in addition to a more creative and 
critical approach to cultural objects, I believe that we can begin to plot the 
trajectory of a contemporary critical theory of culture which moves beyond the 
political economy-cultural studies standoff. In this vein, this thesis engages with 
some Adornian themes and concepts through film analyses and interpretations 
that seek to elucidate and bring out the social and political elements within both 
Adorno’s critical theory and the films under discussion. In this way, I hope to 
move towards the kind of dialectical cultural criticism hitherto elucidated.    
 
1.3  Adorno on Film    
 
Having ostensibly located an area for potentially illuminating research 
(admittedly about an already heavily analyzed thinker), my next task was to 
search for precedents in the existing literature on Adorno and film. To say that 
the assortment of appropriate texts written on this topic is limited would be a 
considerable understatement. At the present time, only a handful of articles and 
seldom any books have been written about Adorno’s work in relation to film.9 
                                               
9 Alexander García Düttmann has undertaken an interesting study analyzing the films of Luchino Visconti 
taking as its point of departure a claim about blocked utopia in the introduction to Negative Dialectics (see 
Düttmann, 2009). This impressive if idiosyncratic text stands alone in its use of Adornian theory for film 
interpretation, although its style and method bear no comparison to the present project. By contrast, there 
is veritable industry of Adornian studies in other fields of the arts and humanities, most notably, music 
and literary theory. To mention just some of the book-length studies alone: on Adorno and music, see 
Witkin (1998); DeNora (2003); Paddison (1993; 1996); Spitzer (2006), while for Adorno and literary theory, 
see Helming (2009); Cunningham & Mapp (2006); and Harding (1997).   
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Now, there are two standard reactions to such a discovery (read: surprise). One 
can either assume that other scholars have considered, or even attempted, 
conducting research in this particular subject area, and have subsequently failed 
to produce something of the requisite quality – in which case a sense of panic 
might be the next appropriate response. Or, alternatively and more 
promisingly, one may return to the original research plan, carefully work 
through its implications (both theoretically and practically), and resolve that it 
is, after all, an area deserving of scholarly attention – in which case the 
researcher can progress with the project, seeing where it leads and amending it 
along the way as necessary. Obviously, the very fact that you are reading this 
serves as evidence of my choosing the latter route. Less obvious, however, is 
just how the link between Adornian theory and film can be successfully 
established. This is so primarily on account of Adorno’s generally hostile and 
dismissive comments on the medium of film. I will begin this section by 
presenting some of Adorno’s stated positions on film, before arguing that such 
responses to film are uncharacteristically shallow on Adorno’s part and do not 
adequately acknowledge the potential of film to become a genuine art form. 
Moreover, Adorno’s comments on film do not constitute a prohibition on 
adopting his theoretical concepts for the purposes of illuminating critical 
potential within filmic works. After all, one of the irrepressible and distinctive 
features of a critical (contra ‘traditional’) theory10 is its reflexivity and historical 
development, meaning that to reify or limit thought to certain privileged areas 
of society, aesthetics, politics, and so forth, would seem to run counter to the 
original motivations of critical theory.     
 
For the vast majority of his working life, Adorno remained a staunch critic of 
film. In his correspondence with Walter Benjamin, the devastating chapter on 
the culture industry in Dialectic of Enlightenment, as well as the various 
                                               
10 See Horkheimer’s classic programmatic essay, ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’ (2002 [1937]). 
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comments peppered throughout other texts such as Minima Moralia and Prisms, 
Adorno makes no secret of his reservations toward film as a medium and the 
cinema as a place of mindless pseudo-mimetic consumption. Diane Waldman, 
in one of very few articles to broach the subject of film in relation to Adornian 
theory, accurately highlights the most significant shortcoming in Adorno’s 
conception of film. As Waldman shows, Adorno ontologizes film as inherently 
ideological on the basis of its mechanical reproduction of the world as it is. 
Since film is from the outset bound up with technical replication, and 
dependent upon vast sums of capital from constricting corporate structures for 
its creation, it can never achieve the artistic autonomy of a painting, a piece of 
music, or literature. Adorno is critical of the extent to which film participates in 
the continuation of a vicious cycle whereby the cultural object ostensibly 
duplicates the outside world, which is then witnessed and (ostensibly) accepted 
as such on screen by the spectators, who then perpetuate the very same ‘reality’ 
when returning to the ‘outside world’. The circular logic11 of culture-catering-
to-consumer and consumer-adapting-to-culture results in a kind of stasis and 
naturalization of the contingent: 
 
The more intensely and flawlessly [the film-maker’s] techniques duplicate 
empirical objects, the easier it is today for the illusion to prevail that the 
outside world is the straightforward continuation of that presented on the 
screen [. . .] Real life is becoming indistinguishable from the movies [. . .] 
[T]he film forces its victims to equate it directly with reality (DE, p. 126) 
 
Adorno’s conception of film, then, is decidedly limited and surprisingly 
undialectical, inasmuch as it does not allow for any filmic production that is not 
merely ‘naturalistic’ (i.e. replicating the existent).12 Indeed, Adorno ascribes the 
                                               
11 The origin of this circularity appears beyond recognition by Adorno’s account: “The assent to hit songs 
and debased cultural goods belongs to the same complex of symptoms as do those faces of which one no 
longer knows whether the film has alienated them from reality or reality has alienated them from the film, 
as they wrench open a great formless mouth with shining teeth in a voracious smile, while the tired eyes 
are wretched and lost above” (2001 [1938], p. 47). 
12 In this regard, namely, the unquestioning duplication of the status quo, Adorno’s dismissal of film 
mirrors his disdain for positivistic social science. 
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diminution of consumers’ spontaneity and imagination not to any personal or 
psychological failing, but to the “objective nature of the products themselves, 
especially to the most characteristic of them, the sound film” (DE, p. 126). Film 
is, thus, ontologically rendered non-art, irrevocably ideological, and dismissed 
out of hand, with no consideration given to the particular capitalist conditions 
in which films are produced. Instead of recognizing the potential within the 
medium under altered conditions of production and reception, Adorno 
disregards the medium in toto (Waldman, 1977, pp. 50-51). The problem, then, is 
not so much that Adorno focuses so insistently on the film production process, 
as that when looking at the production process he cannot envision any 
divergent forms that film production could take. In a shift that somewhat 
prefigures Herbert Marcuse’s work, the technology itself becomes the problem 
for Adorno and the root of his rejection of film as being anything other than 
support for a pervasive and egregious culture industry.13       
 
While Adorno’s criticisms are primarily targeted at the medium of film itself, 
they are also directed toward its modes of mass reception. On the bad mimesis 
encouraged by the culture-industrial production of films, Adorno complains of 
the ways in which the “monopoly shuts its doors on anyone who fails to learn 
from the cinema how to move and speak according to the schema it has 
fabricated” (2001 [1981], p. 92). More forcefully, one finds the following 
damning comment in Minima Moralia, which intensifies the former criticism of 
the unwitting alliance forged between film and its audience: 
 
Immediacy, the popular community concocted by films, amounts to 
mediation without residue, reducing men and everything human so 
perfectly to things, that their contrast to things, indeed the spell of 
reification itself, becomes imperceptible. The film has succeeded in 
transforming subjects so indistinguishably into social functions, that those 
                                               
13 This is a surprisingly undialectical move in his argument, given that amid previous pages Adorno points 
out that standardization and cultural homogeneity is “the result not of a law of movement in technology 
as such but of its function in today’s economy” (DE, p. 121).  
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wholly encompassed, no longer aware of any conflict, enjoy their own 
dehumanization as something human, as the joy of warmth (MM, §131, p. 
206)14 
 
To these negative assessments of film and spectatorship we cannot fail to add 
the now infamous and comically cantankerous complaint: “Every visit to the 
cinema leaves me, against all my vigilance, stupider and worse” (MM, §5, p. 
25). In Adorno’s multifarious works, “film generally does not rate as a subject of 
aesthetics [. . .] but is rather considered within the field of sociology of culture 
or criticism of ideology” (Hansen, 1981, p. 187). Thus, it would appear that, by 
Adorno’s lights, film is inherently an-aesthetic,15 ideological, and incapable of 
provoking the kind of critical insight he so frequently locates in bona fide high 
modernist works (such as the dissonant music of Schönberg and the Second 
Viennese School, the attenuated and fragmented theatre of Beckett, or the 
disconcerting literary works of Kafka).       
 
Despite these forceful dismissals of film as a genuinely artistic medium, in his 
later years, Adorno’s thinking on the matter does undergo a notable revision, 
offering a more nuanced and open understanding of the possibilities of film. In 
the 1966 essay, ‘Transparencies on Film’, he even goes so far as to acknowledge 
that film may yet become an authentic art form. Given what has gone before, 
this is no minor parallactic change in perspective. As Hansen puts it, this “shift 
in angle re-opens areas of speculation which seem stereotypically blocked in 
Adorno’s earlier work” (1981, p. 187). In this late essay, Adorno recognizes and 
rectifies the one-sidedness of his previous statements on the medium of film. 
Instead of criticizing film production in itself – on the basis of its irrefutable 
                                               
14 When writing this, it is highly likely that Adorno had the following line of Benjamin’s in mind, 
particularly since Adorno and Horkheimer’s culture industry chapter was written (partly) as a response to 
Benjamin’s ‘Work of Art’ essay. Indeed, the two passages seem very closely attuned to one another: 
“[Humankind’s] self-alienation has reached the point where it can experience its own annihilation as a 
supreme aesthetic pleasure” (Benjamin, 2008 [1936], p. 242). 
15 ‘An-aesthetic’ in the sense of being both (a) deadening of the senses, and (b) inherently not aesthetic. 
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reliance upon technological apparatus and reproduction – now Adorno makes 
the important distinction between emancipated and commercial film production, 
respectively (TF, p. 204). Emancipated production would “no longer depend 
uncritically upon technology”, while commercial production merely follows the 
naturalistic paths made available by filmic technologies. Having duly made this 
necessary distinction with regard to film production, Adorno ends the essay 
with the familiar sounding criticisms of culture-industrial homogenization and 
automatic self-reproduction of the status quo. Yet, because he has finally 
acknowledged the genuine possibility, if not also expectation, of an 
emancipatory aesthetics of film,16 the critique of the culture industry holds more 
sway, appearing as more discerning and moving beyond generalized dismissal 
(for which his work has come under fire on countless occasions). No longer can 
the previous ontologized (negative) conception of film, nor the unified vision of 
spectators as always passive, be upheld without reference to the particular film 
in question. The ideological nature of the majority of film productions in the 
present should not be misconstrued as indicative of an inherent flaw in the 
medium itself and foreclosing of new aesthetic possibilities in the future under 
altered conditions of artistic creation. 
 
What is more, even if Adorno had not published the ‘Transparencies on Film’ 
essay and tempered his previous claims about film, this would not pose a 
significant obstacle for the present project. For, as far as I can see, there are no 
irrefutable or justifiable reasons for Adorno’s outright dismissal of film as an 
aesthetic form. Moreover, it appears practically viable and theoretically valid to 
invoke aesthetic categories and concepts from Adorno’s critical theory in the 
analysis of filmic works. There is nothing to suggest the inapplicability of film 
to Adornian theory, and vice versa. As such, it is all the more surprising that 
                                               
16 He even refers positively to a specific avant-garde short film by Mauricio Kagel entitled Antithèse: Film 
for one performer with electronic and everyday sounds (1965). 
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there should be such a dearth of existing literature and interpretations in these 
areas. In my view, the juxtaposition of Adornian concepts with filmic artworks 
is an interesting, provocative and worthwhile venture. That having been said, 
the method by which this original work should be conducted is not so clear. To 
such methodological concerns we shall now turn.                  
  
1.4  Towards a Constellational Method 
 
Having explored the general intellectual climate in relation to which the 
following research will be placed, as well as the arguments for considering film 
a valuable and appropriate object of study, it is necessary – before commencing 
the research proper – to outline the overall methodology underpinning the 
thesis as a whole. From what has been discussed so far, it should come as little 
surprise that I reject any method that would rigidly impose a formal structure 
or system onto Adorno’s critical theory. If one were to attempt to deploy such a 
formalistic and analytical approach in reading Adorno’s texts, the results would 
likely fall into one of two categories: on the one hand, complete frustration on 
the part of the analyzer as the texts refuse to ‘fit in’ with the chosen schema, or, 
on the other hand, an indefensible brutalization of the analyzed text so that it 
may be neatly schematized after all. Needless to say, both outcomes are quite 
undesirable and, moreover, appear almost sacrilegious when applied to such an 
unrelentingly anti-systematic thinker as Adorno. As such, it is necessary to 
engage with Adornian theory in a manner which best allows its ideas to freely 
develop, and illuminate the social world and its constitutive elements.  
 
Rather than bringing external and supplementary concepts to bear on Adorno’s 
work, distorting both the former and the latter in the process, it is, in my view, 
more fruitful to follow the contours of the established concepts, that is, to work 
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immanently with Adornian concepts in an attempt to discern their potential 
truth-content and blind spots. To this end, the guiding methodological principle 
of the present project derives from the notion of the constellation.  
 
Walter Benjamin was the first to philosophically appropriate the concept of the 
constellation, stripping it of all strictly astrological connotations and instead 
putting it in the service of an interpretive methodology. Benjamin’s distinction 
between knowledge and truth, and the techniques used in their pursuit, is an 
important one for the development of the constellational method. It is also a 
notable contributory factor in Adorno’s thinking of the non-identical and the 
preponderance of the object [Vorrang des Objekts]. For Benjamin, the 
methodologies associated with knowledge acquisition tend towards possession 
and containment of an object, particularly through the practices of 
categorization and conceptualization. As Benjamin writes in the ‘Epistemo-
Critical Prologue’ to his Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels: 
 
Knowledge is possession. Its very object is determined by the fact that it 
must be taken possession of – even if in a transcendental sense – in the 
consciousness. The quality of possession remains (2003 [1928], p. 29)  
 
Prior to the apprehension of an object by the knowing subject, the object is 
regarded (or rather disregarded) as having little significance or existence of its 
own. Through the incorporation of objects into philosophical doctrine (contra 
reflection), the methodology of knowledge accumulation reduces itself to what 
Benjamin calls “historical codification” (ibid., p. 27). In its incessant progression 
of subjective intention the pursuit of knowledge encourages the imposition of 
consciousness onto its17 object. In contrast to this pursuit of knowledge 
acquisition, the methodologies working towards truth, on Benjamin’s account, 
acknowledge that objects have a substantive existence prior to their 
                                               
17 It is important to stress the possessive nature of this epistemological relation. 
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conceptualization by subjects. The philosophical treatise or essay – unlike a 
doctrine – lacks the “conclusiveness of an instruction” (ibid., p. 28), and instead 
engages with the object at various levels of form (contra imposed subjective 
content) and through irregular, interrupted and unintentional rhythms: 
 
Tirelessly the process of thinking makes new beginnings, returning in a 
roundabout way to its original object. This continual pausing for breath is 
the mode most proper to the process of contemplation (ibid.)               
 
The constellational method – introduced in Benjamin’s ‘Prologue’ of 1928 and 
developed further in his writings of the 1930s – calls for a move away from the 
apprehension of objective content towards the comprehension of objective 
configurations.  “Ideas are to objects as constellations are to the stars” (ibid., p. 
34). While a knowledge-seeking approach may serve us well in examining 
single stars in isolation, such a method fails to, and indeed remains unable to, 
give due attention to the relation of stars with one another, relations which give 
stars form over and above mere individual content. Moreover, through a 
constellational approach, intention falls away, since, in appreciating the 
arrangements of ideas and objects, the latter remain as they were before the 
subjective moment of comprehension (the constellation is, after all, external to 
the objects themselves which are intentionless). Truth, then, in Benjamin’s 
account, is distinguishable from knowledge to the extent that it arises 
spontaneously from constellations of objects and not as the result of subjective 
imposition upon individual objects:   
 
Truth does not enter into relationships, particularly intentional ones. The 
object of knowledge, determined as it is by the intention inherent in the 
concept, is not the truth. Truth is an intentionless state of being, made up of 
ideas. The proper approach to it is not therefore one of intention and 
knowledge, but rather a total immersion and absorption in it. Truth is the 
death of intention (ibid., pp. 35-36) 
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This unimposing approach to truth-content is taken up in Adorno’s critical 
theory. As Buck-Morss notes, Adorno’s “central effort was to discover the truth 
of the social totality (which could never be experienced in itself) as it quite 
literally appeared within the object in a particular configuration” (1977, p. 96). 
Adorno, like Benjamin, follows the lead of interpreting the historical fragment 
in relation to its surrounding context (both past and present). In the early 
lecture of 1931, ‘The Actuality of Philosophy’, Adorno – heavily invoking 
Benjamin’s Trauerspiel study – rejects philosophy that presumes an overriding 
meaning or intention in material reality, a fixed if hidden essence awaiting 
philosophical disclosure. Rather, Adorno avers, the “task of philosophy” is “to 
interpret unintentional reality, in that, by power of constructing figures, or 
images (Bilder), out of isolated elements of reality, it negates (aufhebt) questions” 
(AP, p. 127). As an alternative to totalizing narratives of ceaseless progression, 
overcoming, and codification, the constellational method proceeds rather by 
way of arranging fragmentary concrete items and concepts so as to yield 
insights into the contingent unfolding of historical processes. In contrast to the 
hierarchical and dominating procedures of identitarian thinking that impose 
subjective concepts onto objects, constellations involve a non-hierarchical, non-
imposing method whereby concepts are arranged together so as to encircle the 
object of cognition, allowing the latter to spring forth when an appropriate 
constellation allows the object’s truth-content to emerge. In this conception of 
philosophy’s interpretive task, Adorno’s later thought remains remarkably 
consistent with his lecture of thirty-five years previous. The constellation 
figures prominently in Negative Dialectics:   
 
The unifying moment survives [. . .] because there is no step-by-step 
progression from the concepts to a more general cover concept. Instead, the 
concepts enter into a constellation. The constellation illuminates the specific 
side of the object, the side which to a classifying procedure is either a 
matter of indifference or a burden (ND, p. 162)   
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Up to this point, Adorno and Benjamin appear to be singing from the same 
hymn sheet, as it were. However, there is a minor but noteworthy difference 
between their respective understandings of the object’s existence. As we saw, 
for Benjamin, although the object can be viewed in its constellational 
arrangement with other objects, the original object nevertheless is unchanged. 
The point of the constellational method in Benjamin functions primarily to 
allow the subject to avoid imposing its intention on the object, so that the 
latter’s integrity remains unaffected. But Adorno is critical of what he sees as 
the Medusa-like gaze of Benjamin’s exposures or snapshots – ‘dialectics at a 
standstill’ – since these can end up re-enacting the very reification or freezing of 
the object that a constellational approach is meant to foil (see Adorno, 1992 
[1974], pp. 220-232).   
 
For Adorno, the object remains ever mobile, mediated, in a state of becoming. 
As such, the object is affected by its intertwinement with others and accrues 
new and diverse meanings over time. Such historical meanings are not solely 
reducible to the constellative movement of objects (i.e. strictly in the relation of 
objects), but rather enter into or become sedimented in the individual objects 
themselves. Here, then, one gets a sense of the dialectical nature of the 
constellation as simultaneously internal and external to the object. Most 
obviously, the constellational configuration of objects is external to any 
individual object, with the former providing the unintentional context for the 
latter. Yet, at the same time, this external context feeds into, co-constitutes and 
(at least in part) determines the inner integrity of the fragmentary object: “By 
gathering around the object of cognition, the concepts potentially determine the 
object’s interior” (ND, p. 162). In the following passage, Adorno describes this 
internal-external dialectic in more detail. As such, it is worth quoting in full:    
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This history is in the individual thing and outside it; it is something 
encompassing in which the individual has its place. Becoming aware of the 
constellation in which a thing stands is tantamount to deciphering the 
constellation which, having come to be, it bears within it. The chorismos of 
without and within is historically qualified in turn. The history locked in 
the object can only be delivered by a knowledge mindful of the historic 
positional value of the object in its relation to other objects – by the 
actualization and concentration of something which is already known and 
is transformed by that knowledge. Cognition of the object in its 
constellation is cognition of the process stored in the object. As a 
constellation, theoretical thought circles the concept it would like to unseal, 
hoping that it may fly open like the lock of a well-guarded safe-deposit box: 
in response, not to a single key or a single number, but to a combination of 
numbers (ibid., p. 163)  
 
Thus, the strict demarcation between inside and outside is brought down, 
allowing the object to develop and maintain its mobility, instead of being 
coerced into submission under the whim of subjective categorization and the 
imposition of identity. Regrouping diffuse phenomena is “a continuously 
renewed attempt to picture the essence of society” through unimposing – or, at 
least, minimally imposing – forms of conceptualization (Buck-Morss, 1977, p. 
96). In contradistinction to reifying and identitarian thought forms, the 
constellational method enacts a freer non-subsumptive procedure of idea 
construction. Instead of the epistemological subject subsuming an object under 
a singular domineering concept, the constellational configuration seeks to allow 
the object to remain in a more unimpeded state, able to transform over time, 
and thereby maintain the same dynamics and flexibility required of thought 
itself. As an important rejoinder to the overzealous ‘diamat’ thinker, for whom 
dialectics stands simply as the procedural overcoming of contradictions into a 
higher synthetic unity, the dialectics of a constellational method, by contrast, 
works negatively through the juxtaposition of diverse objects and concepts 
within configurations that precisely draw out rather than resolve extant 
inconsistencies and contradictions.      
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In his lectures on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Adorno makes reference to the 
“force field” that exists within a text like Kant’s. Through the appreciation of 
the varied and frictional forces at work in the text, and not of their cursory 
rejection or tidy resolution, the reader may be permitted to go “beyond the 
immediate meaning on the page” (KCPR, p. 80). This immersion in the contours 
and tensions of the works in question seems most apt for the current project. 
The research presented herein will take the form of constellations in which 
Adornian thought figures are placed in conjunction with elements of certain 
filmic artworks,18 so that illuminating interpretations and new perspectives 
might be cultivated amid our contemporary context. Just as the stars fall into 
new relations by virtue of their astrological reading, so my juxtapositions of 
Adornian theory and film will bring new meanings and figurations to both 
phenomena via their newly inaugurated proximity. Aspects of Adorno’s 
thought can be elucidated and enacted through the aesthetics of Tarkovsky’s 
and Haneke’s films, respectively, while filmic artworks can offer insightful and 
helpful aids to our understanding of Adornian theory. As such, I hope to show 
how such readings can reignite the critical sparks of Adorno’s philosophy for 
and in our own time, taking up the pregnancy of his bottled messages from an 
(as yet) unredeemed past for the purposes of breaking open our lamentably 
foreclosed future. Having presented the general theoretical background and 
methodological considerations of the thesis, we may now proceed to the more 
substantive tasks at hand. 
                                               
18 The constellational method, as I have hitherto construed it, is not only appropriate for interpreting 
elements of Adornian theory. It is also apposite for the analysis of film. This is so because filmic artworks 
can be seen to embody a constellational methodology in their own modes of aesthetic production (and 
consumption). The construction of the image, precisely undertaken so as to allow every object to enter into 
association with others within the frame, closely resembles the notion of constellation as discussed in 
reference to Benjamin and Adorno. Indeed, Adorno says as much: “[Filmic montage] does not interfere 
with things but rather arranges them in a constellation akin to that of writing” (TF, p. 203).     
Chapter II 
Mimesis Reconsidered: Adorno and 
Tarkovsky contra Habermas 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, I will examine an important if ambiguous concept that I believe 
can provide an interesting and provocative response to the apparent 
predominance of instrumental relations. The complex concept under discussion 
here is mimesis. The focus will be on mediating between the theoretical work of 
Adorno and the filmic work of Tarkovsky, but in addition there will be need to 
refer to, in certain parts of the argument, some of the influential work of Jürgen 
Habermas. The latter’s instituting of a significant paradigm shift in critical 
theory – by his own account, moving from the ‘philosophy of consciousness’ to 
‘linguistic philosophy’ – has along the way almost entirely eradicated any traces 
of mimesis as a critical or fertile concept. My argument will be that mimetic 
behaviour (or ‘comportment’ [Verhalten], as is the most frequent translation) 
provides a timely and important alternative to the leading conceptions of 
rationality, namely, instrumental and communicative. To this end, I will examine 
Adorno’s multifarious deployment of the concept, before developing an 
analysis of some of Tarkovsky’s work, which, in my view, employs what could 
be justly construed as a ‘mimetic method’. 
 
The chapter will take the following structure. It begins with an exploration of 
the early uses of mimesis in Adorno’s thinking (section 1), before moving on to 
consider the paradigm shift represented by Habermas’ theory of 
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communicative action (section 2). Also in the second section, I chart the further 
development of Adorno’s use of mimesis and contrast this to the unduly 
dismissive Habermasian reading with a view to rescuing mimesis from critical-
theoretical oblivion. The final part of the chapter then looks to Tarkovsky’s 
films as an aesthetic complement to and enactment of an Adornian 
understanding of mimesis.           
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1. MIMESIS AND CIVILIZATION: ADORNO’S INHERITANCE 
 
In the ‘Dedication’ which marks the beginning of Minima Moralia, Adorno 
makes reference to the ancients and what was once regarded as the “true field 
of philosophy”, but which has since fallen into neglect with the reduction of 
philosophy to mere method. The true field in question is that of the “teaching of 
the good life” (MM, p. 15). One could make the claim that this ancient concern 
with the teaching of the good life represents a theoretical thread that is deftly 
woven throughout the entire collection of aphorisms that follow on from the 
prefatory dedication. Such remembrance of and respect for pre-existing 
philosophical concepts is not only evident within Adorno’s “reflections from 
damaged life”. Indeed, the importance of engaging with extant philosophical 
themes is referred to explicitly in Negative Dialectics. There Adorno writes: 
 
Knowledge as such [. . .] takes part in tradition as unconscious 
remembrance [. . .] Philosophy rests on the texts it criticizes. They are 
brought to it by the tradition they embody, and it is in dealing with them 
that the conduct of philosophy becomes commensurable with tradition 
(ND, pp. 54-55)  
 
Just as the traditional teaching of the good life can be seen as a driving force 
throughout Adorno’s ethics and social critique, so too may the ancient category 
of mimesis be viewed as another key concept recurring through his critical 
project.19  
 
                                               
19 In his seminal work on late Marxism, Fredric Jameson argues that mimesis is an omnipresent concept 
within Adorno’s work, but one that is never really explained or defined. On Jameson’s reading, in later 
works such as Aesthetic Theory, Adorno merely refers back to previous uses of the concept, as if they were 
already established. I want to show that the complex and diverse forms mimesis takes in Adorno’s 
posthumous tome were developed from earlier conceptions expressed over twenty years before in Dialectic 
of Enlightenment. Mimesis has a profound connection with the critique of instrumental reason and identity-
thinking, and its development and conceptual ambiguity form an important part of its critical potential. 
Taking into account these earlier comments on mimesis will be of importance in showing how the 
divergent contexts within which mimesis appears indicate its connection with an alternative kind of 
rationality and forms of thinking that are non- (or at least less) instrumental.     
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The historical development of mimesis is something that cannot be adequately 
dealt with in such a limited space.20 However, some awareness of its diversity 
and alteration over time will become evident as we chart Adorno’s varying use 
of mimesis. As we will see, for Adorno, the refuge of mimetic comportment is 
not so much to be found in language, as it was for Walter Benjamin, but rather 
in art. Yet, of course, artworks are not completely outside of or other to 
language, since they are sites for a kind of non-conceptual expression, 
enigmatic through and through, yet not devoid of meaning or fundamental 
capacities of communicability. These general points are meant to serve merely 
as prefatory remarks to be borne in mind as the chapter progresses. We will 
have recourse to them throughout the subsequent arguments and analyses. 
With that having been said, let us proceed, then, with an examination of 
Adorno’s mapping of mimesis, beginning with its archaic form.   
 
1.1  Archaic Mimesis 
 
As a longstanding part of human being, mimesis is a topic ripe for precisely the 
kind of macro-historical and social-anthropological analysis undertaken in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment. In their demanding and idiosyncratic text, Adorno 
and Horkheimer invoke the notion of mimesis in a variety of contexts, and 
critically dissect its relation to the processes of civilization and enlightenment. 
Their interest is in not only the archaic or pre-civilized forms of mimetic 
behaviour, but also the relation of these earlier forms to their contemporary 
manifestations. The authors argue that in its archaic form mimesis can be seen 
as a form of adaptation to the natural world in order to escape the threats posed 
by brute nature. This kind of mimetic behaviour is much like mimicry in plants 
and non-human animals. Indeed, in the early phases of the civilizing process, 
                                               
20 A good account of some of the key developments and uses of the concept can be found in Gebrauer and 
Wulf (1995). 
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one could say that mimesis of this kind is prior to the development of rational 
consciousness and subjectivity. Archaic mimesis entails a concession to the 
superiority of nature by way of replicating its ossification, its bare existence, its 
deadness. In its encounters with the harsh realities and unpredictable 
movements of nature the developing self has to imitate nature’s rigidity in 
order to survive.   
 
When men try to become like nature they harden themselves against it. 
Protection as fear is a form of mimicry. The reflexes of stiffening and 
numbness in humans are archaic schemata of the urge to survive: by 
adaptation to death, life pays the toll of its continued existence (DE, p. 180) 
 
Just as the chameleon adapts to its local environment to avoid easy detection by 
predators, so the early human being mimics its natural surroundings, sinking 
itself back into inanimate nature, enacting a form of instinctive regression that 
Freud claims to be inherent in every organic being (1961, p. 30).21 These socio-
anthropological interpretations neatly draw attention to the pre-rational status 
of archaic mimesis, while at the same time suggesting the emerging 
development of selfhood. It is clearly inadequate to merely replicate inanimate 
nature in the hope of avoiding the terror and threats posed by the natural world 
– much like if one were to ‘play dead’ when confronted with an incoming 
tornado. In this sense, mere mimicry of dead nature is irrational, or, rather, pre-
rational. Yet, inasmuch as the archaic form of mimetic behaviour is, in some 
degree, intended, it already points toward the instigation of selfhood via the 
gradual differentiation between subject and nature. Archaic mimesis thereby 
contains an embryonic element of rationality within it. Adorno and Horkheimer 
argue that this kernel of rationality in archaic mimesis undergoes major 
development within what they term the magical phase of mimesis, to which we 
shall now turn.   
                                               
21 This, of course, pertains to the ‘death drive’, which for Freud represents the irrepressible yet not total 
desire for calm, stability, and as such a return to an inorganic state (i.e. death). See Freud (1961). 
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1.2  Magical Mimesis and Beyond 
 
In its magical form, magicians and shamans would interact with nature in ways 
that signalled a distinctive shift from the one-way subordination of human 
being to nature characteristic of the earliest (archaic) forms of mimesis. In the 
magical phase, mimesis undergoes ‘organized control’ whereby repeated 
rituals, sacrificial practices, and so forth, are rationally instigated and enacted 
with the idea of adapting and bending (if not entirely controlling) nature 
toward the particular interests of humanity. Thus, we witness a social and 
organizational shift from brute nature dominating the human in the archaic 
phase, to human beings (attempting to) manipulate and tame nature in the 
magical phase and beyond.   
 
The development of magical mimetic activity is concurrent with that of self-
empowerment. As a result of this shift, a steady yet definite movement towards 
a rational, instrumental control of nature is set in motion. As rationality accrues 
greater value for human beings in attempts to secure their own survival, and 
through increasingly effective domination of mere nature, mimetic impulses 
come to be seen as regressive, irrational, even animalistic, that is to say, pre-
human. Mimesis in the post-magical, industrial phase thereby becomes 
prohibited, repressed, tabooed.   
 
Civilization has replaced the organic adaptation to others and mimetic 
behaviour proper, by organized control of mimesis, in the magical phase; 
and, finally, by rational practice, by work, in the historical phase. 
Uncontrolled mimesis is outlawed [. . .] In the bourgeois mode of 
production, the indelible mimetic heritage of all practical experience is 
consigned to oblivion (DE, pp. 180-181)    
 
In order to feel secure in its existence and to offset its inherent physical 
weakness, humanity in its industrializing and post-magical stage of 
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development employs its cunning and rationality to control nature with ever-
increasing intensity and precision. With such rational development within the 
progress of civilization, mimetic behaviour is seen as either pre-rational or 
irrational, and in any event wholly irrelevant to modern social life, the latter 
representing an unequivocally forward step upon the path of progress and 
civilization. Yet, Adorno and Horkheimer argue – with more than a nod of 
recognition in the direction of Nietzsche and Freud – that the price to be paid 
for such self-constitution and empowerment is disproportionately high. For 
them, the mimetic faculty should not be discarded as simply an outmoded pre-
historical relic. Rather, mimesis is inextricably and dialectically bound up with 
rationality. As much as the self is never fully rational and transcendent of its 
mimetic origins, so it is not reducible to its vital, pre-rational, natural core. In 
trying to eradicate or repress mimesis altogether, the rational subject (ironically) 
regresses to the archaic form of mimetic practice whereby the self becomes 
ossified, rigidified, inanimate. In other words, the much vaunted autonomous 
subject becomes but a mere object. In order to survive, the self imitates death.   
 
Only consciously contrived adaptation to nature brings nature under the 
control of the physically weaker. The ratio which supplants mimesis is not 
simply its counterpart. It is itself mimesis: mimesis unto death. The 
subjective spirit which cancels the animation of nature can master a 
despiritualized nature only by imitating its rigidity and despiritualizing 
itself in turn (DE, p. 57) 
 
Here we have, then, the Odyssean model of self-renunciation writ large. The 
cunning of reason and contrivance, in serving to secure the subject’s existence 
when confronted with unbearable risk, doubles back on the self, debasing that 
which it desperately tries to rescue.22 The toll for our unprecedented levels of 
security, brought about through increasing rationalization, is paid for with the 
surrender of all hopes of happiness drawn from mimetic relations with one’s 
                                               
22 The critique of self-renunciation and instrumental reason is explored in greater depth in the chapter on 
humanity and nature (see Chapter IV). 
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world. Inasmuch as mimesis can provide an alternative conception of subject-
object interaction, as well as a nagging recognition of extant unhappiness and 
discontent [Unbehagen], it is an indispensible concept for critical theory – not 
least of all that of Theodor Adorno.   
 
In his later works, Adorno’s deployment of mimesis becomes more complex 
and diverse, taking on a variety of (related) forms in a manner not dissimilar to 
that of the non-identical. Mimesis becomes another, what we might call, 
dialectical concept, that is to say, a sort of anti-concept. If ideology lies in “the 
implicit identity of concept and thing” (ND, p. 40), then one must try to resist 
the urge to impose upon an object a single, self-identical, conceptual straitjacket. 
Already we have seen how the notion of mimesis has developed from an 
archaic form, through its magical phase to the rational-industrial phase, and it 
should come as no surprise that the content of Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory serves 
to shatter any univocal definition one might offer for understanding mimesis. 
Indeed, the sheer diversity of contexts in which the term mimesis appears 
within the book has provided more than enough reasons to reconsider the 
possibility of even writing this chapter! Nevertheless, despite the occasional 
dizzy spells that may accompany readings of Adorno, I believe mimesis to be a 
concept of such significance – for not only understanding Adornian critical 
theory but also approaching and interpreting artworks – that one needs must 
embrace its conceptual ambiguity in the fight against conceptual reification and 
practical instrumentalization. Before examining the potential within Adorno’s 
later use(s) of mimesis, however, it will be worthwhile to first reflect upon the 
likely reasons for its notable absence from the predominant critical-theoretical 
discourse of ‘communicative rationality’.   
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2. THE COMMUNICATIVE PARADIGM AND THE BANISHMENT OF MIMESIS 
 
As mentioned in my introduction to the thesis, the work of Jürgen Habermas 
more than most has exerted a profound influence on the trajectory of the 
development of critical theory in general, and the reception and interpretation 
of Adorno’s work in particular. Despite giving the impression that the aims and 
concerns of first-generation critical theorists still motivate his own work, 
Habermas’ significant move away from earlier incarnations of critical theory 
brings with it some major changes and compromises in the radical perspectives 
and possibilities within the rich intellectual legacy of the Frankfurt School. 
Habermas holds to what he sees as the still nascent rational potential in 
modernity and enlightenment, and as a result steers theory more towards 
pragmatism than radicalism.23 In this section, I will briefly review the 
Habermasian paradigm shift – or ‘linguistic turn’ – and its concomitant 
rejection of mimesis as a meaningful concept for critical theorizing. Following 
on from this, I will reconsider the Adornian usage of the category of mimesis 
and try to defend its relevance against the likes of Habermas and his devotees.  
 
2.1  Mimesis Rejected         
 
In what amounts to essentially a wholesale dismissal of mimesis, Habermas has 
produced a range of influential criticisms of Adornian critical theory, calling for 
and, subsequently, successfully instituting a fundamental paradigm shift from 
the “philosophy of consciousness” – philosophy centred round transcendental 
subjects representing and tarrying with objects – to “linguistic philosophy” – 
philosophy focused on developing intersubjective communication aiming at 
mutual understanding and consensus (1984, p. 390). In the first volume of his 
                                               
23 In a somewhat peculiar and paradoxical turn of phrase, Joel Whitebook classifies Habermas’ project as 
one of “radical reformism” (2004, p. 89). 
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seminal Theory of Communicative Action, and indeed elsewhere, Habermas gives 
short shrift to the notion of mimesis, arguing it to be an utterly unhelpful 
category for critical theory since it can be understood as nothing more than an 
unspecifiable pre-rational, pre-cognitive “impulse”, the “sheer opposite of 
reason” (ibid.). These comments draw upon and supplement his deep unease 
with Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment.24   
 
As he makes unequivocally clear through the fifth lecture in The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity, Habermas believes that his philosophical predecessors, 
in what he refers to as their “blackest book” (1987, p. 106), lapse into 
Nietzschean irrationality and “performative contradiction” (ibid, p. 119). 
Habermas makes this claim on the basis that without retaining some valid 
element of reason that can provide a normative grounding for their critique, the 
authors cannot even begin to justify their own position, thereby irrevocably 
undermining the force and validity of the critique of enlightenment and reason. 
As a result of this self-refutation and reductive understanding of reason, 
Adorno and Horkheimer can only follow the inappropriate paths taken by the 
likes of de Sade and Nietzsche in merely affirming pre-rational or irrational 
moments as alternatives to an ever-increasing infiltration of instrumental 
rationality into all forms of modern cultural and social life. The mimetic faculty 
is viewed by Habermas as just such a pre-rational/irrational moment, inasmuch 
as it is mere impulse, the other of reason, an entirely ineffable intuition 
incapable of signifying or communicating any substantive content: 
 
The critique of instrumental reason, which remains bound to the conditions 
of the philosophy of the subject, denounces as a defect something that it 
cannot explain in its defectiveness because it lacks a conceptual framework 
                                               
24 A similarly dismissive perspective is evident in a somewhat throwaway comment by Esther Leslie, 
whereby amid an expert elucidation of Benjamin’s ‘work of art’ essay, she pauses to complain of Adorno’s 
“pessimistic sense of the mimetic capacity as the compulsion exerted on culture consumers to conform to 
the culture industry’s images of themselves” (2000, p. 154). Hopefully, the present chapter will go some 
way towards displaying the complexity with which Adorno treats the concept of mimesis. 
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sufficiently flexible to capture the integrity of what is destroyed through 
instrumental reason. To be sure, Horkheimer and Adorno have a name for 
it: mimesis (1984, pp. 389-390) 
 
On Habermas’ reading, then, Adorno and Horkheimer regress to a kind of pre-
cognitive mysticism, whereby mimesis stands as a placeholder for something 
about which they can speak “only as they would about a piece of 
uncomprehended nature” (ibid., p. 383). Furthermore, in a simplification that 
has been replicated by other commentators,25 Habermas renders Adorno’s 
account of mimesis tantamount to imitation. Indeed, the former even uses the 
two terms interchangeably. Thus, we read of how “Imitation designates a 
relation between persons in which the one accommodates to the other, 
identifies with the other, empathizes with the other” (ibid., p. 390). While 
imitation may be indicative of some aspects of mimesis – one can think back to 
its archaic form and the mimicry of nature in this respect – it is not particularly 
helpful to reduce mimetic behaviour to mere imitation. In doing so, Habermas 
fails to give sufficient attention to the variable contexts, uses and meanings to 
which Adorno puts mimesis, and instead merely serves to bolster his own 
project of communicative action by subordinating or forthrightly dismissing 
that which cannot neatly come under the desired new theoretical paradigm. In 
the following section, I will address Habermas’ criticisms and attempt to defend 
and further explicate Adorno’s use of mimesis.   
 
2.2  Mimesis Reconsidered 
 
One of the prominent criticisms of Adorno proposed by Habermas relates to the 
ways in which the former is apparently still trapped within an obsolete 
philosophical tradition in the form of the philosophy of consciousness. Habermas 
                                               
25 As Zuidervaart notes (1991, p. 332), Martin Lüdke has criticized a number of German commentators for 
inadequately differentiating between mimesis and imitation (see Lüdke, 1981). 
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argues that, for all his considerable theoretical efforts and deft dialectical 
contortionism, Adorno ultimately fails to move beyond the subject-centric 
epistemological underpinnings of the philosophy of consciousness, which since 
Descartes has concerned itself (almost exclusively) with relations between a 
knowing subject, on one side, and a known object, on the other. The subject-object 
dichotomy, according to Habermas, is unintentionally reinforced in Adorno’s 
critical theory through the latter’s flitting back and forth between an 
instrumental or identitarian form of thinking, on the one hand, and an 
enigmatic, irreducible, non-conceptual mimetic impulse, on the other. This 
position is then said to prevent the negative dialectician from uncovering the 
intersubjective potential within his own theory and instead merely flogs a 
philosophical ‘dead horse’, so to speak.26 Yet, one should examine Habermas’ 
claims closely here, for it is not clear that Adorno can justly be lumped together 
with philosophers of consciousness. It is true that in opening up at random a 
text by Adorno there is a high probability of encountering innumerable 
references to ‘subject’ and ‘object’. This is hardly surprising given that his 
terminology is steeped in the heritage of German idealism. However, his 
understanding of and persistent engagement with the subject-object dialectic is 
not necessarily indicative of a defence or reinstatement of the philosophy of the 
subject. Quite the contrary in fact, inasmuch as Adorno is unrelenting in his 
attacks on phenomenological theories such as Husserl’s and existentialism, 
broadly construed, for their attempts to seek originary epistemological 
foundations in the subject. In this regard, both Habermas and Adorno before 
him exhibit a concern with undermining the philosophy of consciousness for its 
positing of an isolated, transcendental, sovereign and meaning-giving subject. 
Of course, the conclusions to be drawn from their respective critiques are 
massively divergent, but it is important to acknowledge the largely shared 
                                               
26 Albrecht Wellmer follows Habermas’ critical precedent, arguing that Adorno’s attempt at a “critical 
redemption of metaphysics” remains “bound up in the problematic premises of the modern philosophy of 
subjectivity” (1997, p. 127). 
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bases of their critical projects. In need of greater clarity in Habermas’ reading, 
then, are the following two areas of Adorno’s thought: (1) the subject-object 
dialectic; and (2) the relation between mimesis, rationality and aesthetics. These 
two areas are inextricably linked and feed into one another in a variety of ways. 
 
On the subject-object dialectic, rather than asserting the cognitive and 
conceptual powers of a transcendental subject, pace Habermas, Adorno in fact is 
wont to draw attention to the “preponderance of the object” [Vorrang des 
Objekts] (ND, p. 183). This priority of the object stands out as marking the 
critical materialism of Adorno’s thinking. Conversely, in Habermas’ 
communicative project the object practically dissolves into thin air, with the 
emphasis being solely on interaction between subjects (intersubjectivity). The 
communicative turn could be said to have catalyzed a distinct move away from 
subject-object relations to subject-subject relations. As a result of this shift, for 
Habermas, there is no longer any need to invoke a mysterious reconciliatory 
interrelation with some ‘other’ that is beyond the reaches of domination or 
reification, for in communicative acts we are always already interacting with 
another subject, that is, a subject with a voice, communicative capabilities, and 
so forth, who is neither unknowable nor ineffable. Through communicative 
actions we strive toward being understood and a rational consensus. The 
relative lack of tension within Habermas’ understanding of communicative 
practice is indicative of a more general overemphasis on identical meaning and 
mutual understanding in linguistic usage, which in forming the basis of a 
theory of communicative action largely ignores the discrepancies and 
alternatives of various communicative forms, some of which may have 
significant ethical import.27 
 
                                               
27 In Chapter IV, I discuss the argument that Adorno is of the opinion that objects too can contain or at 
least provoke ethical demands at times when an object’s spontaneous development is suppressed or 
maltreated by domineering subjects with their identitarian rationality.   
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For Adorno, it seems clear that trying to put to rest the longstanding 
philosophical struggle and debate over the complex relations between subject 
and object by unquestioningly positing the subject as superior – as is the case 
not only for idealists but also for Habermas – is problematic and undesirable. 
Adorno’s point is not that the subjective element in thinking be expelled (if 
indeed such a thing were even possible). Rather, he is cognizant of the 
restrictions imposed upon thought when subjectivity is hypostatized. The 
preponderance of the object is the materialist foundation of Adorno’s critical 
theory, but it also points the way toward a greater reflexivity in subjective 
consciousness, which is to say that in order to fully realize itself the subject 
must reconnect with and give itself over to the object. In so doing, the subject 
does not fall into the traps associated with hypostatizing itself qua subject, while 
the object remains freer from domination within such a relation. Adorno’s 
paradoxical yet provocative perspective on this new form of subject-object 
dialectic is made most explicit through his work on mimesis and aesthetics.   
 
The vestiges of mimetic possibility, or rather the possibility of mimetic relations 
between subject and object, are, on Adorno’s account, to be found in aesthetics. 
As he writes, the “survival of mimesis, the nonconceptual affinity of the 
subjectively produced with its unposited other, defines art as a form of 
knowledge and to that extent as ‘rational’” (AT, p. 70). Thus, in contrast to the 
Habermasian rejection of mimesis as pre-rational or irrational and thereby of no 
use to knowledge, interests, communication and consensus, Adorno believes 
genuine artworks to contain elements of rationality within them and therefore 
the potential for world-disclosing or even world-changing experiences and 
knowledge. As Shierry Weber Nicholsen has argued, in the realm of aesthetics 
Adorno considers mimesis to be both “the activity of assimilating the self to the 
other” and “the affinity of the creation, the work of art, with objectivity” (1997, 
p. 62). This is how the play of interactions between subject and object are 
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internalized and then contained within the art object, without either one being 
hypostatized or elevated to a level of epistemological or ontological purity. In 
the act of creating a work of art, of course, the subject (or group of subjects) 
involved cannot but manipulate, dominate, and identify, to a certain extent, the 
objective material at their disposal. Adorno openly acknowledges as much 
when he writes of how, to the extent that all partial elements immanent to the 
work are subordinated to the unity of the whole, construction is “the extension 
of subjective domination” (AT, p. 74). Yet, he swiftly adds: “Construction tears 
the elements of reality out of their primary context and transforms them to the 
point where they are once again capable of forming a unity” (ibid.). The almost 
infinite number of ways in which such material can be arranged, and 
subsequently experienced again by individuals, is seen in our postmodern 
context as lending art its openness and enigmatic, puzzling or even ‘playful’ 
character. But, for Adorno, the artwork is not mere ‘play’, pastiche or 
haphazard whimsy. Rather, genuine works of art are both mimetic and rational:   
 
Rationality in the artwork is the unity-founding, organizing element, not 
unrelated to the rationality that governs externally, but it [rationality in the 
artwork] does not reflect its [externally governing rationality’s] 
categorizing order (AT, p. 70)   
 
While the element of subjective domination extends into the creation of the 
work of art, the objective result (the artwork itself) becomes an autonomous and 
unified object in its own right, with an “enigmaticalness”28 that stands opposed 
to the categorizing tendencies of the social world in general and instrumental 
reason in particular. In its objective state, the work of art cannot but remain 
incomplete yet inexhaustible just as the non-identical cannot be represented 
directly (given that were it to be identified or conceptualized as such it would 
cease to be non-identical). For these reasons, Adorno takes interest not only in 
the objective artwork but also in the subjective activity relating to it, that is, both 
                                               
28 Hullot-Kentor’s translation of ‘Rätselcharakter’. 
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in aesthetic production and reception.29 Through its internalization of mimetic 
behaviour, as well as what Adorno terms its “immanent lawfulness” (AT, p. 
72),30 art stands as a conveyor of insight, reflection, communication and truth 
amid a social world whose prevalent forms of objective rationalization and 
reification perpetually reduce the subjective horizons of experience, knowledge 
and imagination. As a form of social critique that is both rational yet not 
reducible to a single repeatable ‘message’ or eternal meaning, genuine aesthetic 
objects engage with a dialectic of reason and mimesis – intertwined from the 
very start – and as such act as more than a mere “substitute for the traditional 
subject-object relationship” (Jameson, 1990, p. 256), instead subverting the 
whole basis upon which the epistemological demarcation between subject and 
object is founded.   
 
Where Habermas sees weakness in mimetic-aesthetic activity vis-à-vis its lack of 
explicit validity claims – in other words, the very fact that art does not seem to 
be ‘saying’ or positing something tangible, rational, immediately 
communicable, and so forth – Adorno finds in this very openness, opacity and 
communicative irreducibility, the fundamental basis of art’s truth-content 
[Wahrheitsgehalt]. This is not to say that art has no capacity of communicability, 
or that it lapses into sheer irrationality. Rather, art is “rationality that criticizes 
rationality without withdrawing from it; art is not something prerational or 
irrational” (AT, p. 71). The mimetic language of art is merely of a different kind 
to that of philosophy. Yet, while the two forms are distinct in many ways – for 
example, art’s lack of conceptuality contrasted with philosophy’s conceptual 
language – they are neither wholly separate nor incompatible. Indeed, art and 
philosophy dialectically interweave and consistently call forth one another. 
                                               
29 I have opted for the term ‘reception’ in this instance over the more obvious counterpart ‘consumption’ 
on account of the latter’s pejorative connotations – such as intellectual passivity and physiological 
ingestion. 
30 Interestingly, Tarkovsky expresses this sentiment in almost identical terms, when he writes of how art 
“necessarily obeys its own immanent laws of development” (1989, p. 170). 
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Such issues are of importance for our purposes here, for they already hint at the 
deficiencies inherent in any approach that presupposes a clean break between 
thought and non-identity. I will explore these elements of aesthetic-mimetic and 
philosophical-conceptual language in the following analyses of some of 
Tarkovsky’s films. The analyses will draw upon Adorno’s theory of mimesis as 
examined hitherto, and along the way hopefully provide an illuminating 
critique of the predominant Habermasian communicative paradigm.   
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3. TARKOVSKY’S MIMETIC METHOD 
 
Despite receiving some notable (if haphazard) critical acclaim over many years, 
not to mention the apparent influence his works have had on the medium of 
film in general, Andrei Tarkovsky has seldom been the focal point of research to 
date. As Robert Bird notes, Tarkovsky remains an “elusive subject for reflection 
and analysis, and his name is surprisingly rare in discourse on film, whether 
popular or academic” (2000, p. 10). As someone who has viewed his work with 
an ever increasing sense of intrigue, I find this relative under-appreciation 
rather surprising. Hopefully an exploration of some of his films – particularly 
when undertaken in relation to a critical (aesthetic) theorist of such scholarly 
standing as Theodor Adorno – will help to bring greater attention to the many 
levels, nuances, techniques and ideas that, I believe, feed into and can be drawn 
out of Tarkovsky’s enigmatic work. Between the years of 1962 and 1986, the 
headstrong yet patient director produced seven feature films, which, when 
considered in both chronological and constellational relations, appear to 
indefatigably seep into one another in interesting ways. The films share or at 
the least invoke some particular and notable images, reflections, motifs and 
ideas – some of which are direct relations perceptible on an initial viewing,31 
while other less obvious themes may be teased out or intuited on further 
viewing and reflection. The gradual and growing sense of familiarity that 
occurs over time through watching (and re-watching) Tarkovsky’s films is 
characteristic of what Vida Johnson and Graham Petrie refer to as “a visual 
fugue” (1994). Such recurrent motifs may even allow one to invoke the 
adjectival neologism ‘Tarkovskian’ with more than a little justification. What I 
wish to argue here is that one of the most significant characteristics of 
Tarkovsky’s oeuvre is to be found in his distinctive and highly sophisticated 
                                               
31 Some of the more obvious visual and aural recurrences include the natural elements (particularly the 
earth and water), animals (especially horses and German Shepherds), milk, mirrors, and birds.   
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aesthetic form and method of film-making, what I will subsequently refer to as 
his mimetic method.   
 
In a similar vein to other well-established auteurs – such as Sergei Eisenstein, 
Robert Bresson, Ingmar Bergman, Akira Kurosawa, Federico Fellini, 
Michelangelo Antonioni, Jean-Luc Godard, to give but a few immediate 
examples – Tarkovsky’s works (both consciously and unconsciously) chart the 
development of a uniquely personal and inimitable style, one that can provoke 
an extremely varied response from viewers. From excitement and engagement 
to bafflement, anger and rejection, Tarkovsky’s films can hardly be said to leave 
anyone wallowing in a bog of indifference. His films – often long in duration, 
minimal in dialogue, fractured or non-linear in narrative, rigorously 
independent in pace and momentum – certainly do not fall into the prevalent 
culture-industrial categories associated with ‘entertainment’. But, while there is 
much to be said for the active reception that Tarkovsky’s work encourages, or 
more strongly demands,32 my interest initially will be more on the mimetic 
elements that I believe can be seen in the aesthetic object itself, that is to say, the 
film or scene under consideration. Tarkovsky’s particular style, method and 
form appear to have much in common with the Adornian notions hitherto 
discussed – especially, though not exclusively, the preponderance of the object 
and the theory of mimesis, as well as the relation between the ‘languages’ of 
philosophy and aesthetics, respectively. As with subsequent chapters, my 
readings are not intended to be merely ‘one-way’ (for example, applying 
Adornian theory to film). Rather, they should be read as dialectical, inasmuch as 
not only will certain of Adorno’s ideas offer provocative and innovative tools 
with which to view and interpret some of Tarkovsky’s filmic work, but the 
latter’s films also provide provocative and fertile grounds for better 
understanding and reinvigorating the former’s often complex critical social 
                                               
32 I will examine the issues around reception and mimesis in section 3.4. 
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theory (a timely task given the prevalence and perseverance of Adorno’s 
detractors).           
 
Since technological innovations first produced the ability to portray moving 
images on screen, the medium of film and its primary tool, the camera, have 
been frequently celebrated as constituting the mimetic art form par excellence. 
The camera is widely revered as being capable, like nothing else, of entirely and 
authentically capturing and reproducing reality, of recording and mimicking 
the material world ‘as it is’. Early film theorists, such as the Soviet film-maker 
Dziga Vertov (1896-1954), even went so far as to argue that the camera is vastly 
superior to the primitive human eye, inasmuch as the technological ‘eye’ is 
infinitely more perfectible than its natural predecessor.33 The mimetic capacities 
seen to be inherent in film also extend beyond the seamless replication of reality 
(as in the ‘social realist’ tradition, for instance). Indeed, they permeate more 
recent theoretical developments, too, particularly in psychoanalytic film theory, 
which still maintains a reasonably dominant position within contemporary film 
discourse.34 Following Christian Metz’s influential work, the camera is said to 
stand in as the human ‘gaze’, not merely reproducing but mimetically 
appropriating – that is, becoming one with, assimilating to – the all too human 
desire for voyeurism. Through the filmic gaze we can supposedly witness and 
be party to an immediate experience of reality, or at least the reality of what is 
‘captured’ on film.   
 
Yet, in the various accounts that champion the mimetic capabilities within the 
medium of film, it is too often the technological device per se (e.g. the camera) 
that is given prominence and overemphasized. In the midst of such 
                                               
33 For example, Vertov writes: “We cannot improve the making of our eyes, but we can endlessly perfect 
the camera” (1984, p. 16).  
34 This despite the best efforts of David Bordwell and Noël Carroll to bring down psychoanalytic film 
theory in their caustic collection entitled Post-Theory (1986).  
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undialectical triumphalism, and with an element of alienation not dissimilar to 
that proposed in Marx’s notion of the ‘fetishism of the commodity’, the social 
and human bases of technological production either become opaque or are 
overlooked.35 The camera’s vision is but an extension of that of the human 
subject: without an operator, the camera has no such capacity to record. While 
Tarkovsky often enthused about the potential of film as a fledgling art form, 
there are some key differences and discontinuities to be found between his 
work and the dominant theoretical traditions in which film in general is 
steeped. The following are key points which, as will become clear, doubtlessly 
share certain traits with Adornian aesthetic theory and support my reading of 
Tarkovsky as a mimetic artist:   
 
First is technology versus technique. Tarkovsky is not so strongly led by the 
capabilities and movements of the photographic technology itself,36 but rather 
tries to discern the inner rhythms, movements and developments of the 
objective material confronting the technical apparatus. This technique moves 
Tarkovsky’s work away from the cinematic conventions that were well 
established in, and even well before, his time.       
 
Second is reality. Despite this almost ‘organic’ sensibility regarding aesthetic 
construction, Tarkovsky is not concerned with replicating or capturing reality 
‘as it is’, since he (like Adorno) acknowledges the complex and continuous 
dialectic between subject and object. There is no ‘peeping out’, as it were, to see 
or experience reality without mediation (this would be akin to the philosophical 
fallacy that Adorno chastises as ‘peephole metaphysics’). All images are 
unavoidably constructed.   
 
                                               
35 This is particularly strange in the case of Vertov, given his extensive knowledge of Marxist thought. 
36 Although he will occasionally utilize some of technology’s unique features – for instance, slow motion – 
if he feels the scene, or the meaning thereof, demands it or would be greatly enhanced by its use. 
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Third is image and communication. Tarkovsky’s mimetic method betrays an 
adherence to the power of the image and its extra-verbal, intuitive structure of 
(rational) communication. In doing so, his works help to shed light on the limits 
inherent in a purely linguistically founded conception of communication, while 
drawing attention to the entwinement of aesthetic language and philosophical 
language, respectively.   
 
Fourth, and finally, is reception and mimesis. The form of mimetic behaviour 
Tarkovsky’s films elicit in the viewer is akin to an openness to the film’s 
objective preponderance as well as its specific form and content, which resist 
traditional identificatory techniques. I argue that an Adornian conception of 
mimesis is appropriate to the interpretation of Tarkovsky’s work and of altering 
(and enhancing) our capacities for critical viewing and experience. Such an 
argument will help to show up some of the limitations of the Habermasian 
communicative paradigm, and will have implications not merely in the confines 
of the cinematic arena, but also in the damaged social world in which we 
(co)exist.   
 
I will now explore the above four points in turn.  
 
3.1  Technology versus Technique 
 
Let us consider, in greater detail, how Tarkovsky’s work explores and 
represents a kind of mimetic activity, in contradistinction to the prevalent and 
somewhat restrictive conceptions of mimesis-as-imitation/replication that have 
so dominated both film theory and (Habermasian) critical theory. One of the 
most notable features of Tarkovsky’s films can be seen in his refusal to adhere 
fully to established techniques, devices and ‘languages’ of cinema. From the 
time when film was in its infancy, traditional and repeatable methods of filming 
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and directing quickly brought to prominence, and then reinforced, a particular 
‘grammar’ of the screen. In the process, a range of standard cinematic 
conventions became entrenched in the minds of film-makers, studio executives 
and viewers alike. These conventions – including establishing shots, reaction 
shots, cutaways, point-of-view (POV),37 matched cuts, narrative linearity and 
fidelity, and so on – created expectations on the part of the audience and a 
certain predictability in the films themselves. While the processes involved in 
filming were so determined by this duty to adhere to strict narratives – with 
streams of setups and resolutions – similar limitations would follow in the post-
production context, particularly in the role of editing.   
 
The task of the editor in conventional cinema, by and large, was to merely 
dutifully follow and transpose the already explicit intentions of the director 
(and story) in ordering the film images so as to short-circuit any need for the 
viewer to actively interpret or think beyond the framed image at any given 
time. All scenes were shot and edited with a view of conveying direct 
developments in plot and/or character. For instance, in numerous war films, we 
witness typical scenes in which a character is shown surveying an area with 
binoculars or a rifle sight, before a routine cut is made to a shot (customarily 
with a circular black mask for added effect) depicting, or replicating, the 
character’s perspective.38 Immediately and seamlessly, without any great effort, 
we assume the gaze of the character and readily integrate this frame into our 
understanding of the film’s narrative. In such instances both the actor’s position 
in the film and the director’s intentions are primarily overt, unquestionable, and 
                                               
37 In the scene which follows the first obvious dream sequence in Mirror, Alexei talks on the phone to his 
mother and tells her of his dream. The dialogue accompanies an extended and complex camera 
movement, starting with a left to right pan followed by a steady tracking shot along the hall. The camera 
movement in itself flouts technical conventions, being neither strictly a pan nor a track. But more notable 
is the obscure point-of-view here. Alexei is speaking on a telephone (which is attached to the wall by a 
cable), yet the camera movement gradually and freely floats away from this apparently subjective 
perspective, exploring the scene from an impossible and artificial viewpoint.  
38 Even Stanley Kubrick’s (1964) otherwise groundbreaking Dr. Strangelove features a scene of precisely this 
nature. 
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(one is tempted to say) in danger of becoming overdetermined. Another 
example would be when a fade-to-black is used between shots to imply an 
indefinite passage of time which will be rapidly specified through subsequent 
dialogue and action, so as to allay any potential ambiguity or confusion on the 
part of the audience. Such formulaic techniques fall into the trend of ‘question 
and answer’ within linear narrative structures, in which a range of questions 
are raised – in relation to certain characters, actions, motivations, back stories, 
and so forth – that are later answered before a satisfactory closing resolution. So 
much, then, for the established techniques of film-making. 
 
Partly reflecting a great belief in and respect for the audience, but likely even 
more so on account of his longing to create a unique aesthetic style, Tarkovsky 
found these conventions stultifyingly unimaginative, and duly sought to flout 
them. As a result of this desire to forge new pathways, in Tarkovsky’s work the 
movements of the camera, as well as the editing techniques used, rarely serve to 
reinforce any mainstream cinematic conventions. Instead, his method is 
representative not of an assimilation of the human eye to the technological eye, 
but rather an assimilation of both human and technological eyes to the unique 
rhythms and movements of the objects themselves, or, more broadly construed, 
the environment. This is reminiscent of the Adornian notion that art is born of 
the attempt to make what is mute (nature, objects) eloquent, to give a voice to the 
natural world, or, better, to provide a minimally imposing aesthetic framework 
in and through which objects might become articulate. While it is undoubtedly 
the case that the artist, by engaging in the creative process, selects and arranges 
particular elements and materials in a manner which, as we observed 
previously, must to an extent risk furthering the subjective domination of 
objective material, following Tarkovsky’s method the director is not at liberty to 
coerce his or her material into a preconceived framework. Rather, (s)he must 
become adept at discerning the temporal rhythms that are always already 
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present in the material, and work with them rather than against them. The 
cinematic image is, as Tarkovsky puts it, “essentially the observation of a 
phenomenon passing through time [. . .] The image becomes authentically 
cinematic when (amongst other things) not only does it live within time, but 
time also lives within it” (1989, pp. 67-68). This deep understanding of and 
respect for time – in all its natural, tangible, self-perpetuating realness – 
contributes in large part to the gradual yet precise development of Tarkovsky’s 
technique, which includes extensive use of long takes, panning and tracking 
shots as ways of remaining true (or truer at least) to objective temporal rhythm. 
 
Of all the technical precision he exhibits, the long take is without doubt one of 
the most notable Tarkovsky trademarks.39 Through extended shots – whether 
fixed, with tracking, ultra-slow zooms or pans – the image preserves the 
“concrete life and emotional content of the object filmed” (Tarkovsky, 1989, p. 
70). There is a gradual and chronological rise in the use of long takes in 
Tarkovsky’s work. In the first of his seven feature films, Ivan’s Childhood, there 
is just one shot that lasts two minutes, while in Andrei Rublëv shots exceeding 
two and three minutes are frequent. These shot lengths are also commonplace 
in Solaris which features a longer take comprising four minutes. Mirror breaks 
the progression somewhat due to its use of relatively short shots, with just one 
scene that is approximately four minutes in length. But by the time of Stalker, 
the vast majority of shots now exceed two minutes, with many also breaching 
the four minute mark and one particular scene (in the room with the telephone) 
almost reaches seven minutes in duration. Nostalghia has the powerful extended 
take of Gorchakov carrying Domenico’s candle across the pool, which lasts 
eight minutes and forty-five seconds, while The Sacrifice, Tarkovsky’s last film, 
                                               
39 It is also evidently one that is likely to aggravate certain viewers – even those watching with sympathetic 
eyes, as is evidenced by Fredric Jameson’s complaint of Tarkovsky’s “camera and his actors moving if 
anything more slowly than real time itself, with a solemnity quite intolerable to any but the truest [of 
Tarkovsky’s] believers” (1995, p. 92).        
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features a shot in which Alexander plants a tree, which lasts nine minutes and 
twenty-six seconds, becoming the longest in his oeuvre (Johnson & Petrie, 1994, 
pp. 194-195). In all cases, a mimetic relation between subject and object is 
present through which the dominating identificatory practices of subject-
centred cognition are destabilized and dethroned, restoring an irreducibility of 
potentialities within sensible material (what Adorno would refer to as the ‘non-
identical’). Such methods once more call into question the centrality of the 
notions of intersubjectivity and undistorted communication to the Habermasian 
paradigm. The parameters and criteria that determine what qualifies as 
‘communication’ should be extended, not curtailed. Tarkovsky’s mimetic 
method, in rejecting the primacy of subject-subject interaction reinstates the 
primacy of the object, drawing attention to the inadequacies of unreflective 
subjective conceptualization and challenging the underlying assumptions of the 
theory of communicative action.     
 
This critical potential is not only achieved in the sheer duration of the take. It is 
also awakened through the fixity of the camera’s gaze. Indeed, frequently such 
long takes entail not only much planning and commitment before the shot, but 
also a great deal of technical movements and precision during the take. 
Tarkovsky’s camera will often track, and, when it does so, it will sometimes 
also zoom. Meanwhile, in other instances, the camera tracks while 
parallactically circling the focal object, or it may move at such a slow pace as to 
be almost imperceptible, so that only after an extended passage of time do we 
notice the shift in our perspectival position. Returning to the scene from 
Nostalghia in which Gorchakov carries the candle across the pool, it is easy to 
overlook the significant movement of the camera, since its tracking accurately 
mimics or shadows the deliberate movement of the character. In Stalker, where 
we witness the title character’s sepia-tinged dream sequence featuring the 
stream filled with seemingly random objects, the camera slowly but continually 
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draws forward – affecting something like a vertically unfolding cinematic 
tapestry – floating above the water, allowing every piece of material within the 
frame to become eloquent both as an independent object and in constellation 
with those around it. In such long takes, the mimetic method of the director 
aims at remaining as faithful as possible to time inherent in things, or what 
Adorno would refer to as the sedimented history in the object(s).     
 
Another significant technical element of what I am here calling the ‘mimetic 
method’ is editing, for it is in the specific ordering of the individual shots that 
the rhythm, movement and time within each object and shot demands (and 
should receive) due respect and foregrounding. As important as the editing 
process must be, it is – for obvious logistical reasons – subordinate to the 
filming process. Without the latter there would be no need for the former. But 
editing essentially entails, once again, a submission on the part of the subject to 
the preponderance of the object. In this way, the editing process follows the 
inherent structures, flows and rhythms contained in the shot material, and tries 
to assemble them accordingly into an unified whole. This aesthetic unity is 
thereby not strictly imposed upon the material by the artist, but rather results 
more from, and is propelled by, the filmed material itself. Tarkovsky refers to 
precisely this element of editing in the following passage, which is worth 
quoting at some length: 
 
Editing is ultimately no more than the ideal variant of the assembly of the 
shots, necessarily contained within the material that has been put onto the 
roll of film. Editing a picture correctly, competently, means allowing the 
separate scenes and shots to come together spontaneously, for in a sense 
they edit themselves; they join up according to their own intrinsic pattern [. 
. .] In a curious, retroactive process, a self-organising structure takes shape 
during editing because of the distinctive properties given the material 
during shooting. The essential nature of the filmed material comes out in 
the character of the editing (1989, p. 116)   
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Such mimetic forms of editing are in stark contrast to the deliberately 
provocative and disjunctive cuts of, say, Jean-Luc Godard, or the didactic and 
ideologically determined content produced through the techniques associated 
with montage.40 Indeed, Tarkovsky – despite having a general admiration for 
Sergei Eisenstein’s talent and contributions to both the theory and practice of 
the developing medium of film – was hostile towards montage cinema, seeing 
in it a domineering cinematic form through which the artist/director imposes 
his or her will, firstly, on the material (during construction) and, then again, on 
the viewing audience. On Tarkovsky’s account, rapid cuts that juxtapose 
independent shots from divergent contexts in order to create a third moment 
merely serve to rupture any possible “time-pressure” that might exist within a 
shot. The result of such techniques is superficiality and inconsistency that 
pervades the imagery, as each shot is emptied of its original temporal content 
and coerced into a new, unnatural and self-contained form. The editing in 
montage cinema is so subordinated to the ideological position of the author 
that, by the time the film reaches the audience, all that is required is a mere 
decoding of the (unequivocal) meaning of the ‘text’. Meanwhile, in the mimetic 
method, editing proceeds immanently – that is, in accordance with the 
movement of the material itself in each scene – and, instead of being an activity 
that instrumentally serves the will of the author, retains the dialectical 
interaction between the author (subject) and the material (object). In so doing, 
the mimetic technique allows the filmed material to extend beyond the limits of 
the frame, invoking and relating the myriad interconnections between the 
particular shot and what is external to the shot. Technique (as much as 
technology) is in and of itself a neutral phenomenon, that is to say, it can be 
tailored towards furthering the existing forms of subjective domination, or it 
can be deployed mimetically, in a way that restores to the object its subjugated 
                                               
40 Of course, montage was famously vaunted by Walter Benjamin, but interestingly – and somewhat 
surprisingly – Adorno also occasionally referred to montage in a more promising and positive light (for 
example, see TF, p. 203). 
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priority. As an artist whose technique, I would argue, can be seen as ‘mimetic’, 
Tarkovsky would undoubtedly have endorsed Adorno’s claim that “art 
mobilizes technique in an opposite direction than does domination” (AT, p. 70).     
     
3.2  Reality 
 
Siegfried Kracauer argued that the “essential material of ‘aesthetic 
apprehension’ is the physical world, including all that it may suggest to us. We 
cannot hope to embrace reality unless we penetrate its lowest layers” (1997 
[1960], p. 298). Leaving to one side the corporal qualities of Kracauer’s chosen 
verbs ‘embracing’ and ‘penetrating’, there is nonetheless something of this 
materialist aesthetic that rings true in both Adorno’s critical theory and 
Tarkovsky’s films. Despite taking the real world as its guide, realism, in 
Tarkovsky’s work, is not to be confused with the striving for a perfect and 
unambiguous replication of the ‘real world’. It rather relates to the desire to 
assimilate artistic technique to the temporal movements and contours of the 
material in question, allowing the latter to speak in a manner that is non-coercive 
to the utmost extent possible. There is, of course, a risk of lapsing into a kind of 
organicist reductionism here, with so much talk of respecting the innate time 
that is sedimented in each object, and so forth.41 Moreover, the successful 
production of authentic works of art must be more than merely capturing 
reality, ‘as it is’, for this would surely mean that anyone with the requisite 
technology could aptly represent a true likeness of reality on film. Indeed, this 
conclusion would surely reduce the art of film to the function of that most 
ubiquitous of modern-day phenomena, closed-circuit television (CCTV). 
                                               
41 Robert Bird perceptively likens the ruin at Galgano in the finale of Nostalghia to Caspar David Friedrich’s 
Ruin at Eldena, arguing that such imagery betrays the “ubiquitous temptation of romanticism in 
Tarkvosky’s films” (2008, p. 66). In a similar vein, Steven Vogel (1996) is critical of Adorno and 
Horkheimer for what he sees as a lapse into Romanticism with their conception of nature as an 
undifferentiated pure objectivity that is systematically maimed through the ‘progressive’ dialectic of 
enlightenment. Although a popular criticism, it can only be sustained by a reductive and instrumental 
reading of Adorno. My rendering of Adorno’s conception of nature is presented in Chapter IV (§2). 
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Tarkovsky himself acknowledges as much when he writes, “[n]aturalistically 
recorded facts are in themselves utterly inadequate to the creation of the 
cinematic image” (1989, p. 107). There clearly have to be supplements to a mere 
duplication of the material in order to instantiate an authentic aesthetic image. 
We might begin by noting the complex and continuous interaction that occurs 
between the subjective artist (and their utilization of technical means) and the 
objective matter. In other words, there is a double movement – of subject and 
object – at work in the cinematic image. As Bird puts it, the cinema “returns us 
to material reality not by representing it to us, but by forming a space where 
things and human gazes encounter each other as forces of resistance” (2008, p. 
57).     
 
Tarkovsky’s work incorporates this movement in introducing techniques that 
simultaneously attest to the objectivity present in the shot, on the one hand, 
while also enacting the shot’s artifice – its constructedness – on the other. In 
doing so, his films remain faithful to reality precisely by not fetishizing or 
reifying it. The director is not in the business of simply capturing reality, but at 
the same time neither is she at liberty to create absolutely anything ex nihilo. 
Tarkovsky writes, invoking the materialist bent mentioned above, “[o]ne of the 
most important limitations of the cinema, if you like, is the fact that the image 
can only be realised in factual, natural forms of visible and audible life” (1989, 
p. 71). There are, as it were, physiological and physical mechanisms that place 
inherent restrictions upon (and guides for) artistic practice and representation.42 
As Adorno writes, “Artworks derive from the world of things in their 
performed material as in their techniques” (AT, p. 176).  He continues: 
                                               
42 This claim is ostensibly rendered problematic – albeit anachronistically – by the recent and rapid 
progressions in CGI (computer-generated imagery), which make it possible to create images seemingly 
without restriction. However, the results to date, even at their most technically advanced, appear to be 
nothing more than slicker looking forms of cartoon animation. While there could be an argument to be 
made on behalf of animated cinema and social critique, I doubt that it would proceed on the basis of form 
and technique over content.  
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[T]here is nothing in them [artworks] that did not also belong to this world 
and nothing that could be wrenched away from this world at less than the 
price of its death (ibid.) 
 
Again, this is characteristic of the dialectic between artist (subject) and material 
(object): “Construction tears the elements of reality out of their primary context 
and transforms them to the point where they are once again capable of forming 
a unity” (AT, p. 74). The mimesis of the cinematic image, then, is not of a 
Platonic kind. That is to say, the image is not trying to imitate reality. Rather, the 
mimetic movement in film is dual layered: firstly, the subject-as-artist 
subordinates her practice to the preponderance of the object; before, secondly, 
the subject-as-viewer assimilates to the object-as-artwork (more on the latter 
specifically in section 3.4).   
 
This dialectic is played out within the context of some of Tarkovsky’s most 
arresting scenes. These are the scenes that, while adhering to the rhythms of 
their content, also subvert the realness of the objective components. Often 
seamless additions or movements are used to effect dreamlike experiences in 
which time, space and physical laws (for a brief time at least) no longer restrict 
the possibilities of the shot. One example of an infiltration of an ‘outside’ object 
entering the artwork can be observed when a French poster for Tarkovsky’s 
film, Andrei Rublëv, is seen on the interior of the dacha, creating a disjuncture 
that disturbs the narrative identity (in the form of Alexei) by imparting the 
director’s autobiographical content onto the film. Yet, it is the authenticity of 
and mimetic connection between the objects in the shot that extend into these 
overtly artificial elements, creating a continuity and density that compel the 
viewer to follow the contours of the work, rather than become detached as soon 
as any ‘non-natural’ part of an image is discerned. Tarkovsky notes that “[a]ll 
too often film dreams are made into a collection of old-fashioned filmic tricks, 
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and cease to be a phenomenon of life” (1989, p. 30), which is why he refuses to 
give typical cinematic clues or breaks between real and fantasy – such as the 
routine misty-edged frame, visual fades or aural interludes. Given that dreams, 
as semi- or sub-conscious expressions, are so important to the creation of an 
authentic image of character, history, relations, and so on, Tarkovsky shoots 
them according to the same principles as all other scenes. The ‘surreal’ 
moments that people recall from dreams or dreamlike experiences are usually 
not so different from ‘everyday life’ (for want of a better phrase). The eerie 
feelings sometimes associated with dreams are often elicited by the unexpected 
juxtaposition (or constellation) of perfectly routine and comprehensible things. 
In Mirror, there are a number of sequences – some of which are dreams, others 
memories – which remain true to the authenticity and coherence of the film but 
do so while drawing attention to the technical apparatus, the artist’s hand, as it 
were. Sometimes a change in colour is used (usually a switch to black-and-
white or sepia-like tones), but this is not always the case, again frustrating 
existing cinematic formulae or visual cues. At other times, a subtle use of slow 
motion is present, though not always immediately apparent, as in the memory 
scene that shows Maria (the narrator’s mother) and her colleague Lisa hurrying 
along a hallway in the printing factory. There are also moments when 
characters directly address the camera, sometimes silently,43 other times with 
dialogue.44    
 
Another way in which Tarkovsky mediates reality and art is in his depictions of 
dream, memory and fantasy. He regularly makes use of both temporal and 
spatial disjuncture. In Alexei’s first dream sequence in Mirror, the mother is 
seen walking through a room after having washed her hair, as the camera 
                                               
43 For example, the second scene in Nostalghia when, upon hearing the running water, Gorchakov turns his 
head and looks to the camera; see also the shot towards the end of Mirror in which the mother briefly 
smiles and looks into the lens (simultaneously gazing at Alexei – her son, the narrator – but also at we the 
audience). 
44 For example, the monologue delivered by Stalker’s wife in the penultimate scene of Stalker. 
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tracks sideways to show her reflection in the mirror. The camera pans further 
and Maria goes out of frame to the right, but shortly she reappears to the left, 
giving the impression that she exists concurrently in two distinct parts of the 
room. She then approaches the mirror and moves a hand toward its surface. 
The camera pans to the mirror and we now see the hand and image of an old 
lady (played by Tarkovsky’s real-life mother) wearing the same white gown 
and shawl as Maria. Of course, only later do we discover that both women in 
the dream (mirror) sequence are the narrator’s mother, Maria, yet the 
impeccable interrelation and arrangement of form and content in the sequence 
already lends a sense of (at least partial) comprehensibility, even on a first 
viewing. While the overall effect of the shot does not adhere to traditional 
cinematic conventions relating to dream sequences, the shot evokes an 
authentic dreamlike experience. The reality in and of the cinematic image arises 
neither entirely from the filmed objects nor simply from proficient subjective 
technique. Reality, in art, stands at the intersection of the two.   
 
This dialectical understanding of the relation between reality and art perhaps 
also goes some way towards explaining why, in his films that are undoubtedly 
in the general field of ‘science-fiction’ (namely, Solaris and Stalker), Tarkovsky 
refuses the allure of special effects technology. Visually, there are hardly any 
moments that even hint of supplementary effects.45 Indeed, it is only aurally 
where notable innovations are present, particularly in the eerie soundscapes 
provided by Eduard Artemiev, which through their disconcerting textures and 
layers of synthesized noises become an indispensible part of the aesthetic 
whole. Comparing Tarkovsky’s form of science-fiction to the endless streams 
through which the genre appears to us today – what with the ever-increasing 
capabilities of CGI and so forth – one sees in the former an aesthetic 
                                               
45 The depiction of the mysterious ‘ocean’ in Solaris suggests some additional effects but no others come to 
mind. 
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engagement with and reflection upon reality, while in the latter there is little 
beyond mere escapism, whimsy and fantasy. As Miriam Hansen has argued, 
the utopian reach of the mimetic impulse “prefigures the possibility of a 
reconciliation with nature, which includes the inner nature of human beings, 
the body and the unconscious” (1997, p. 90). As such it would be wrong to seek 
either a reinforcement or reproduction of an unreconciled existent, on the one 
hand, or reconciliation through exile, on the other. Tarkovsky’s work effectively 
resists the dual temptations of replication and escapism, in its mimetic method 
and mediation between reality and art.             
       
3.3  Image and Communication 
 
Earlier in the chapter, we considered some of the limitations of a Habermasian 
conception of communication. Here I want to return to this theme, but with a 
greater focus on the relations between image and communication, and art and 
philosophy. Adorno’s theoretical work and Tarkovsky’s filmic work provide 
some complementary insights that challenge some of the core tenets of the 
theory of communicative action. We noted previously the wholesale rejection of 
mimesis that accompanies the paradigm shift in critical theory from 
‘consciousness philosophy’ to ‘linguistic philosophy’. Concomitant with the 
banishment of mimesis is a disciplinary demarcation – or ‘division of labour’ – 
in which art and philosophy (and the languages thereof) are held to be distinct 
and incompatible, two realms that follow their own unique logics and forms of 
rationality. The pragmatic conception of language (and its use) favoured by 
Habermas and his followers tends towards an overly positive understanding of 
the efficacy of conceptualization and communication. Utterances by a speaker 
(subject a) make a number of validity claims and as such can be either accepted, 
rejected, or left undecided, by the receiver (subject b). Consensus is at the heart of 
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discourse; the former acts as both arche and telos of the latter. Thus, we have the 
basis for intersubjectivity.46   
 
With consensus as its goal, communicative action favours language use that is 
clear, precise, transparent and sincere, that is, language aimed towards 
truthfulness. This is promoted and classed as ‘normal’ language use. Such 
‘normal’47 language use, for Habermas, is the primary method through which 
social integration is achieved, and for this reason it ought to be prioritized. The 
centrality of the ‘force of the better argument’ is indicative of the precedence of 
discursive reason (philosophy) within the dominant communicative paradigm. 
Reason in communicative action is rational and enlightening, working in the 
service of freedom and the enhancement of the democratic public sphere and its 
institutions. Thus, so the Habermasian argument concludes, we should resist 
being hoodwinked by Adorno’s persuasive yet totalizing critique of reason and 
have no need to follow his lead unto a dead-end of irrationality and aporetic 
artworks, leaving the substantial achievements of the enlightenment and reason 
behind as so much debris.   
 
Yet, the place of aesthetics in both reaching understanding and developing 
intersubjectivity is far from isolatable. What I want to show in this section is 
that, although art and philosophy may well work with different methods of 
communication and forms of rationality – sensuous in art, conceptual in 
philosophy – they are nonetheless interlinked, inseparably so, and ultimately 
co-constitutive of knowledge and understanding. Therefore, to split them off 
from one another is to render each partial and wanting. 
 
                                               
46 The significance of the phrase ‘intersubjectivity’ to Habermas’ project is perhaps partly a making explicit 
of claims that should already be understood from the term ‘subjectivity’. When Adorno speaks of 
subjectivity the notion always implies co-constitution of and interaction between subjects. In this context, 
then, the ‘inter’ prefix could be said to be superfluous. 
47 Michel Foucault would say ‘normalized’. 
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The following quote is exemplary of the stark demarcation of art, on one side, 
and philosophy, on the other: 
 
Tarkovsky is not a philosopher, but an artist. He writes philosophy 
unusually well for an artist, but his best work remains his art, and it is a 
mistake to confuse the two or to treat them as equal, or to try to bring them 
together to reveal the ‘true’ Tarkovsky (Jones, 2009, p. 264)   
 
Now, I think most people familiar with his films would agree that Tarkovsky’s 
best work is indeed his art. But, even if we disregard the fact that this particular 
artist happened to write rather sophisticatedly on a range of philosophically 
inflected themes, it is still highly misguided to cordon off philosophy and 
aesthetics in such a way. Indeed, such conceptual segregation is precisely what 
occurs in the prevalent forms of culture-industrial production/consumption, 
whereby art – from kitsch to classics – is packaged and prescribed in 
metaphorical ‘culture tablets’ to be regularly consumed to ease psychic disquiet. 
Yet, one thing that authentic artworks carry within them is an impulse towards 
philosophical interpretation: “Artworks [. . .] await their interpretation” (AT, p. 
169); “Aesthetic experience is not genuine experience unless it becomes 
philosophy” (AT, p. 172). An artwork cannot be created with a specific aim in 
mind, say, of satisfying a particular subjective urge or interpretive niche, as it 
were, since this makes of art a mere instrument, destroying its (partial) 
autonomy and integrity in the process. An artwork has no immediate message 
to transmit to an observing meaning-consuming subject. When a work of art 
states an unequivocal or categorical claim it ceases to be art; in such instances, it 
merely reproduces the transparency thesis of discursive reason (in which case 
the artist might as well have written a philosophical treatise and be done with 
it).48 Interpretations, no matter how philosophically adept, will always fail to 
fully capture the aesthetic object. Indeed, awareness of precisely this 
                                               
48 Adorno is emphatic on this point: “Artworks that unfold to contemplation and thought without any 
remainder are not artworks” (AT, p. 161). 
71 
 
inadequacy or incompleteness of conceptualization, thought, and language, is 
one of art’s crucial characteristics, and the persistence of the discursive 
determination of concepts over objects perpetually drives the need for 
aesthetics: “The content [Gehalt] of art does not reduce without remainder into 
the idea, rather, this content is the extrapolation of what is irreducible” (AT, p. 
170).    
 
Tarkovsky’s films consist of complex constellations of images that call forth 
interpretation, and thereby also engage in a form of communication. Of course, 
when I use the term communication in this context, it is not to be read in 
precisely the same form as would be understood in a purely linguistic 
framework, which is to say that whatever communicative elements exist in and 
arise from the films cannot be reduced to mere signification or even 
symbolism.49 Tarkovsky’s mimetic method attests to the sensuous aspects of life, 
subjectivity, objectivity, thought, experience and communication.50 
Communicative interaction between persons is complex and multifaceted. The 
inert concepts deployed in discourse, no matter how transparent and self-
reflexive they may be, cannot properly identify and represent what they 
purport to.51 In this sense, concepts are semantic placeholders that we use while 
continuing our quest towards greater eloquence and expression. Art does not 
step in to ‘fill the gap’, as it were, or to provide the aesthetic yin to philosophy’s 
yang. Yet, art can serve to articulate this very lack, this negative remainder that 
                                               
49 The director’s views on symbolism are too complex to be explored here. Suffice it to say, Tarkovsky 
clearly made use of certain symbolic images in his work, yet he was stringently against reducing shots to 
symbolic interpretations. The latter point probably goes some way towards explaining his more 
hyperbolic dismissals of symbolism in his work: “I had the greatest difficulty in explaining to people that 
there is no hidden, coded meaning in the film, nothing beyond the desire to tell the truth. Often my 
assurances provoked incredulity and even disappointment. Some people evidently wanted more: they 
needed arcane symbols, secret meanings” (Tarkovsky, 1989, p. 133).  
50 Adorno notes this with reference to the “indispensible sensual element of artworks” (AT, p. 177); and 
again, “art, mimesis driven to the point of self-consciousness, is nevertheless bound up with feeling” (AT, 
p. 336).   
51 The recurrent motif of stuttering within Tarkovsky’s work – most notably in Ivan’s Childhood and the 
opening scene of Mirror – could be seen to evoke this ineluctable failure of the speech-act. Even when 
physical impairments dissipate, we remain nevertheless incapable of full articulation. 
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escapes conceptual identification. As such, art both immanently criticizes 
conceptualization while indirectly conceptualizing. Artworks make no direct 
conceptual claims, yet are densely suffused with conceptuality. They are all 
“pervaded by the conceptual” (AT, p. 125). This marks art’s inherently dual 
character, as well as its inextricable links with philosophical thought.  
“Philosophy and art converge in their truth content: The progressive self-
unfolding truth of the artwork is none other than the truth of the philosophical 
concept” (ibid., p. 172).       
 
The place of the cinematic image within this art-philosophy dialectic is 
noteworthy. The image is capable of expressing – or, rather, is capable of 
allowing for the expression of – something that is beyond the subjective 
conceptual grasp. In this way the image remains true to the mimetic 
comportment that problematizes traditional subject-object epistemology, as 
well as the commonplace linguistic formulation of signifier-signified. As 
Miriam Hansen claims: 
 
Mimesis [. . .] does not pertain to the relation between sign and referent; it 
is not a category of representation. Rather, it aims at a mode of subjective 
experience, a preverbal form of cognition, which is rendered objective in 
works of art, summoned up by the density of their construction (1997, p. 
90) 
 
In his precise and dense construction of aesthetic images, Tarkovsky’s use of 
actors is another point worth considering. The actors in his films are – to the 
extent that one would expect an ‘actor’ to perform dialogue – quite insignificant 
in relation to the film as an artistic whole. In fact, the director made a point of 
hiring semi- or even non-professional actors, often on the basis of purely 
physical characteristics rather than auditioning talent as such. Moreover, 
according to a wide range of mutually reinforcing first-hand recollections, 
Tarkovsky offered very little if anything in the way of detailed direction (on 
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voice, wording, emphasis, tone, pace, expression, and so on). Instead, his focus 
was almost exclusively on physical placements, movements, gestures, manners 
and feeling.52 In other words, the construction of the image (and the 
arrangement or sequencing of images) is what makes for a genuine aesthetic 
object, not the outward expressions and pronouncements of its lead characters. 
The coherence of the aesthetic image is what communicates or intimates to the 
viewer, but this connection is indirect. Any illumination arrives via refraction, 
since the image is both determinate and indeterminate. The strength of 
Tarkovsky’s films, as Natasha Synessios argues, is that they give “form, density 
and a particular ‘voice’ to an aspect of life that language is not capable of” 
(2001, p. 49). They are ‘enigmatic’, but they are neither mystical nor obfuscatory, 
for the lawfulness and consistency in each film calls forth and guides 
subsequent interpretation. The latter may indeed be without absolute finality, 
but that is not to say that interpretation can proceed in any old way.53 In this 
somewhat elliptical sense, art interacts with conceptuality to invoke the non-
conceptual. This latter notion chimes with Adorno’s assertion that the 
“cognitive utopia would be to use concepts to unseal the non-conceptual” (ND, 
p. 10). Mimesis, then, rather than being some purely pre-rational or mythical 
residue, an ‘other’ of reason, is instead deeply enmeshed in the dialectic of 
reason and communication. Through the construction of the image, mimesis 
reflects that which cannot be directly communicated but can only be gleaned, as 
it were, through a glass darkly.54 Tarkovsky’s view of the importance of the 
                                               
52 Tarkovsky complains: “Actors are often told to ‘get the meaning across’. And so the actor obediently 
‘carries the meaning’ – and sacrifices the truth of the persona in the process” (1989, p. 155). Alexander 
Kaidanovsky (who played the eponymous Stalker) recounts in an interview that Tarkovsky once told them 
on set: “I don’t need your psychology, your expressiveness [. . .] The actor is part of the composition, like 
the tree, like water” (cited by Johnson & Petrie, 1994, p. 45). 
53 Indeed, there is a risk, in the predominant deconstructive reading tendencies towards ‘play’, of 
advocating wilful misreadings that ignore the real socio-historical content sedimented in the text under 
consideration. In such cases, virtuosity in interpretation trumps the potential for aesthetic truth-content.    
54 This kind of refracted or partial glimpsing of truth is reflected in Tarkovsky’s shots which often depict 
characters, objects and situations through mirrors, windows, sheets of rainfall, puddles, half-memories, 
dreams, and so on. 
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image is given as follows, in terms which seem to reprise certain Adornian 
refrains: 
 
The image is indivisible and elusive, dependent upon our consciousness 
and on the real world which it seeks to embody [. . .] We cannot 
comprehend the totality of the universe, but the poetic [i.e. cinematic] 
image is able to express that totality. The image is an impression of truth, a 
glimpse of the truth permitted to us in our blindness (1989, p. 106)   
 
When the pressure of experience that is linguistically contained within the 
verbal and significative structures of a film reaches its limit, the cinematic 
image is needed to intensify, bring out and give voice to that pressure and 
experience. Tarkovsky’s image opposes the reductive practices of identification 
in language.55 But it does so precisely in order to keep true to the mimetic 
promise inherent in communication. Art retains a language-like character 
through its formal properties and mimetic composition. Amid the space 
between an indecipherable cacophony of meanings and a void of meaning 
altogether, the artwork communicates diversely and enigmatically. The 
artwork’s “enigmatic image is the configuration of mimesis and rationality” 
(AT, p. 168). The textured, complex, dense composition of the image sets forth 
associations and intimations which significative language is simply not capable 
of attaining. What seeps out of linguistic rationality is absorbed and rejuvenated 
by its mimetic dialectical counterpart, which in artistic praxis develops its own 
non-violent forms of communication. 
     
3.4  Reception and Mimesis 
 
Throughout the preceding arguments, I have occasionally alluded to an 
additional level of mimetic activity that occurs in the realm of aesthetic 
                                               
55 There is a memorable scene in Nostalghia where Gorchakov (a poet himself) sets fire to a book of poetry 
(by Arsenii Tarkovsky, no less, the director’s father). The image takes over (mimetic) communicative 
duties from the word.   
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experience. The first level of mimetic comportment exists in the aesthetic-
productive process, that is, the subject-object dialectic that plays out between 
the artist and the ‘raw’ material (for want of a better term). Though this mimetic 
level is unquestioningly paramount in the argument, there is nevertheless a 
second level mimesis which warrants consideration, for without it works of art 
would be in danger of becoming largely irrelevant or dismissed as vacuous 
objects. The second level mimesis occurs in the act of aesthetic reception, the 
point at which a subject (or group of subjects, as is often the case with filmic 
works) encounters the objective artwork and experiences it. Tarkovsky’s 
cinematic works – like any genuine work of art – exceed ostensible meanings 
through their formal construction and coherence. They cannot be approached 
and experienced according to the usual co-ordinates of subjective reasoning and 
conceptual ordering. In the previous section, I noted Tarkovsky’s preference for 
certain actors and acting methods, and with regard to mimetic reception this 
insistence on physicality, visceral energy, and image construction (opposed to 
overt expressiveness, psychology, excessive dialogue, and so on), takes on 
greater significance. The viewer is indirectly, surreptitiously perhaps, provoked 
into interpretive activity, for the refusal of both exterior expressivity and 
conventional clue-giving in the film requires that the viewing subject attempt to 
assimilate to the aesthetic object. The artwork follows its own immanent laws 
and in its objective final state is not pliable to the traditional categories of 
identification:  
 
What is essentially mimetic awaits mimetic comportment. If artworks do 
not make themselves like something else but only like themselves, then 
only those who imitate them understand them (AT, p. 166)  
 
Only through such mimetic comportment can a genuine experience (and a 
move towards understanding) be hoped for. In relation to Tarkovsky’s work, 
Maya Turovskaya notes that “the more the form of the film prevails over the 
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exigencies of plot and narrative structure, the greater the effort required [of the 
audience]” (1989, p. 95). It is as if the film presents itself as a Rubik style puzzle, 
one that has a definite form and can be picked up countless times though with 
no guarantee of approaching a ‘solution’. The puzzle requires of us input and 
activity, yet each time we take up the puzzle its configuration seems to have 
altered, almost as if it has taken on a life of its own quite beyond our repeated 
and laboured attempts to ‘solve’ it. Tarkovsky’s films are saturated with just 
such feelings of puzzlement, wonder56 and enigma. They give rise to a form of 
reception that combines intuitability and interpretation, since neither on its own 
is up to the task of reaching understanding (or knowledge for that matter). 
Neither pure concept nor pure intuition will suffice: “Shorn of its antithesis, 
intuitability would become a fetish [. . .] Because aesthetic appearance cannot be 
reduced to its intuition, the content of artworks cannot be reduced to the 
concept either” (AT, pp. 126-127). Applying our conceptualizing faculties to the 
aesthetic object will fail because the former can never fully capture the formal 
properties and enigmatic content within the latter. At the same time, however, 
attempts to renounce all conceptual work and merely experience the artwork 
intuitively, viscerally even, will be inadequate since the artwork is always 
pervaded by the conceptual, that is to say, it is not wholly intuitable.   
 
Mimesis inheres in Tarkovsky’s films, and the viewer is compelled to assimilate 
to the film, to follow its immanent logic, rhythm, development, abandoning the 
domineering and instrumental form of rationality that pervades the social 
world. In doing so, a dialectical space is opened up between subject and object 
in which the potential truth-content in the film may find its (partial) expression. 
Its truth-content remains partial since art is not in possession of, what Hegel 
would call, the Absolute. Any truth that is sedimented in Tarkovsky’s work is 
shrouded in black. It is not graspable directly, for all art remains semblance 
                                               
56 “A priori, art causes people to wonder” (AT, p. 167). 
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[Schein]. Art is inescapably in and of its social context. Should that context 
prove to be replete with contradictions, falsehoods, ideological structures, and 
so on, then any artwork that claims or invokes total immunity from these 
factors will be an unadulterated illusion (ideology). The necessary semblance of 
art should not be overlooked or papered over, as if its autonomy were pure. 
Rather, its semblance becomes a part of its very composition. Through its very 
semblance it calls all false appearances into question, thereby partly redeeming 
semblance. 
 
Moreover, as we noted earlier, were an artwork to have only one interpretation, 
a single truth or message, it would cease to be art. This is partly why I find 
Tarkovsky’s films to be of greater aesthetic value than those in the tradition of 
montage. The innovative work of montage directors is not without artistic 
merit, but in terms of its relation to mimesis and reception there is a drawback. 
The drawback being that, while montage cinema also displays the kind of 
puzzle-like character of which we have just been considering, the ‘puzzles’ 
within montage films come with in-built limitations and authorial guidelines 
that dictate to the viewer how he or she should ‘solve’ them.57 Stretching the 
puzzle metaphor a bit further still, the montage film perhaps best recalls the 
jigsaw puzzle, in that there are many different parts, cut up into different 
shapes and sizes, but which nonetheless can only come together in one 
particular and coherent final form. Its telos inheres in the method. This brings to 
mind Adorno’s more general criticism of ideologically driven works:  
 
There are artworks in which the artist brought out clearly and simply what 
he wanted, and the result, nothing more than an indication of what the 
                                               
57 In one of Tarkovsky’s stronger denunciations of montage cinema, he writes: “Each of these riddles [in 
montage film] has its own word-for-word solution [. . .] the author proceeds to make a total onslaught on 
the audience, imposing upon them his own attitude to what is happening” (1989, p. 118). There is 
probably a lot to say in favour of such a view, given that the Bolsheviks actively deployed montage films 
as an effective propaganda tool. The Party would surely have been less enthusiastic towards the technique 
were it to open up interpretive possibilities and autonomous thought forms.   
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artist wanted to say, is thereby reduced to an enciphered allegory. The 
work dies as soon as philologists have pumped out of it what the artist 
pumped in (AT, p. 170)   
 
Tarkovsky’s work, in contrast, offers up no singular reading or message. 
Instead, his films call for the subject to follow the self-contained flows of time, 
space and imagery that run through the work as a whole.58 Once set in motion, 
the images and sequences within Tarkovsky’s films appear paratactically like 
connected train carriages, each linked to the ones immediately preceding and 
following, adding in the process greater weight and momentum to the overall 
movement. The suggestiveness of certain opaque motifs that seem to recur in 
different films, in diverse contexts and forms, extends each film beyond its own 
limits, calling forth associations and constellations of images that draw the 
viewer on to the interpretive praxis necessary for genuine aesthetic experience. 
The “intellectual stimulation experienced by the audience [. . .] gives the 
spectator a moment of true co-authorship, awakening the creative instinct” 
(Turovskaya, 1989, p. 99). In Tarkovsky’s case, the finished film will always 
exert a certain level of coercion over its audience. But then, all objects have this 
potential within them, and indeed it is precisely this unknown or 
unquantifiable force of coercion that the subject unduly reacts against through 
the imposition of rigid thought forms and categories. In such instances, it is as if 
the subject-as-spectator becomes an aesthetic sleuth, proudly proclaiming: ‘Aha! 
Yes, that is what this object is. This is what it does. And this is the method by 
which it does so’. The object is reactively submerged beneath a sea of concepts 
and identifications, and is silenced in the process.   
 
In contrast to this suppressive subject-object relation, the mimetic reception 
required of Tarkovsky’s work and other artworks gives back priority to the 
                                               
58 One might recall the importance of temporal flow (rhythm) in the editing process, which, as was noted, 
constitutes a major part of Tarkovsky’s method of achieving an aesthetic totality. 
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object. As the director himself notes, in encountering his films the viewer will 
either sink into the flow of the film itself, assimilating herself to it, or she will 
not, in which case “no contact is made” (Tarkovsky, 1989, p. 120). It is precisely 
the former type of viewing that represents the kind of mimetic reception 
required of aesthetic objects. If any hope for social transformation and a more 
critical self-consciousness is to be found in film (and I will argue throughout 
this thesis that it is), then such an altered state of receptive, aesthetic and 
mimetic subjectivity – assimilating to the object itself rather than delimiting it 
under conceptual schemata – will be a prerequisite of any such change. Along 
such speculative lines, we might yet move some way towards Adorno’s claim, 
to wit: “Contemplation without violence, the source of all the joy of truth, 
presupposes that he who contemplates does not absorb the object into himself: 
a distanced nearness” (MM, §54, pp. 89-90).    
 
SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter, I have attempted to explicate the complex concept of mimesis as 
it appears and develops in Adorno’s critical theory. This was deemed to be of 
importance in response to the stringent attack on mimesis contained within the 
paradigm-shifting critique of Jürgen Habermas. I argued that in the latter’s 
‘communicative turn’, and the concomitant banishment of mimesis as a fruitful 
concept, the possibilities for critical-theoretical projects are reduced and limited. 
The primary form of such limitation was seen to be present in the distinct move 
away from subject-object to subject-subject relations (intersubjectivity). In his 
formulations, Habermas discards that which does not fit in to his construal of 
reason, in the hope of leaving behind what he sees as mystical ‘others’ to 
reason, of which mimesis is exemplary. Yet, as I have tried to show, there is an 
unavoidable non- or pre-conceptual moment to rationality and communication, 
as theorized by Adorno and imparted aesthetically by Tarkovsky in his mimetic 
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method, which bespeaks the inadequacies and necessary failures of 
communicative action. The thesis of the preponderance of the object, which 
highlights the necessity of returning epistemological priority to the object, was 
argued to be of immense significance to Adorno’s critical thinking. Moreover, 
the preponderance argument was also drawn out of my readings of 
Tarkovsky’s filmic works, once more with the aim of refuting the Habermasian 
rendering of mimesis. While Adorno’s work advocates the potential in mimesis 
through its theorization and conceptualization, Tarkovsky’s films aesthetically 
deploy mimetic techniques in order to non-conceptually invoke the same latent 
critical possibility within mimetic comportment. Taken together, a powerful 
and persuasive case is made for the enduring, if not irreducible, pertinence of 
mimesis as an intriguing and illuminating concept.    
Chapter III 
Marginality and Critique in 
Adorno and Haneke 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
At the heart of Adorno’s critical theory, one can sense a disquieting paradox 
relating to the possibilities of resisting the deleterious effects of the present 
social world. This paradox may be summarized as follows: resistance to the 
totally administered world is both absolutely necessary yet utterly impossible. The 
implications of this aporetic notion of resistance are ominous, for they appear to 
induce a boundless sense of despair at not only the state of the social world but 
also our inability to alter it in any significant way. It is as if, to invoke once more 
Benjamin’s infinitely intriguing reading of Klee’s Angelus Novus, we are being 
uncontrollably swept along by the winds of ‘progress’ and, having no say in its 
direction or speed, can only lament and capitulate as the debris left in its wake 
mounts ever higher. Adorno’s apparently aporetic position points toward the 
interrelations between individual subjects and the social objective totality. In 
trying through critical thought to estrange and displace the world as it currently 
stands, we may be afforded glimpses of what freedom and true human 
flourishing could be, via the negation (or negative analysis) of their currently 
distorted forms.  Yet, at the same time, whatever we can presently think or 
imagine will be indelibly coloured, affected and ultimately restricted by the 
extant ‘bad’ reality. Such are the limitations of our socially determined 
consciousnesses. These arguments seem to suggest that while we should 
attempt to resist the societal impositions that bring about and reinforce 
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suffering, the pervasiveness and power of the objective totality is such that, 
however we may try to resist it, we will ultimately fall short and, what is more, 
may unintentionally exacerbate or perpetuate existing failures.   
 
These ostensibly totalizing formulations have, in recent years, brought 
defenders and detractors alike into quarrels over the political, ethical and 
practical potential in and limitations of Adorno’s work. It is fair to say that to 
date the limitations have received more widespread expression and influence. 
My aim here is to help redress the balance by offering a reading of Adorno, in 
constellation with some of the provocative filmic work of Michael Haneke, that 
goes beyond a mere reiteration of the former’s original claims and proposes a 
tentative model of, what I will call, marginal subjectivity. I argue that both 
Adorno and Haneke present existing affluent (Western) societies in 
unremittingly pejorative terms, with seemingly minimal possibility for 
resistance or large-scale social change. However, neither Adorno nor Haneke is 
willing to relinquish their belief in the inextinguishable potential of critical (if 
partial) autonomy amid social domination. The apparent impossibility of 
entirely subsuming human subjectivity sustains the hope that, when sufficiently 
marginal to the existent social order, one can call that order into question and 
perhaps even provoke semi-autonomous responses from other individuals in 
the process. The results of such a process of gradual marginalization cannot be 
predicted in advance, but it is clear that, should the margins become more 
populous, both the legitimacy of the status quo and the brutal foreclosure of the 
future will be severely challenged. 
 
The structure of the chapter will take the following form. In the first section, I 
examine the macro-level critique of Adornian critical theory, and make the case 
for reading both Adorno and Haneke as anti-psychological social critics 
(sections 1.1 and 1.2). This argument precedes a discussion of the apparent 
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absence of a collective revolutionary subject and the implications this has for 
critical social theory (1.3). The second half of the chapter is dedicated to 
developing the idea of a marginal subject. The first of two subsections defends 
the legitimacy of estrangement as part of marginal subjectivity (2.1), while the 
second explores the dialectic of bourgeois coldness and how this functions as a 
crucial catalyst for critique in both Adorno’s social theory and Haneke’s films 
(2.2).      
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1. THE FALSE WHOLE 
 
In this first section, I will explore the radical59 social criticism that is offered in 
both Adorno’s theoretical work and certain of Haneke’s films, since in both 
cases the existing social world is conceptualized in decidedly bleak terms. 
When confronted with Adorno’s vision of late capitalist society60 one finds 
precious little respite. His critical theory at the social (macro) level is resolutely 
Marxian. Theoretically, Adorno undoubtedly follows Marx’s famous call for the 
“ruthless criticism”61 of all that exists. Yet, while the Marxian position was 
always developed within and conceived as part of a progressive linear 
movement through history, culminating in its telos of a utopian communist 
society, Adorno’s position is thoroughly decentred, anti-systematic, non-linear 
and anti-teleological. What is more, his works exhibit an absence of the 
revolutionary optimism and underlying sense of inevitability so prevalent in 
traditional Marxist thought. For Adorno, there is nothing to suggest that things 
might substantively improve in the near future: “no higher form of society is 
concretely visible [. . .] [A]nything that seems in easy reach is regressive” (2001 
[1978], p. 202). This range of factors severely complicates any attempt at 
arriving at a clear or definitive understanding of Adorno’s ‘Marxism’, and, 
moreover, such factors make it difficult to draw out individual concepts as 
being absolutely central or foundational to his overall critique. The latter is so 
because each concept purposively feeds into and out of other concepts, and in a 
(supposedly) non-hierarchical manner.62 Despite these apparent difficulties, 
however, I believe it is possible to discern what is of most relevance in Adorno’s 
                                               
59 ‘Radical’ here should be understood in relation to its original Latin form [radix] (i.e. referring to the very 
roots or fundamental elements of a problem). 
60 For my purposes, I consider our contemporary so-called ‘postmodern’ context to be largely an extension 
of capitalism’s ‘late’ phase. Adorno uses the term ‘late capitalism’ to refer to the monopolistic and 
centralized forms of capitalism that arose towards the end of the nineteenth century and into the 
twentieth. My decision to maintain its use here is primarily to avoid the unnecessary and anachronistic 
juxtaposition of ‘postmodern’ and ‘Adorno’.      
61 This line appears in Marx’s letter of September, 1843, to his friend Arnold Ruge. 
62 A more detailed account of this idea has been explored in the opening chapter on constellations. 
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work for our present purposes, namely, maintaining the necessary macro-level 
critique of late capitalist society, in addition to suggesting potential ‘marginal’ 
responses at the micro-level. Before we can develop an argument for such 
responses, we must first provide an account of the false social world that is, 
according to Adorno, so profoundly damaging and deforming of contemporary 
experience. It will also be possible to consider how such arguments might 
illuminate certain elements of Haneke’s filmic work, and, furthermore, how the 
latter can be interpreted as aesthetically supporting the former.   
 
1.1 Social Theory Contra Psychology 
 
It is my contention that there are some interesting and persuasive parallels 
within the social critiques to be found in both the work of Adorno and Haneke. 
One of the most interesting elements is the apparent eschewal of psychological 
categories and explanations. The point to be made here is not that the discipline 
of psychology is in its entirety without merit or relevance. Rather, inasmuch as 
it refers to and makes routine diagnoses on the basis of what it takes to be 
individual pathologies, psychological explanation remains limited in its scope, 
incapable of moving adequately towards a wider theorization of extant social 
conditions. I claim that both Adorno (through theory) and Haneke (through 
form) offer just such refutations of psychology’s pre-eminence, and call forth a 
more radical and all-encompassing social critique. However, the implications of 
their seemingly totalizing criticisms are such that any counter-position to 
egregious objective forces is significantly endangered. If the social totality is 
genuinely of a kind that forcefully compels individuals without exception to 
bend to meet its demands, then there would appear to be very little in the way 
of prospective resistance or improvement. I will address this apparent practical 
deficit in the second half of this chapter. In the meantime, I will make the case 
for an anti-psychological reading of Adorno and Haneke.   
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Adorno frequently emphasises the total nature of society’s ‘administered’ 
features. He hardly tires of reminding his readers that nobody is immune to or 
exempted from the brutalization and deformation of life. In Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, we are told how, under the ever-extending trawling net of the 
culture industry, “no one can escape”, while in Negative Dialectics one finds that 
“In a state of unfreedom no-one [. . .] has a liberated consciousness” (ND, p. 95). 
But it is within the pages of Minima Moralia where one finds relentless 
variations on the theme of total societal domination. The following examples 
include some of the most remarkable: “All this leaves no individual unmarked” 
(MM, p. 33); “There is no way out of entanglement” (MM, p. 27); “no-one [. . .] 
can escape such degradation” (MM, p. 31); “no-one, without exception, can now 
determine his own life” (MM, p. 37); “the ever more rigid hierarchy that 
encompasses everyone” (ibid.); “In principle everyone, however powerful, is an 
object” (ibid.). Any divergence in the integrative effects of the social totality 
upon a particular individual is, by Adorno’s account, purely a difference in 
degree and not in kind.   
 
The apparent ubiquity of objective forces, working over the heads and behind 
the backs of individual subjects (to paraphrase Ernst Bloch), leads Adorno to 
problematize the much pursued analytical fit between psychology, on the one 
hand, and critical theory, on the other. Psychological explanations – primarily 
deriving from interpretations or creative adaptations of Freud’s work – can be 
seen to supplement a critical social theory when the latter’s (primarily Marxist) 
theoretical tools show explanatory weaknesses, for example, in providing 
adequate reasons as to why people would so act to perpetuate conditions that 
fundamentally work against their own interests.63 To this end, advocates of 
social psychology often argue the case for the value of psychology to the 
                                               
63 This attempt to mediate between critical theory and psychology is most clearly to be found in the work 
of one of Adorno’s Frankfurt colleagues, Erich Fromm, but the mediation is also implicit in the work of 
other members of the Institute (e.g. Herbert Marcuse).  
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classical Marxist categories of base and superstructure. The material base is 
analyzed in terms of fundamental human drives, while the ideological 
superstructure is seen to reinforce or serve the economic realm by way of these 
base-level drives. The foremost of these drives is self-preservation. Since self-
preservation is a perpetual priority for human beings, immutable at its most 
basic level of ensuring one’s ongoing survival, it can be exploited ideologically 
so as to encourage individuals to adapt to existing economic forces in order to 
sustain themselves. Of course, the Adornian criticism of this social-
psychological position is that within a false society, self-preservation will also 
always entail significant elements of self-destruction. The purely instrumental-
rational forms of self-preservation required of capitalist society entail nothing 
less than self-renunciation. The self preserved is merely a deformed version, 
and – as Adorno at his most sombre might add – perhaps so deformed as to be 
hardly worth preserving.      
 
Still, Adorno does not advocate the dichotomous thinking that would posit 
society, on the one hand, and psychology, on the other. Such a position would 
be insufficiently dialectical, and, moreover, would seem to theoretically smooth 
over practical antagonisms by holding each realm in a mutually independent, 
that is, unmediated condition. For Adorno, this “separation of society and 
psyche” is nothing but false consciousness, and holds little hope of uncovering 
the real determinants of human behaviour – both on an individual and social 
scale. The separation of society and psyche “perpetuates conceptually the split 
between the living subject and the objectivity that governs the subjects and yet 
derives from them” (SP1, p. 69). The latter half of this claim reasserts the 
dialectical moment in the critique of psychological explanation. That the social 
totality both governs subjects’ behaviour and derives from subjective behaviour 
indicates the indispensability of psychology to critical theory. There are 
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moments when Adorno concedes the importance of psychological concepts to 
social and political thought, as when he writes: 
 
Without psychology, in which the objective constraints are continually 
internalized anew, it would be impossible to understand how people 
passively accept a state of unchanging destructive irrationality (MTP, p. 
271) 
 
This point attests to the value of psychology for comprehending seemingly 
irrational behaviour patterns. In the very same paragraph, however, he goes on 
to note that such psychological motivations cannot be strictly read as causes. 
Rather, it is more likely the case that such psychological effects merely result 
from and in response to “objective obstacles” (ibid.). Indeed, the very first line 
of the cited passage states, “The objective theory of society, in as much as 
society is an autonomous totality confronting living individuals, has priority 
over psychology” (MTP, p. 270). So, while Adorno unquestionably takes 
influence from Freud and gives much of his scholarly attention to psychological 
concepts – most notably repression, ego-weakness, narcissism and 
internalization – the Frankfurt theorist, I claim, ultimately rejects psychological 
approaches, at least at the level of understanding thoroughly social phenomena. 
For Adorno, the latter should be prioritized theoretically, for in reality they 
hold material precedence.   
 
The refocusing and broadening of this critical perspective seeks to locate the 
failings of existing society at the macro level, and reignite interest in the earlier 
and more far-reaching psychoanalytic aim of bringing the unconscious to 
subjective awareness. This original aim of treatment has, on Adorno’s account, 
been neglected or rather supplanted by the theoretical models proposed by 
social psychologists (such as Erich Fromm and Karen Horney). In the process, 
the more radical premises of Freudian psychoanalysis – the biological 
foundations of psychic suffering, the repressive features of Kultur, the 
89 
 
essentially unruly energies of libido, and so on – are revised in a more openly 
‘progressive’ light, so that the primary function of social psychology and 
psychoanalysis becomes successful (re)integration of individuals into society. 
Such treatments give inadequate attention to social causes and, moreover, are 
morally neutral. The cure is seen to be positive when the individual is able to 
adapt to, fully participate in and enjoy the various offerings of the status quo. 
This rather uncritical position thus lends psychological insight a functionalist 
bent, which is anathema to Adorno’s social critique. As he writes in a note from 
the writing of Dialectic of Enlightenment:  
 
Where psychology has to be called in to explain human beings they are 
already disordered [. . .] To resort to psychology in order to understand 
one’s fellow man is an effrontery (DE, p. 246) 
 
On Adorno’s account, then, critical theory should be wary of resorting to 
psychological explanatory devices, but – given what he concedes elsewhere – 
neither would it be prudent to entirely discount psychological findings, since 
some of these have proven genuinely groundbreaking in terms of 
understanding the motivations and mechanisms underlying individual 
behaviour. Instead, one needs to maintain the preponderance of the object, 
namely, society, and work to uncover the objectively reproducing social forces 
that seemingly demand the problematic responses which psychoanalysis tries 
to treat. As Adorno puts it, the “recurrence or nonrecurrence of fascism in its 
decisive aspect is not a question of psychology, but of society” (EAA, p. 194); 
“All varieties of psychologism that simply take the individual as their point of 
departure are ideological” (SP1, p. 77). Elsewhere, in his critique of Karl 
Mannheim, for instance, Adorno notes how, in the activities carried out under 
the guise of the ‘sociology of knowledge’, the “growth of antagonisms is 
elegantly described as ‘the disproportionate development of human capacities’, 
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as though it were a question of personalities and not of the anonymous 
machinery which does away with the individual” (P, p. 35).64     
 
In relating these arguments to the concept of mimesis (examined in Chapter II), 
one could say that psychoanalysis has long since enabled damaged subjects to 
mimic or assimilate to the reified forms of ‘happiness’,65 ‘success’, ‘living a full 
life’, and the rest, so relentlessly peddled through the sprawling channels of the 
culture industry. Indeed, in the essay ‘Sociology and Psychology’, a 
cantankerous Adorno flatly states that “therapists are frauds” (SP1, p. 78). He 
continues, “In adjusting to the mad whole the cured patient becomes really sick 
– which is not to imply that the uncured are any healthier“ (ibid.). At this 
juncture, one begins to see the true extent of Adorno’s negativism, inasmuch as 
he views the slightest suggestion of happiness or adjustment to the status quo 
as either an unjustifiable compromise or downright delusion. The “cult of 
psychology”, as he puts it, is “the necessary accompaniment to a process of 
dehumanization, the illusion of the helpless that their fate lies in their own 
hands” (ibid., p. 76). Here the potentially affirmative and ideologically 
supportive effects of psychoanalytical practice and theory, to the detriment of a 
more thoroughgoing, radical questioning of society, become evident. The point 
at which critical thought stays faithful to its potential for emancipation is when 
it seeks not to offer false comforts or enforced reconciliation, but instead to 
                                               
64 It is interesting to note a parallel here in relation to how, amid the fallout from the financial crisis of 2008, 
certain individuals were exposed and depicted as ‘evil’, aberrations, high stakes criminals, greedy 
speculators, and so forth. But is not the more salient point that an entire system failed, showing itself to be 
not only unstable and corruptible but wholly unsustainable in any case?  It is overly simplistic to 
characterize individuals (such as Bernie Madoff) as eccentric or excessive, for this forestalls deeper systemic 
analysis of the social and economic conditions that tend toward such crises. Projecting collective 
discontent onto a small number of individuals who merely represent the falsity of a total system is a sure 
way of re-establishing ‘normality’ with minimal disruption. Adorno makes a similar criticism of film 
villains: “Even if [brutal businessmen] were thereby revealed as monstrous characters, their 
monstrousness would still be sanctioned as a quality of individual human beings in a way that would tend 
to obscure the monstrousness of the system whose servile functionaries they are” (2001 [1981], p. 66). 
65 One recalls a series of popular advertisements in the 1980s, which proclaimed proudly: “Happiness is a 
cigar called Hamlet”. In response, one need only consider the complex relations that pertained between 
Freud and his beloved yet destructive cigars in order to appreciate the duplicitous nature of both 
commodity and consumer. 
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bring extant unhappiness to consciousness of itself.66 In so doing, it remains 
possible to refute the (by now) default Fukuyaman position, whereby liberal 
democratic capitalism is seen by many people as, if not the ‘best’ of all 
imaginable political systems, then certainly the ‘least bad’ and therefore only 
feasible option.   
       
1.2 Haneke’s Anti-Psychological Form 
 
Continuing on the anti-psychology theme just elaborated through Adorno’s 
critical theory, in this section, I will argue that few directors’ work so fervently 
resists the use of psychological devices, invocations and motivations than that 
of Michael Haneke. Nearly all of his films indirectly invoke the presence of 
anonymous social forces permeating and deforming contemporary life, in both 
the public and private spheres. In Haneke’s stark vision of the modern-day 
Western world, one feels a collective sense of complicity set amid a consumerist 
hell populated more by commodities than communities, its ‘characters’ 
divested of all but their reified exteriors (truly characters sans character). While 
Haneke’s work takes as its basis specific individuals, as it must do in order to 
become determinate in some way, it also denies these individual characters 
(and us, the film’s spectators) any personal or idiosyncratic features, such as 
one might expect to find in more traditionally constructed narratives. Instead, 
the majority of Haneke’s filmic works seek to give form to the overriding falsity 
and alienation inherent in affluent ‘Western’ societies.  
 
In his first feature film, Der siebente Kontinent (1989), we are presented with a 
collection of fragments that provide snapshots into the repetitive and mundane 
life of a middle-class family (which, as one of Haneke’s trademarks, consists of 
                                               
66 See section 2.2 on the need for conscious unhappiness. 
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mother Anna, father Georg, and their daughter Eva).67 The film is set in Linz, 
Austria, but this is only discernible from the registration plate on the family car, 
which is shown in the opening carwash scene. For the remainder of the film, the 
specific location is rendered purposefully anonymous. The cityscape depicted is 
merely a wash of concrete blocks, shops, the Autobahn, petrol stations, 
checkouts, industrial parks, offices, and so on, all of which bespeak of 
interchangeability and sameness. Indeed, in interviews the director has stated 
that his aim was to show a kind of archetypal consumerist society, rather than 
making a film that is distinctly ‘Austrian’, ‘French’, or whatever, since this 
could allow for simplistic defence-mechanisms to arise, in which the viewer or 
film critic comforts herself with the thought that the critical portrayal of social 
alienation and automatism on screen pertains only to Austria.68 Each scene in 
the film is transitioned by way of black outs, which in traditional film narratives 
usually signify the transpiration of time. In Haneke’s films, by contrast, fade 
outs act as a fragmenting device, replicating the isolated repetitiveness of his 
characters’ lives. Some scenes could have a short space of time separating them, 
while others are clearly taking place concurrently. The temporal differentiation 
that fade outs usually connote is completely subverted. Whether washing up, 
cleaning teeth, tying shoelaces, working, or having sexual intercourse, all 
actions are shown with the same lack of feeling, thought, spontaneity and 
interaction, as if they have merely been objectively designated and functionally 
determined. No matter how much time has passed between scenes, the 
                                               
67 Haneke made a number of television films beforehand, but I refer here to his first theatrically released 
work. 
68 In an interview, Haneke recounts a time when, following a screening of this film at Cannes, a journalist 
asked him: ‘Are things so terrible in Austria? Is that the way it is?’ (Haneke & Porton, 2005). In putting 
forward such a question, the journalist clearly missed the social-critical elements in the film and its 
attempts to widen the context beyond national borders. Elsewhere, Haneke notes that critics and viewers 
are tempted to minimize any disquieting effects of a work by saying that “the auteur who made this film is 
a negative person, he is pathological” (Haneke & Riemer, 2000, pp. 169-170). Similarly, after damning the 
mutilations necessary in order to achieve an “unhampered capacity for happiness”, Adorno complains 
that the critical subject, the consciously unhappy person, “will be told gloatingly by psycho-analysis that it 
is just his Oedipus complex” (MM, §38, p. 63).     
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characters’ activities remain as perfunctory and rote as at any other time, as if 
every day is equally insignificant and wholly interchangeable.     
 
Having established this bleak view of a family’s contemporary existence, one 
might expect to be given more individual information about the characters. Any 
spectator familiar with prevalent cultural trends and narrative devices will be 
immediately tempted to demand a ‘back-story’, some causal explanation to 
address the pressing question, to wit: what has made them so disconnected, 
cold, lifeless and automated?  Yet, at no point during the film does Haneke 
provide any psychological clues as to why the family appear to live in this 
fashion. There is an image that recurs three times in the film, a poster from the 
Australian tourist board showing a picturesque sandy beach. This image 
represents the ‘seventh’ continent, a kind of utopian dream image that presents 
itself as an escape from the existent. As the film continues, we get the 
impression that the family are preparing to emigrate, to search for this ‘utopian’ 
alternative in Australia. The father (an engineer) submits his notice at work, 
while the mother closes their bank account. Georg narrates a letter to his 
parents explaining that they have decided “to leave”. But the form of escape we 
are led to anticipate in the film does not materialize. Instead, what we witness is 
the gradual unfolding and methodical undertaking of a brutal family suicide 
pact. During the last third of the film, we see the father and mother 
systematically offload or destroy all of their possessions – selling the car, 
flushing money down the toilet, cutting up clothes, chopping up furniture, 
smashing the fish tank69 and breaking vinyl records – before each in turn 
(starting with daughter Eva, then Anna, and finally Georg) takes an overdose of 
pills and dies in front of a television screen (their sole remaining possession it 
                                               
69 Haneke notes on the DVD extras that, when the film was screened at Cannes, more people walked out 
during the extended shot of Georg flushing currency down the toilet than at the smashing of the aquarium 
which results in the graphic depiction of a suffocating fish.     
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seems), as the latter shows nothing but ‘snow’70 and emits the discomfiting 
sound of white noise.   
 
The family’s decision to physically remove itself from an unbearable social 
world succumbs to nihilistic despair, in which there is believed to be no 
justifiable alternative, no ‘right’ way of living their false life, to invoke Adorno. 
Their self-annihilation here conforms to the darkest logic of Silenus, namely, 
that best is to have never been born, but, since this is not possible, the next best 
thing would be to die soon. If life were to emphatically attain its own concept, 
that is to say, if life truly ‘lived’,71 then death would be the greatest fear for 
human beings. Yet, the damning criticisms of contemporary life offered by both 
Adorno and Haneke suggest that the difference between experiencing literal 
death, on the one hand, and living death (i.e. reified life), on the other, is rapidly 
diminishing.            
 
Der siebente Kontinent is a disturbing and chilling work that provokes an 
interpretive quest on the part of the viewer for meaning and explanation. One 
of the most routinely used interpretive devices is, of course, that of psychology. If 
we wish to begin to comprehend some ostensibly unfathomable event, then 
surely there must be particular elements in an individual’s psychic constitution 
and personal history that offer up some explanatory leads.72 But, building upon 
the Adornian position I have outlined, psychological elucidation is inadequate 
to the task of social critique. Focusing on individual actions in isolation, 
attempting to provide coherent and diagnostically verifiable motivations for 
                                               
70 ‘Snow’ refers to the black and white electronic noise seen on analogue televisions when no signal is 
received. 
71 Adorno cites Ferdinand Kürnberger in the epigram to Minima Moralia: “Life does not live” (MM, p. 19). 
See also: “Life itself is a lifeless thing” (S, p. 151); “Life has become the ideology of its own absence” (MM, 
p. 190). 
72 In this light, another viewer of Der siebente Kontinent recently asked the director whether he had suffered 
an “unhappy childhood” (Haneke & Porton, 2005), once again resorting to the reductive reassurances of 
psychological explanation. 
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such actions, reduces the critical moments in the film’s representation of the 
social. The form itself helps constitute the work’s content. In this way, 
psychological interpretation is not only insufficient for social critique but is also 
a decidedly limited approach to the aesthetics of film. As Adorno remarks:   
 
The psychologism of aesthetic interpretation easily agrees with the 
philistine view of the artwork as harmoniously quieting antagonisms, a 
dream image of a better life, unconcerned with the misery from which this 
image is wrested (AT, p. 14)   
 
In Haneke’s work, the aim is to bring social contradictions and antagonisms to 
consciousness, without offering any condolences or cursory reconciliations. His 
films stand as “an appeal for a cinema of insistent questions instead of false 
(because too quick) answers, for clarifying distance in place of violating 
closeness, for provocation and dialogue instead of consumption and consensus” 
(Haneke, 1992, p. 89). Haneke’s cinematic form and style is unrelentingly anti-
psychological. There is a telling moment in Funny Games, in which the 
terrorized mother, Anna, asks the two violent intruders, “Why are you doing 
this to us?”  The first boy, Paul, tells of the other’s (Peter’s) history of suffering 
child abuse and drug addiction, before the pair laugh in mockery of such 
psychological explanation, revealing the claims of abuse and addiction to be 
just more fabrications, another part of their sadistic ‘funny games’. Moreover, 
we never discover the real names of the protagonists. They haphazardly adopt 
the names ‘Peter’ and ‘Paul’, but also play around with other monikers (for 
instance, ‘Beavis’ and ‘Butthead’). The critique of psychology is also effectively 
served in Haneke’s rendering of the individual family members in Der siebente 
Kontinent. Their identities are withheld for a considerable time. Indeed, even 
facial recognition is precluded for the film’s opening, where we are instead 
confronted with a range of partially captured limbs, torsos, objects, and so on; 
in other words, everything but the face (only at 11mins 45secs do we first get a 
shot of Eva’s face). There is minimal dialogue throughout the film, which serves 
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not only to highlight the general impossibility of genuine communication in a 
false world, but also to leave the individual characters as essentially 
synecdochal, as substitutable specimens of a universally determined kind of 
‘individual’.73 This recalls Adorno’s critique of identity as the primal form of 
ideology:        
 
The all-powerful principle of identity itself, the abstract interchangeability 
of social tasks, works towards the extinction of their [individuals’] personal 
identities [. . .]  [T]he abstraction implicit in the market system represents 
the domination of the general over the particular, of society over its captive 
membership (S, p. 148)   
 
And, once again, this time with direct reference to film: 
 
In so far as a film only recounts the fate of an individual, even if 
maintaining the most extreme critical awareness, it already succumbs to 
ideology. The case which is presented as one which is still worth 
recounting becomes for all its desperate nature an excuse for the world 
which has produced something so worthy of being related (Adorno, 2001 
[1981], pp. 65-66) 
 
This is not to say that one cannot have any recourse to individual subjects as a 
way of trying to make sense of contemporary society. Indeed, the later parts of 
this chapter would make little sense were this the case. Rather, the more 
plausible method of enquiry can be found most explicitly deployed in Adorno’s 
Minima Moralia, which states its aim as beginning from subjective experience 
and reflections (from ‘damaged life’), and extrapolating to the broader social, 
cultural and anthropological levels. Haneke’s filmic work, too, plays its part in 
representing subjective experiences in a way that abstracts from them to the 
universal social plane, thus extending feelings of complicity and guilt to society 
                                               
73 As a point of interest, Haneke almost always uses variations on the names Georg and Anna for his 
central bourgeois parents, re-establishing the destruction of individuality in a false society. In Code inconnu 
(2000), Le Temps du Loup (2003) and Caché (2005), the main characters take the French variants, Georges and 
Anne; in Benny’s Video (1992), we have again Georg, Anna and Eva – exactly replicating Der siebente 
Kontinent; while in Funny Games (1997), the parents also take the German forms Georg and Anna.   
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as a whole.74  “There is nothing innocuous left” (MM, p. 25). Amid a social 
world of ‘universal fungibility’75 it is no longer possible to sanguinely point to 
singular instances of self-sustenance or full autonomy as evidence of an 
indefatigable and progressive ‘humanity’. Instead, one has to work from and 
through the existing ‘damaged’ forms – subjective and objective, individual and 
social – that are constituted parasitically, or rather symbiotically, since the 
process is not merely one-way. Critique, then, would be charged with reading 
out of individual experiences their socially sedimented character, in other 
words, their objectively determined elements:   
 
[T]he task of criticism must be [. . .] to decipher the general social 
tendencies which are expressed in these [cultural] phenomena and through 
which the most powerful interests realize themselves. Cultural criticism 
must become social physiognomy (P, p. 29)  
 
This method of criticism, I believe, upholds the rejection of micro-psychological 
explanation, and retains that most valuable and endangered social-critical vision, 
the eye that sees in the seemingly mundane or everyday details of life the 
relations between the universal and particular. One might say here that not 
only is the Devil in the detail, but also that the detail, as it were, is in the Devil.   
 
1.3  The Absence of a Collective Subject 
 
The macro-level analysis of the false whole, as presented in the first section of 
the chapter, offers a damning and unrelentingly critical vision of contemporary 
society. As we saw, the objective determinants of individuals’ behaviour are 
such that originally rational goals – such as self-preservation – come to be 
                                               
74 As Mattias Frey argues, the fractured moments (scenes) in Haneke’s 71 Fragmente “remarkable only in 
their unremarkability, form a system that implicates an entire form of society for the crime of one” (Frey, 
2003).   
75 The phrase ‘universal fungibility’ refers to a state of affairs in which no thing or end exists or is pursued 
for its own sake, but rather only for the sake or in the service of something else. In other words, everything 
parasitically ‘lives off’ other things and retains no intrinsic value. As Adorno puts it in Prisms, “all being is 
merely there for something else” (P, p. 20).   
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wholly irrational, as the logic arising out of real material need outlives its 
primary necessity and carries over into the conscious domination (and 
destruction) of nature and the self. Again, in this regard, one can see the 
retention of particular Marxian ideas within Adorno’s social criticism, 
concerned as it is with the means and relations of production, humanity’s 
interactions with nature, commodification, forms of life determining 
consciousness, and so on. Yet, despite its recognizably (if selective) Marxian 
tone, Adorno’s theory parts with Marx on one of the points of central 
importance for critical theory’s hope of revolutionary social change, namely, the 
collective subject. Rather than following the traditional and progressive Marxian 
trajectory of revolution – most thoroughly theorized and supported by Georg 
Lukács – with its immanent collective (class) subject in the form of the 
proletariat, Adorno almost entirely rejects this element of, what might be 
generally termed, ‘Hegelian-Marxism’. In its stead, I argue, he offers a quasi-
Kantian position, founded upon the enhancement of critical self-reflection, 
autonomy and judgement. These claims will be developed in the latter half of 
this chapter, but for now let us better understand why Adorno claims that a 
collective subject is no longer, or at least not currently, a possibility. 
 
By Adorno’s account, the social totality both predominates over individual 
subjects and is objectively unified. While individuals produce and reproduce 
the totality, the latter gains if not an agency then at least a certain objective 
momentum of its own that estranges it from its constituent members. As noted 
before, social forces come to work over the heads of human beings. Society 
precedes the subject. However, the social totality is neither fully coherent nor 
positively cohesive.76 It is shot through with contradictions, tensions, conflicts, 
                                               
76 Adorno maintains the use of the concept of ‘totality’ only for the purposes of negation. To my 
knowledge, he – unlike Lukács for instance – does not invoke the notion of totality in any positive, 
Hegelian manner. For Adorno, the whole is false. For an excellent analysis of ‘totality’ in and after Western 
Marxism, see Jay (1984a). 
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inconsistencies, incommensurabilities, and suchlike – all of which are 
unavoidably reproduced in the thoughts and practices of individuals. Thus, 
somewhat paradoxically, for Adorno, society is not only unifying but is, at the 
same time, fragmenting and atomizing. It is largely such fragmentation and the 
concomitant (enforced) unification – or ‘reconciliation under duress’ [erpresste 
Versöhnung] – that leads Adorno to retract hopes of or calls for an entirely class-
conscious revolt. As social and political conditions alter over time, it is 
untenable to unreflectively assume that a collective historical subject will 
always be lying in wait, easily identifiable, ready to be awakened into true 
consciousness and undertake the revolutionary praxis seen as necessary to 
realize universal emancipation. Such a view would not only instrumentalize 
and subsume a whole range of individuals (who already suffer subsumption 
and instrumentalization under the false whole), but would also hypostatize 
revolutionary conditions, as if one could create a template for revolution that 
need only be grafted on to a given social context.   
 
The point to recall here is that the context in which we find ourselves affects 
both the practical and theoretical possibilities at any given time. Critical theory 
must always reflect upon itself for precisely this reason. One has to accept that 
the collective historical subject is exactly that: historical. It is in this regard that 
one can understand the peculiar sense of melancholic belatedness running 
through Adorno’s critical theory, which must no doubt irk those radical critics 
who like to invoke the Leninist question, ‘what is to be done?’  The oft-cited 
lament in the opening words to Negative Dialectics bespeaks the general tone of 
Adorno’s philosophy and confirms this sense of belatedness: “Philosophy, 
which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was 
missed” (ND, p. 3). The same theme is also repeated and developed elsewhere:  
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The rationality of self-preservation is ultimately doomed to remain 
irrational because the development of a rational collective subject, of a 
unified humanity, failed to materialize – a situation with which, in turn, 
each individual has to contend (SP1, p. 78) 
 
So, the historical contingency of collective possibilities and socio-political 
conditions play a major part in Adorno’s refusal to elaborate a theory of a 
revolutionary collective subject. Yet, in addition to this, there are perhaps even 
stronger reasons for the absence of a collective subject in Adorno’s work. This 
becomes clearer if we recall the considerable influence of Nietzsche, which runs 
through Adorno’s thinking,77 an influence that leads to an unwavering 
suspicion of collectivism and group formation. The fervour with which Adorno 
refutes the ideology of a higher, collective reason is certainly on par with 
anything penned by the author of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Compare, for 
example, the following passages on collectives, madness and irrationality:   
 
Madness is something rare in individuals – but in groups, parties, peoples, 
ages it is the rule (Nietzsche, 1990 [1886], p. 103) 
 
A modicum of madness furnishes collective movements [. . .] with their 
sinister power of attraction (MTP, p. 265)   
 
More comprehensive examples include:  
 
[I]f praxis obscures its own present impossibility with the opiate of 
collectivity, it becomes in its turn ideology [. . .] Weak and fearful people 
feel strong when they hold hands while running. This is the real turning 
point of dialectical reversal into irrationalism. Defended with a hundred 
sophisms, inculcated into adepts with a hundred techniques for exerting 
moral pressure, is the idea that by abandoning one’s own reason and 
judgment one is blessed with a higher, that is, collective reason (MTP, p. 
276)    
 
People who blindly slot themselves into the collective already make 
themselves into something like inert material, extinguish themselves as 
self-determined beings (EAA, p. 198) 
                                               
77 For a decent if preliminary exploration of the Nietzschean heritage in Adorno’s corpus, see Bauer (1999). 
I think it fair to say that the Nietzschean elements in Adorno’s thinking are still in need of greater 
attention. 
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Brecht’s line – that the party has a thousand eyes while the individual has 
but two – is as false as any bromide ever. A dissenter’s exact imagination 
can see more than a thousand eyes peering through the same pink 
spectacles, confusing what they see with universal truth, and regressing 
(ND, p. 46) 
   
Thus, while the Marxist elements in Adorno’s thinking demand wholesale 
transformation at the social level78 and help to bolster his scepticism regarding 
all attempts at piecemeal reform, the Nietzschean – and, for that matter, 
Kantian – elements within his critical theory call for respect and recognition of 
the irreducible particularity of each unique individual and the necessity of using 
one’s own reason (becoming mündig, that is, politically mature). On Adorno’s 
account, any subordination of the individual to a manufactured collective 
would be to engage in precisely the kind of ‘identity-thinking’ that is the 
principle form [Ur-form] of ideology against which a negative dialectics 
attempts to think. Adorno’s challenge to the traditional Marxist position, with 
its understanding of a progressive and revolutionary trajectory, occurs (a) at the 
level of socio-historical embeddedness – the recognition that the contexts in 
which theory and praxis take place cannot be hypostatized and considered 
immutable; and (b) as a result of the violent subordination of individuals to the 
prevailing social totality – a feature of the false whole that needs to be resisted, 
not replicated in collective movements.   
 
This distinct departure from the collectivist revolutionary impulse can be 
tackled in a number of ways. For example, some may want to show that ‘new 
social movements’ have the potential to exert real political pressure and 
resistance, on an international scale, leading to progressive policy changes. This 
approach would try to empirically disprove Adorno’s claims about the alleged 
absence of a collective subject. Yet, there is another (more interesting) 
                                               
78 “No emancipation without that of society” (MM, p. 173). 
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possibility, which instead of refuting Adorno’s arguments would consist in 
trying to reconstruct a theory of resistance through and out of his arguments. 
For the remainder of this chapter, I will attempt to demonstrate that there exist 
marginal subject positions that can offer points of resistance to the false whole 
and help to foster more autonomous forms of thinking and acting. As 
exemplary and provocative, marginal subjectivity makes use of a critical 
proximity to the social order, and as such can shed light on the latter’s failings. 
In making the case, I will explicate some Adornian themes with reference to the 
filmic work of Haneke. 
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2. THEORIZING THE MARGINAL SUBJECT 
 
Having offered a damning critique of contemporary capitalist society and 
rejecting the attempts of psychological theory to provide explanations at an 
appropriately social level, it is important to consider potential responses to the 
‘false whole’, lest we succumb to the prominent caricature of Adorno’s work as 
eschatological and irredeemably pessimistic.79 Elucidating clear guidelines or 
arguments for positions of resistance is certainly nowhere near as 
straightforward as drawing out the radical social criticism that inheres in 
Adorno’s and Haneke’s work, respectively. As Deborah Cook notes with some 
regret, Adorno “appeared to be far more interested in describing the nature of 
domination than in assessing the potential for resistance to it” (1996, pp. 52-53). 
This is undoubtedly the case, not only for Adorno’s critical theory but for 
Haneke’s films as well. On the rare occasions when Adorno drops his guard, as 
it were, and lets slip an allusion to a positive image of one kind or another, it is 
more often than not couched in strategically vague and messianic terminology. 
As such, there is a definite need to actively reconstruct a form of resistive 
potential out of and in response to Adorno’s perceptive yet totalizing social 
theory. To this end, I will here develop a defence of, what I will call, marginal 
subjectivity. The marginal subject position enables a process of estrangement to 
occur between the individual subject and the objective social environment, such 
that critical reflection can take place. To the extent that critical forms of thinking 
and acting are routinely expunged from the social whole, I argue it becomes a 
duty of those individuals who, for a variety of reasons, can be considered 
marginal to existing society to remain as socially (and self-) critical as possible. 
                                               
79 See the following descriptions: “a deepening pessimism” (Jay, 1973, p. 107); “tragic pessimism” 
(Connerton, 1980, p. 119); “bleak pessimism” (Bottomore, 2002, p. 37); “implacable pessimism” (Vogel, 
1996, p. 101); “starkly pessimistic” (Bennett, 2001, p. 3); “Adorno’s gloom” (Agger, 1992, p. 12); “so gloomy 
and pessimistic” (Blühdorn, 2000, p. 80). In all cases, these descriptions precede a critique of Adorno’s 
pessimism as unwarranted, problematic and unhelpful to socio-political practice. I hope to offer something 
of a reconstruction here that will help redress the balance in Adorno’s favour. 
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As this section progresses, I will make the argument with recourse to Adorno’s 
theoretical work and Haneke’s filmic work.       
 
2.1  Marginality and Estrangement 
     
Given the at times exaggerated and totalizing nature of the social critiques 
offered by Adorno and Haneke, in addition to the general absence of belief in 
the potential for collective resistance or agency, it is unsurprising that their 
portrayals of the contemporary world are frequently regarded as overly dark, 
hopeless, bleak and pessimistic. Yet, in my view, there nevertheless remains in 
their work an indefatigable kernel of hope. Such hope, however, is not bound to 
a concretized vision of the future. Rather, it is founded upon the vestiges of 
resistance that remain in the present, despite all attempts to expedite their 
eradication. The decisive transformation of hope has also to do with its 
relocation from a fully class-conscious collective subject to fragmented, 
marginal and individual subjects. To this end, marginal hope grows out of the 
recognition that human subjectivity is incapable of being wholly integrated:   
 
The rigidified institutions, the relations of production, are not Being as 
such, but even in their omnipotence they are man-made and revocable. In 
their relationship to the subjects from which they originate and which they 
enclose, they remain thoroughly antagonistic. Not only does the whole 
demand its own modification in order not to perish, but by virtue of its 
antagonistic essence it is also impossible for it to extort that complete 
identity with human beings that is relished in negative utopias (Adorno, 
1998a, p. 156) 
 
Just as Adorno’s anti-systematic negative dialectics makes the claim that when 
we utilize an abstract concept to subsume and classify a particular there will 
always be a remainder (the non-identical), so, even with the best efforts of the 
culture industry and its concomitant ideology, human subjects are never fully 
identical with their subsumption under the categories imposed upon them 
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through predominant social forces. There is always a subjective excess to 
objective identifications, and such excess can result in critical illuminations. 
However, since social conditions so strongly determine individual subject 
positions, such insights cannot be presumed achievable from the outset. It is not 
as if we can produce a neat set of guidelines which, if followed to the letter, will 
result in universal autonomy. Acknowledging this limitation would seem to 
lead to conflict with the dominant waves of liberal-democratic understanding.   
 
The tenets of liberal-democratic orthodoxy are born of the notion of equality. 
While equality, in abstracto, is without question a laudable notion, in our 
contemporary context, this egalitarian impulse is primarily if not only to be 
found amid a prevalent and crippling relativism, whereby all views are deemed 
‘merely subjective’ and therefore of equal (in)validity.80 Robert Hullot-Kentor 
aptly describes this situation as follows:  
 
Though we insist on having our preferences and consider the freedom to 
like and dislike inherent in democracy, these preferences are limited to the 
judgment itself. Whatever we find to like in an art gallery, we assume 
someone else might, with equal justification, dislike. Conversely, what 
someone else likes, we might just as well, and with equal justification, 
dislike. In the morality of our everyday aesthetics, what is important to us 
is that we have our likes and dislikes, and at any moment be ready to call a 
truce over the objective claim of a distinction in value (2004, p. 182)   
 
                                               
80 One often encounters this relativistic trend within postmodern cultural studies, in which individual 
consumers are regarded as the irrefutable basis upon which to understand and interpret cultural products; 
what they say goes, and external judgement by self-appointed ‘experts’ is considered authoritarian and 
therefore strictly off-limits. While I give due attention to subjective responses to certain cultural objects, 
and, indeed, even invoke the notion of autonomy (clearly a subject-centred concept), here as elsewhere I 
nonetheless retain the primacy of the object in this regard. Autonomy should not be thought of as a strictly 
isolated subjective achievement as such, but rather as a process occurring in the relation between particular 
subjects and objects. Despite the protean creativity of funded researchers and active consumers alike, not 
all cultural objects can be considered equally conducive to the promotion of autonomy. To acknowledge 
qualitative differences in cultural artefacts is hardly elitist. In fact, it is surely essential if genuinely critical 
engagement and judgement is to occur. As Adorno notes, “Where it [insight into culture] finds 
inadequacies it does not ascribe them hastily to the individual and his psychology, which are merely the 
façade of the failure, but instead seeks to derive them from the irreconcilability of the object’s moments” 
(P, p. 31). The primacy of the object reinstates the materialist conditions of thought, and undermines the 
overly imposing (if illusory) powers of the liberal subject.   
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To proffer arguments that run counter to the egalitarian cornerstone of liberal 
doxa is to instantly trigger accusations of ‘elitism’, ‘paternalism’, 
‘authoritarianism’, and suchlike.81 Yet, I claim, unless we can accept that certain 
individuals – by virtue of circumstantial deviations pertaining to proximity, 
opportunity, ability, interests, independence, and so on – are in some crucial 
respects better placed to glean critical insights into an existing social order, 
there can be little hope for any substantive challenge to the status quo. In an 
intrinsically exploitative and unequal social order, to claim that every 
individual has the same degree of freedom, expression, capacities and choice 
would not only be an outright lie (the ‘liberal fiction’ of equality), but would 
also serve to exacerbate extant inequalities by pre-emptively quashing 
dissenting voices. The (at present) unavoidable divergences in subjective 
positions require not only recognition but analysis so as to locate critical and 
resistive potential within the damaged existent. It is at this juncture where the 
concept of marginality becomes central to critique. Let me explain more 
precisely what is meant here by the term ‘marginality’.   
 
In the first instance, marginality relates to an individual’s degree of dependence 
on, entanglement in, and commitment to, an existing social order. As noted 
previously, on Adorno’s account, there is no opting out, as it were, from society. 
The universal prevails over the particular, shaping and (de)forming subjects, 
without exception, in the process: “The choice of a standpoint outside the sway 
of existing society is as fictitious as only the construction of abstract utopias can 
be” (P, p. 30). Yet, in acknowledging universal entanglement and the 
impossibility of escape, one need not succumb to the resigned view that all 
individuals, thoughts, actions, theories and practices are just as entrapped and 
doomed to capitulate within the false whole. When Adorno claims that there 
                                               
81 Adorno, of course, has often enough been confronted with just such accusations, most notably in relation 
to his culture industry thesis. For one of the more forceful critiques along these lines, see Collins (1987).  
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can be no emphatic forms of life – that is, no genuine living as such – within the 
confines of a false society,82 I think it should be understood as a necessary 
guarding against all kinds of ersatz reconciliation, all positive understandings 
of the present state of affairs, any view or behaviour that would (whether 
intentionally or not) dull the critical edge required in facing the horrors of the 
world. As Adorno remarks, “[c]ritical intelligence cannot be equal to this 
challenge [i.e. the increasing reification of the mind] as long as it confines itself 
to self-satisfied contemplation” (P, p. 34). Thought, on account of the 
irreducibility of the non-identical objective excess, inherently reaches beyond 
itself, folding back in on its attempts at conceptualization before reconstituting 
itself and trying again. Thought remains critical by virtue of the recognition of 
its inadequacy: hence, thinking as dynamic process contra static achievement. 
The underlying nature of this reading, then – the claim that there are no longer 
any binding guarantees, ethical or moral, as to the appropriateness of our 
thoughts and actions – is, what we might term, vigilant negativism. Instead of 
proceeding in a strictly teleological manner, seeking out the rational elements 
within the existent, critique must now proceed by way of negation, in other 
words, without a positive telos guiding it.   
 
For such negation to occur, one requires a decidedly critical perspective of that 
which should be negated, of that which ought not to be. The key to achieving 
such a perspective, I argue, is marginality. An individual so fully enmeshed in, 
dependent upon, or subordinated to, socially determined actions is, on my 
view, unlikely to be in a position to critically analyze prevalent social structures 
and objective forces. The same social and political co-ordinates functionally 
integrate those subjects who are entirely embedded within the existent. 
Whether someone is in a position of economic luxury and wishes to continue 
enhancing their wealth, or struggles in relative poverty and must toil for so 
                                               
82 “Wrong life cannot be lived rightly” [Es gibt kein richtiges Leben im falschen] (MM, §18, p. 39). 
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many hours in order to survive, both subject positions are wholly determined 
by the extant order. For differing reasons but with similarly cooperative 
outcomes, each is significantly invested in society as it is. Neither has a 
sufficiently distanced position from which to critically reflect on the social 
world. Yet, at the same time, one can hardly justify leaving the demands of 
critical thinking to individuals who are completely outside of or absolutely 
alien to the false whole. For, in this case, it would be impossible for such 
subjects to adequately know society’s internal mechanisms – its practical 
demands, political horizons, ideological workings, socio-cultural values, mores, 
and so on. Thus, we move from, on the one hand, a position in which there is 
insufficient distance, to, on the other, a position that is too distant. In the 
former, unbreakable entanglement forestalls critique, while, in the latter, 
insufficient connection empties the motivational and epistemological bases for 
critique in the first place. Herein lays the pertinence of the marginal position.   
 
The marginal subject, like Georg Simmel’s ‘Stranger’ (1950 [1908]), is in but not 
entirely of society, neither fully inside nor outside. One can sense elements of 
this conception of marginality in Adorno’s work, when, for instance, he writes 
of the position of the “dialectical critic of culture”, who must “both participate 
in culture and not participate” (P, p. 33). It is not enough merely to approach 
objective phenomena – cultural artefacts, social trends, institutional structures, 
and so forth – as an impartial external observer, as a kind of ‘free-floating 
intellectual’ (to use Mannheim’s phrase). Social scientists have long debated the 
extent to which their practices and theories should follow the model of the 
natural sciences, all the while giving too little attention to the fact that their 
‘object’ of study is not of the same ilk as that of natural science. The ‘social’ is 
both objective and subjective, and the ‘scientist’ herself is also entwined in, not 
merely external to, the social. Stefan Müller-Doohm alludes to this 
embeddedness when he notes that Adorno “did not analyse the universal, that 
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is contemporary society, from the perspective of an observer contemplating it 
from outside, but from within” (2009 [2003], p. 441). I would modify this claim 
slightly, for Adorno was not – and critical subject positions, in my view, can 
never be – entirely ‘within’ the existent society. The critical position is neither 
within nor without, but rather liminal. Let us consider the following well-
known passage from the final aphorism in Minima Moralia:   
 
Perspectives must be fashioned that displace and estrange the world, reveal 
it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as indigent and distorted as it will appear 
one day in the messianic light (MM, §153, p. 247) 
 
This sentence is often cited, but the interpretive focus is ordinarily placed on the 
latter ‘messianic’ part. My interest presently lays more in the necessity of 
estrangement [Verfremdung],83 and how it relates to the notion of marginality. I 
understand estrangement and marginality to be closely interrelated, for both 
require of the individual a certain proximity to the social order – a “distanced 
nearness”, to appropriate an Adornian phrase (MM, p. 90).84 Of course, 
estrangement has important definitional contrasts with strangeness. Mere 
‘strangeness’ is indicative of an entirely new and unknown relation, sensation, 
experience, or whatever, and arises from the very fact that we encounter 
something that is absolutely alien to our current knowledge, memories, social 
norms, values, and so on. Strangeness would be the expected response of an 
individual with no connection to his or her present situation. Estrangement, by 
comparison, is a concept with greater depth and complexity, for it is only 
                                               
83 It is not possible in the space available to go into the arguments over the complex terms ‘Verfremdung’ 
and ‘Entäusserung’. The central distinction, for my purposes here, is that the former (usually rendered as 
‘estrangement’) signifies a state in which once familiar people or objects appear distant, unfamiliar, 
unwelcome, while the latter (usually rendered as ‘alienation’) signals a process through which a genuinely 
constitutive element of something is given up, externalized, torn from its origins – e.g. a person’s labour is 
alienated when it is merely undertaken on someone else’s behalf, as it becomes something determined by 
external controls. Alienation so understood can be said to have little if any positive effects, whereas 
estrangement is clearly more ambiguous and, as I will argue, provides the necessary distance for critical 
reflection.    
84 In contrast to the enforced elimination of distance between subjects, or what Adorno refers to as “false 
nearness” (MM, p. 173).       
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possible within the context of previously established familiarity, affection, 
connection, and – when applied to interpersonal relations – friendship even. A 
marginal subject position allows for the micrological appraisal of everyday 
details, objects, interactions and stimuli that are otherwise routinely 
incorporated into our daily lives and given minimal attention. The marginal 
perspective, as neither wholly faithful nor completely alien to social 
phenomena, contains the possibility of estranging our common, everyday 
surroundings, finding them to be no longer one’s own as such. It is my 
contention that in the work of both Adorno and Haneke one can find examples 
of such marginality and estrangement. In Adorno’s case, of course, the 
marginality exists in large part because of his conditions of exile. Living in exile, 
in a society not one’s own, is perhaps the archetypal form of marginal 
subjectivity, whereby one is neither assimilated nor rejected, but instead lives 
out an interstitial existence. Meanwhile, in Haneke’s case, it is the aesthetic 
object itself that provokes estrangement and attempts to marginalize the 
spectator in the process. Let us now consider this latter claim in more detail.         
 
The majority of Haneke’s films enact a kind of estrangement through which the 
everyday features of contemporary, affluent, consumerist society, so familiar 
and taken-for-granted, become de-familiarized, inhospitable, even hostile. One 
of the ways in which Haneke’s work prompts such estrangement is with the use 
of long takes and repetition. The long take is often understood as giving filmic 
form an objective or realist temporal core, that is to say, a temporal 
verisimilitude that dutifully reproduces the time of the ‘real world’.85 In 
Haneke’s work, by contrast, the long take usually employs a fixed camera 
focusing on mostly familiar actions or scenes (often with no direct narrative 
correlation). The fixity of the formal technique coupled with the repetitious 
                                               
85 One can see this kind of long take usage in the Italian neo-realist work of Michelangelo Antonioni, or, in 
one of the most disturbing examples of recent years, the ‘real-time’ rape scene in Gaspar Noé’s Irreversible 
(2002).   
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nature of the content produces an interpretive excess, that is, an enforced 
perspectival movement on the part of the spectator. When confronted with long 
takes depicting repetitive, banal or static content, one’s intellectual-interpretive 
capacity is accompanied by a reawakened affective investment in both the 
content shown and the form in which it is shown. Such emotional 
(re)engagement – a kind of renewed cathexis – can manifest itself in terms of 
anger, impatience, boredom, confusion, disquiet, delight, humour, or whatever. 
This cognitive-affective connection with the object is essential if one is to move 
from a position of identification to one of estrangement. Identification is the 
predominant manner in which subjects experience familiar behaviours and 
grow accustomed to social surroundings. In Haneke’s debut film, the family’s 
existence is seen as socially productive and functional, yet personally and 
emotionally hollow, calling to mind Adorno’s claim: 
 
The illusory importance and autonomy of private life conceals the fact that 
private life drags on only as an appendage of the social process. Life 
transforms itself into the ideology of reification – a death mask (P, p. 29)   
 
Quite simply, basic functionality within society can be unravelled when 
identification and adaptation are undermined by or replaced with a sense of 
estrangement. This is precisely why the aim of Adorno’s critical theory and 
Haneke’s filmic work is to estrange the familiar, to challenge the uncontested 
ubiquity of routinized identification and activity. In Haneke’s case, the long 
take serves this end effectively by exhausting our automated, that is, socially 
(pre)determined, responses to all-too-familiar phenomena, and instead allowing 
the latter to be seen anew, as unfamiliar or, more precisely, thoroughly de-
familiarized. As Haneke notes, in a criticism of televisual advertising methods, 
the “faster something is shown, the less able you are to perceive it as an object 
occupying a space in physical reality, and the more it becomes something 
seductive” (Sharrett, 2010, p. 586).   
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Consider the opening scene in Der siebente Kontinent, in which we are 
positioned in the back seat of a vehicle as it slowly passes through a carwash. 
The three family members remain silent and passive throughout the shot. We 
only see the backs of their heads as the interior of the (temporarily inescapable) 
vessel darkens. We hear disconcerting rumblings from the technological 
apparatus outside, and sense a degree of claustrophobia. Moreover, the scene 
introduces the synecdochal technique that recurs in the film, whereby, in this 
case, the family’s entrapment in the car (commodity), the warning sign ahead 
that reads ‘Do Not Brake’, the slow yet inexorable forward movement of 
individuals devoid of autonomy, perfunctorily fulfilling preformed actions, all 
serve to indict the objective conditions that bring such phenomena about. A 
perfectly familiar and regular practice – in this instance, passing through an 
automatic carwash – becomes estranged through both Haneke’s formal 
representation and our spectatorial experience of this occurrence amid an 
altered context. The scene is an apt example of the paradoxical notion 
mentioned previously, a ‘distanced nearness’. The view is distanced inasmuch 
as it is reproduced (and consumed) in a cinematic format, thus displacing the 
action from its original context (a petrol station or garage). Yet, at the same 
time, the perspective could not be closer, to the extent that the camera takes us 
inside the central object of the shot. We become one of the inhabitants of the car, 
and, of course, in terms of what the car can be said to symbolize, namely, 
society, we genuinely are its co-inhabitants and co-creators.   
 
Der siebente Kontinent covers three separate days in the family’s life – one day 
out of each year, for three years. On each day, Haneke frames the same rote 
behaviours, the morning ‘rituals’, in the same fragmented form, refusing to give 
precedence to the individual subjects. Instead, he obscures their faces and, as a 
result, the viewer is charged with reflecting on the everyday occurrences on 
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screen, in other words, the actions over the actors. Through the dual techniques 
of repetition and duration we become increasingly estranged from once familiar 
phenomena. Our taken-for-granted vision is altered, or perhaps even 
hampered.86 But such a transformed way of seeing is a prerequisite for adopting a 
critical attitude towards what confronts and engulfs us on a daily basis.87 The 
marginal position is one that is not (yet) entirely functionally integrated into the 
existent. In both Adorno’s theory and Haneke’s film, I believe, one finds such 
marginality put in service of radical social critique, and as a way of provoking a 
greater degree of estrangement between individual subjects and their objective 
social environment.   
   
2.2 Conscious Unhappiness: The Dialectic of ‘Bourgeois Coldness’ 
 
An essential and related element of marginality is that of conscious 
unhappiness, or, put another way, the overt foregrounding, as opposed to 
covert repression, of extant unhappiness. The marginal position, in which a 
subject is neither fully inside nor outside society, provides the capacity to both 
recognize and intimately know the ‘happiness’ that is socially produced and 
promoted, while retaining enough distance to be genuinely critical of such 
forms of happiness and challenge the latter’s value and validity. Arising out of 
this ultra-critical perspective on happiness is dissatisfaction and negation. 
Given the dispiriting state of affairs at the societal level (as analyzed in the first 
half of this chapter), it would be not only irrational but immoral to willingly 
                                               
86 “The splinter in your eye is the best magnifying glass” (MM, §29, p. 50). 
87 Der siebente Kontinent was actually based upon a report Haneke read in an Austrian newspaper, telling of 
how a family opted for collective suicide rather than continuing with their alienated, administered life. 
Relatives of the deceased could not comprehend how such a comfortable bourgeois family – living in a 
nice home, with decent jobs, financial security, and so on – could choose to take their own lives. Indeed, 
such was the relatives’ disbelief that they refused to accept the validity of the suicide note and demanded 
a full police investigation. This level of denial reinforces the necessity and critical value of a degree of 
estrangement and marginality. Over-identification with what envelops us, day in, day out, diminishes our 
capacities for making judgements and thinking autonomously.         
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integrate oneself into a radically bad social order.88 The remaining aim, then, is 
to resist – as much as is possible given the divergences of subject positions – the 
ersatz comforts of cathartic consumerism, and in the process refuse the tacit 
demands for universal adaptation. Adorno alludes to this notion of marginal 
resistance, when he offers the following prescriptive advice: 
 
The only responsible course is to deny oneself the ideological misuse of 
one’s own existence, and for the rest to conduct oneself in private as 
modestly, unobtrusively and unpretentiously as is required, no longer by 
good upbringing, but by the shame of still having air to breathe, in hell 
(MM, §6, pp. 27-28)           
 
Maintaining this position at all times would seem to require the utmost 
austerity, a wholesale denial of falsified happiness and recognition of the lie 
that holds happiness to be genuinely attainable amid objective unhappiness, as 
if happiness were a purely individual phenomenon, something that does not 
depend in any way upon social factors for its realization. There is a temptation 
when interpreting Adorno’s work to attribute to it an ethic of care, or of love, 
that serves as a form of opposition to the predominant indifference and 
coldness of the social totality.89 Yet, I claim that such arguments are too hastily 
injecting a degree of positivity into Adorno’s theory that is insufficiently 
dialectical and, furthermore, presupposes a subjective position too far removed 
from the existent society. My argument here is that, rather than holding fast to 
positive conceptions of love, warmth, solidarity, and so on, Adorno and Haneke 
instead work within and through the dialectic of bourgeois coldness. This builds 
upon the preceding understanding of universal entanglement and marginality, 
inasmuch as while every individual is, to some degree, determined by social 
forces, there are yet varying ways in which the coldness that permeates society 
                                               
88 In this way, a marginal position can be said to follow Adorno’s advocating of social negation in contrast 
to the positive Hegelian form of social affirmation (see Geuss, 1998).  
89 Bernstein’s monumental effort to reconstruct an ethical theory out of Adorno’s thought is primarily 
centred round the notion of an ethic of care (see Bernstein, 2001). 
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finds its way into individual subjects. Coldness may not be avoidable, but it can 
surely take different forms and responses depending on individual subject 
positions.   
 
Those familiar with the intellectual history of Marxist social and political theory 
might feel justified in expecting from Adorno’s damning and totalizing social 
critique an equally unambiguous condemnation of all things ‘bourgeois’. Marx, 
probably more than any thinker before or since, deployed the ‘bourgeois’ 
adjectival tag with such regularity and pejorative ferocity as to leave one in no 
doubt over which class was to be held solely responsible for the deplorable 
failings of the status quo.90 In Adorno, by contrast, there is a deep ambiguity at 
the core of his understanding and use of the term ‘bourgeois’. In place of 
wholesale dismissal, one finds a more nuanced dialectic at work. For Adorno, 
the bourgeois subject is not solely mythical, since its ideological constituents are 
born out of a genuine promise of freedom and autonomy (Wohlfarth, 1979, p. 
975). The afterlife of bourgeois values is dialectical, inasmuch as it represents 
both possibility and risk. Its possibility lies in the unrealized potential of the 
original concepts – autonomy, freedom, free and fair exchange – which, even 
amid their current ideologically determined context, retain some truth-content. 
Indeed, in my view, despite the catastrophic course taken by world history, 
Adorno retains a (qualified) belief and hope in these bourgeois concepts. Yet, at 
the same time, since such concepts and values are inherently progressive and 
tend toward their own universalization, there is always the danger that one 
lapses into reaffirming the mythical status of bourgeois values, that is, the idea 
                                               
90 To illustrate this point, here are some examples taken from a range of Marx’s writings spanning nearly 
half a century. In all cases, the connotation is unequivocally derogatory: “it is man as a bourgeois and not 
man as a citizen who is considered the true and authentic man” (1978 [1843], p. 43); “bourgeois economists” 
(1978 [1846], p. 140); “bourgeois thoughts” (ibid., p. 141); “bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors” 
(1978 [1867], p. 302); “bourgeois intellect” (ibid., p. 327; p. 370); ”his usual unerring bourgeois instinct” 
(ibid., p. 426, n5); “bourgeois democracy” (1978 [1879], p. 550); “respectable ‘bourgeois behaviour’” (ibid.); 
“chock-full of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideas” (ibid., p. 554); “this favourite bourgeois phrase” (1978 
[1891], p. 216).  
116 
 
that they are, in fact, already fully present and have been achieved. Despite 
these dangers, Adorno clings to what he sees as the vestigial potential within 
the bourgeois self as one of the few, if not only, viable (if still inadequate) 
responses to a radically evil social world. The point, then, is not to throw out 
these concepts and categories in toto, but instead to use them against their 
currently instantiated and alienated forms. In so doing, one can highlight the 
discrepancy between, on the one hand, what the concept attempts to represent, 
and, on the other, how these concepts are in fact materially and socially 
realized, and distorted in the process. My argument here is that, given the 
falsity, or at the least inappropriateness, of existing instances of solidarity, co-
operation, love, warmth, freedom, autonomy, and so forth, the marginal subject 
need approach such phenomena with a coldly critical, negative, eye. On my 
reading, both Adorno (through his theoretical work) and Haneke (through his 
formal technique) work in and through the dialectic of bourgeois coldness, so as 
to bring to light the failings of the current society and to provoke more marginal 
and semi-autonomous responses in individuals.         
 
In Negative Dialectics, Adorno writes critically of coldness, referring to it as “the 
basic principle of bourgeois subjectivity, without which there could have been 
no Auschwitz” (ND, p. 363). Bourgeois coldness is characterised by 
indifference,91 a distinct lack of empathy and care for all but those select few 
with whom we have familial or close relations. Adorno’s claims about the 
fostering of indifference in the rise of fascism also extend to the post-war 
situation in liberal-democratic societies. Indeed, one can clearly witness a 
rehabilitated ideology of coldness and indifference re-emerging with a 
vengeance through the Thatcher and Reagan administrations of the 1980s in the 
UK and USA, respectively. The understanding of ‘society’ as some kind of 
                                               
91 “The coldness of the societal monad, the isolated competitor, was the precondition, as indifference to the 
fate of others, for the fact that only very few people reacted [to the rise of fascism]” (EAA, p. 201). 
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dangerous fiction that acts as an excuse for workshy, non-productive 
individuals, became (and, to a large extent, is reappearing today)92 de rigueur. 
Yet, amid precisely this asocial and atomized existence, the enveloping “glacial 
atmosphere” of the present (MM, p. 30), the marginal subject retains the 
potential to ingest and utilize this socially obligatory coldness towards more 
critical and autonomous ends. The very form of coldness that was, on Adorno’s 
account, the fundamental principle of bourgeois subjectivity and instrumental 
in supporting the barbarism of Nazism, is now, paradoxically, a prerequisite for 
adequately resisting and criticizing the existing forms of liberal social reform, 
ersatz satisfactions, emotional investment in commodities, counterfeit 
happiness, and all adjustments to the status quo: “the very movement of 
withdrawal bears features of what it negates. It is forced to develop a coldness 
indistinguishable from that of the bourgeois” (MM, p. 26). And, again:   
 
Whoever imagines that as a product of this society he is free of the 
bourgeois coldness harbours illusions about himself as much as about the 
world; without such coldness one could not live (MTP, p. 274) 
 
Maintaining an appropriate (marginal) distance from society demands that one 
reject ostensibly positive elements within the false whole. In this regard, one 
might think of the growth of specialized charitable organizations, ‘fair trade’ or 
‘ethical’ consumerism, the existence of ‘new social movements’, amendments to 
enhance working conditions and wages, as well as improvements to ecological 
policies both nationally and internationally. While it would be morally dubious 
to object to such developments given the extent to which they serve as at least 
some form of progressive counterweight to prevailing inequalities, it is 
nonetheless imperative to retain that rigorous coldness of critique, an 
                                               
92 The present Liberal Democrat-Conservative coalition government in the UK has recently made much of 
the idea of ‘big society’. Yet, being primarily a Conservative-led cabinet, what this equates to is seldom 
different from the coldness and indifference under discussion – the idea being that individuals and 
families should be allowed to take care of their own, without interference from the state, institutions or 
other people. Social forces and practices remain, as usual, unchallenged and unchanged.    
118 
 
indefatigable capacity for negation, which steadfastly refuses to submit to the 
momentum of the existent. No matter how correct it may be to feel compassion 
for those who suffer under present conditions and as a result offer support for 
particularistic responses aimed at addressing concrete instances of suffering, it 
is precisely the particularistic nature of such actions that render them 
inadequate. The paradoxical nature of charitable money-raising campaigns is 
that, in the main, they employ evocative imagery of individuals, thereby 
humanizing a systemic problem requiring a systemic solution.   
 
[T]here is an aspect of compassion which conflicts with justice [. . .] It 
confirms the rule of inhumanity by the exception which it practices. By 
reserving the cancellation of injustice to fortuitous love of one’s neighbour, 
compassion accepts that the law of universal alienation – which it would 
mitigate – is unalterable (DE, pp. 102-103) 
 
On this account, coldness would appear to be the antithesis of compassion 
culminating in a lack of affective connection to and with concrete particulars, 
both subjects and objects alike. Initially, this critique of compassion strikes the 
reader as somewhat jarring, for is it not precisely this process of abstraction, of 
subsuming particularity under the universal, that occurs in the primordial form 
of ideology, namely, identity-thinking? How then, one might reasonably 
wonder, can coldness be anything other than a reinforcement of indifferent 
abstraction?   
 
As I alluded to previously, while coldness permeates all of society and is 
thereby, to all intents and purposes, unavoidable, it is nevertheless enacted and 
assimilated by individuals in varying ways, dependent upon their degree of 
(partial) autonomy or independence. The marginal subject – as one who clings 
to at least a modicum of independence by way of not being fully absorbed into 
the false whole – can utilize coldness so as to negate piecemeal reforms and 
particularistic, charitable practices that merely result in strengthening the very 
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structures and institutions that bring about the need for such charitable 
interventions in the first place. Coldness in this regard is not strictly antithetical 
to compassion, love, and happiness, but instead is placed squarely in the service 
of negating that which falsely claims to stand for compassion, love, and 
happiness. The negation, then, far from being the philosophical dead-end of a 
resigned, pessimistic Weltanschauung, is in reality the more open and optimistic 
position, since it refuses to recalibrate its co-ordinates to the limited purview of 
the present.93 Adorno offers support for this reading in the following passage: 
 
He who is not malign does not live serenely but with a peculiarly chaste 
hardness and intolerance. Lacking appropriate objects, his love can scarcely 
express itself except by hatred for the inappropriate, in which admittedly 
he comes to resemble what he hates. The bourgeois, however, is tolerant. 
His love of people as they are stems from his hatred of what they might be 
(MM, p. 25)       
 
The provocative language deployed here – tolerance and intolerance, love and 
hate – bespeaks a certain kind of coldness, detachment even, but it surely 
cannot be cast as the language of indifference. Rather, one senses both the 
inescapability of coldness and the possibility of its dialectical overcoming 
[aufhebung] which would bring coldness to full “consciousness of itself, of the 
reasons why it arose” (EAA, p. 202). Turning the socially demanded coldness 
against itself and against the placations of false warmth – this is one of the 
primary tasks for the marginal subject.94 Not to posit love and happiness as 
indissoluble human qualities that live on in spite of the enveloping glacial 
atmosphere, but instead to take up the unavoidable coldness within and use it 
to shatter the illusory forms of love and happiness routinely and forcefully 
                                               
93 In an interview, Haneke offers a similarly scathing attack on those individuals who would merely settle 
with and adjust to the existing horizons of experience, rather than negate them: “The people who make 
entertainment movies are the pessimists; the optimist tries to shake people out of their apathy” (Haneke & 
Horton, 1998).   
94 In this way, one might think of coldness as a pharmakon, that is, as potentially both poison and antidote. 
Jacques Derrida made much of this definitional complexity in his seminal if somewhat protracted essay, 
‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ (see Derrida, 1981).      
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marketed to each and every individual. The most prevalent ideological 
commandments today perpetually implore us to smile more, to be happy, to 
love and care for one another, and so on, all of which, of course, can 
conveniently be achieved through the purchase and exchange of commodities. 
The marginal subject resists, as much as her position of relative autonomy will 
allow, the unremitting pull of present society’s injunctions to enjoy and relax. In 
pursuing such a resistive stance, one critically (re)uses this pervasive coldness, 
initially demanded for survival but now necessary for the sake of rejecting the 
ersatz comforts offered by consumerism and capitalist exchange relations. 
Adorno remarks of Freud that he “makes himself as hard as the petrified 
relations, in order to break them” (cited in Jarvis, 1998, p. 81). This is indicative 
of the dialectical movement of bourgeois coldness that is, in my view, central to 
an understanding of what constitutes a marginal subject, and helps to ensure 
the latter’s vestigial autonomy and critical distance from the status quo.   
 
The foregoing arguments provide the theoretical basis for what I am defending 
as the marginal subject position. However, I want also to consider how 
Haneke’s filmic work, in my reading at least, contributes to the dialectic of 
bourgeois coldness and promotes a marginalization of the spectating subject in 
the process. As in the case of Adorno’s critical positioning, Haneke’s films, in 
both their form and the spectatorial act of viewing, contribute to a similarly 
marginal, semi-autonomous perspective.     
 
Conventional film techniques and narrative devices tend towards affirmative 
relations between the viewer and reality (the reality of the world within and 
without the cinematic frame). Stories, characters, episodes, and so on, for the 
most part, are tidily explicable within the already established and ceaselessly 
reproduced interpretive frameworks. There are few film works that resist the 
temptation to ultimately return to the spectator a sense of affirmation, whether 
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this is achieved by inducing a warm glow of recognition and identification with 
straightforward characters (x is the ‘good guy’, y is ‘evil’), or with an 
emotionally stabilizing ‘payoff’ to compensate for any disturbances incurred 
along the way as if by some kind of cunning of cinematic reason. Haneke’s 
work is unique – and uniquely Adornian – in its outright negativism, that is, its 
rejection of any move towards positive reassurance, closure, adjustment or 
spectatorial placation. On my reading, Haneke replicates in film what Adorno 
attempts in theory, namely, the dialectical aufhebung of bourgeois coldness. 
 
The inescapable coldness permeating society feeds into Haneke’s work and can 
be discerned in both its content and form. In terms of content, the majority of 
his films depict characters almost entirely devoid of emotional capacities and 
interpersonal connections, save those that are painful and (psychologically 
speaking) undesirable. Haneke’s first three feature films are often understood 
as constituting an ‘emotional glaciation trilogy’ [emotionale Vergletscherung 
Trilogie], since thematically they share much in common: among these themes 
are alienation and coldness between people; the increasing televisual mediation 
or virtualization of the world and the loss of ‘reality’; narcissism; consumerism; 
and violence (and the representation thereof). Aside from the more blatant 
portrayals of cold indifference, usually culminating in acts of senseless 
violence,95 there are many scenes in Haneke’s work that seem to consume and 
(re)present the glacial atmosphere of contemporary society as it feeds into 
particular micrological situations. One thinks here of the perfunctory and 
soulless sex scene (Der siebente Kontinent), the extended and mutually resentful 
telephone conversation between an elderly man and his daughter (71 
Fragmente), the casual disregard that a couple seeking to adopt display in their 
choice of child (71 Fragmente), the cold calculation of Benny’s father whose 
                                               
95 For example, Benny’s murder of the girl in Benny’s Video; the two sadistic intruders in Funny Games; the 
disaffected student’s random and unexplained shooting spree in a bank at the end of 71 Fragmente; and, of 
course, the systematic self-annihilation of the family at the climax of Der siebente Kontinent.    
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primary concerns are career-preservation and how best to dispose of the 
murdered girl’s body (Benny’s Video), and, finally, the foreboding scene on the 
Metro where Anne is accosted and harassed by two youths before failing to 
acknowledge the one person on board who actually came to her aid and 
intervened (Code inconnu). Such provocative and memorable scenes testify to 
Haneke’s concern with the unremitting coldness of existing society and the 
centrality of this theme within his filmic content. Yet, these examples appear to 
be somewhat undialectical or one-sided in their representation of coldness. In 
such scenes, there is little suggestion that coldness may include in its own 
counteragent. In light of this (possible) dialectical deficit, let us take a more 
detailed look at another example from Haneke’s oeuvre, which indirectly 
bespeaks of coldness.   
 
In one of the scenes in 71 Fragmente, when a man breaks the otherwise silent 
and sterile occasion of a married couple’s dinner by saying to his wife (just 
before sipping his beer), “I love you”, she responds by asking if he is drunk, 
since he is not the kind of person to just say such words. She goes on to ask, 
“So, what do you want?”  The husband admits he thought “it might help”.  
“Help with what?” the wife replies, and with this the husband lashes out with a 
single sharp slap to his wife’s face. She slightly rises from her chair and 
considers walking away from the table, but shortly retakes her seat. After they 
have both silently processed the initial shock of the situation, the wife lovingly 
touches her husband’s arm, and within half a minute they resume eating dinner 
as before, as if nothing had happened. Both characters in this unsettling scene 
are shown as being utterly incapable of love. The man’s words are delivered 
with reluctance and resignation, as if being uttered by someone under the 
command of external forces or a ventriloquist, while the wife’s unrelenting 
suspicion and cynicism speaks of the coldness that counteracts the capacity to 
love. Yet, were she to accept such inadequate and inauthentic expressions of 
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love, or were she even to acknowledge the very possibility of genuinely loving 
in the present time, her coldness would cease to hold any critical potential for 
its self-overcoming. In “erecting truth directly amid general untruth”, the idea 
of love, here and now, deforms and betrays truth and subsumes it within the 
false whole (MM, §110, p. 172). In making do with a partial and paltry form of 
love, the wife would indirectly affirm the existent – an existent that should be 
rigorously negated. Somewhat paradoxically, then, the wife’s cold response to 
the man’s strained attempts at loving expressiveness is ultimately the socially 
critical and necessary one, that is, the one that calls the false proclamation of 
love by its name and thereby resists its placating and affirming allure.   
 
Adorno writes of the entanglement between the injunctions to love and the 
imposition of coldness, in the following passage: 
 
The exhortation to love – even in its imperative form, that one should do it – 
is itself part of the ideology coldness perpetuates. It bears the compulsive, 
oppressive quality that counteracts the ability to love. The first thing 
therefore is to bring coldness to the consciousness of itself, of the reasons 
why it arose (EAA, p. 202)   
 
This passage recalls the old Kantian argument, to wit, ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. That 
one should love presupposes that the subjective capacity to love is already 
present, and is simply awaiting actualization. The more critical and marginal 
perspectives – which, in my view, both Adorno and Haneke adopt – are those 
which challenge the notion that love today is even experientially possible. As 
such, coldness should not be hastily repressed or therapeutically reduced, but 
instead, given its capacity to provoke critical insights into the false whole by 
refusing the comforts associated with adaptation, coldness should be more 
fully, internally and dialectically understood and worked through rather than 
against. In this regard, one may think of the ‘shudder’ [das Schauder] as 
simultaneously an internal (negative) sensation of coldness and the recognition 
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of external, objective, lived coldness. In Haneke’s films, there are numerous 
images and events that elicit a visceral response on the part of the spectator akin 
to the mimetic shudder, that undeniable and unsettling corporeal ‘flinch’ in 
recognition of something that ought not to be.96 Of course, in the non-aesthetic 
contexts of our daily lives, we physically shudder when an unexpected or 
sharply increased feeling of coldness occurs, or upon hearing particularly loud, 
piercing or unpleasant sounds that jolt us. Yet, the very persistence of the 
possibility of experiencing the shudder is enough to signal that human 
subjectivity has not been entirely nullified or functionally incorporated into the 
dominant social structures. Socially prescribed coldness does not move mono-
directionally.       
 
The emotional coldness depicted in Haneke’s bleak content is reproduced in the 
formal setup of his shots, many of which employ a static camera position, 
perhaps suggesting an indifferent and passive observer.97 Yet, paradoxically, or 
rather dialectically, precisely this coldness in form promotes the vestigial 
autonomy and humanity missing from so much of life as shown in the film’s 
content. Utilizing well placed edits and predictable types of point-of-view shot 
may well aid the mainstream spectator’s comprehension of the content, but at 
the same time this concession to convention will diminish the impact and 
critical potential of the film image and its formal representation, not to mention 
the audience’s level of participation in its interpretation. Haneke himself speaks 
of this excessive possibility within form, when he states: “All important 
artworks, especially those concerned with the darker side of experience, despite 
                                               
96 “The cinema has tended to offer closure on such topics and to send people home rather comforted and 
pacified. My objective is to unsettle the viewer and to take away any consolation or self-satisfaction” 
(Sharrett, 2010, p. 587). 
97 This fixity is replicated elsewhere, most notably perhaps in Majid’s graphic suicide in front of Georges in 
Caché. The camera’s position and distance is coldly maintained throughout the scene despite the 
emotionally and visually disturbing power of the imagery. This is likely the most explicitly violent scene 
in Haneke’s corpus. Indeed, throughout Haneke’s work, the vast majority of violence is left off-screen, 
with often disorienting diegetic sounds providing greater information for the viewer than the visual data.    
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whatever despair conveyed, transcend the discomfort of the content in the 
realization of their form” (Sharrett, 2010, p. 584). By eschewing the conventional 
shifts in point-of-view and thereby suspending complete identification with the 
characters, Haneke’s film demands that the spectator become involved in active 
engagement with and critical judgement on what is shown. The formal qualities 
of the film refuse to do the interpretive work on behalf of the spectator. Instead, 
the form merely pushes the spectating subject into what I see as (potentially at 
least) a marginal position, that is, one between the poles of internality – whereby 
one feels recognition, affiliation and ultimately affirmation with what one sees – 
and externality – in which one feels entirely foreign or other to the content and 
as a result lacks the motivational and epistemological bases upon which to 
engage with it. 
 
Haneke’s preferred formal techniques mostly centre round a combination of 
fixed passive shots and long takes. In its fixity the camera is turned into a 
(deceptively) neutral tool of cool observation, performing a clinical-style 
examination, rejecting the moral and identificatory injunctions that accompany 
standard shot/reverse-shot techniques. The latter make for an all-too-
comfortable and explicable experience, which, as I have been arguing 
throughout this section, starkly contrasts with the position of Adorno and 
Haneke, who, in my view at least, seek to unsettle, provoke and disturb us into 
critical awareness. Haneke’s refusal of the simplistic shot/reverse-shot device is 
abundant. For instance, in Benny’s Video, the moment when Benny shoots and 
(eventually) kills the girl with a bolt gun takes place off-camera. The camera 
remains static throughout and no edit is made that would enable the viewer to 
adopt the perspective of either victim or culprit. Similarly, in Code inconnu, in a 
long fixed shot of Anne (played by Juliette Binoche) ironing and half-watching 
television, the screams of a young girl from an adjacent apartment become 
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audible, temporarily disrupting Anne’s routine.98 As before, in this scene there 
are no direct routes for identification provided, yet, nor is there a comfortable 
distance or escape from implication. Indeed, throughout many of Haneke’s 
films, people are shown as being simultaneously victims and perpetrators of 
widespread injustices and violence. Culpability is, thus, rendered social through 
and through.   
 
The dialectic of bourgeois coldness acts at two levels in Haneke’s work: (1) in 
the aesthetic object itself; and (2) through the marginalization of the (spectating) 
subject. Firstly, then, the coldness ingested and brought to bear aesthetically, 
through Haneke’s ‘gaze’, is not inhuman, indifferent and purely mechanical, 
such as would problematically replicate the functional structures of the status 
quo. Rather, Haneke retains, in filmic form, a marginal position that refuses 
both direct identifications, on the one hand, and a comfortable escapist 
distanciation, on the other. His work occupies the margins between the 
‘mainstream’ and the ‘avant-garde’. While the mainstream is critically deficient 
on account of its general adaptation to the existent, the avant-garde moves 
ceaselessly towards the complete rejection of the possibility of coherence, 
communication, critique, meaning and interpretation. In each of these ‘torn 
halves’ of film practice there is, in my view, little hope for a significant shift in 
subjective positioning and understanding, since both the mainstream and the 
avant-garde have well-established audience expectations, rituals, viewing 
practices, discourses, and so on, which appear to allow for minimal disruption 
to received norms and opinions. The marginal position, however, as aimed at in 
Haneke’s work, might provoke a greater degree of critical reflection and 
spectatorial engagement from a wider range of subjects, given that it is situated 
amid neither the traditionally produced and marketed films of the mainstream, 
                                               
98 We later see Anne attending the young girl’s funeral, clearly racked with the guilt of her past inaction. 
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nor the self-posited outsider state of anti-mainstream experimentalism.99 From 
its critical proximity, its transgression of such narrow categorial distinctions, 
Haneke’s work has the potential to connect with different audiences and 
provoke a variety of responses. This provocation of viewer activity gives rise to 
the second element of the dialectic of coldness worthy of note.      
 
The dialectic of coldness moves not only within the filmic object itself, but also 
in its interpretive relationship with the viewer. Haneke’s work serves to place 
the spectating subject in a position of co-authorship, marginality and joint 
responsibility. The genuine practice of co-authorship occurs not merely 
voluntarily, as if only applicable to certain viewers who may happen to be in an 
interpretive mood, as it were. Rather, the films demand from the viewer a more 
active role in the production of coherent or possible interpretations. Haneke’s 
work is ‘difficult’ (to use one of the most popular terms of the present time) and 
opaque, but it is not devoid of meaning. That it is filled with ambiguities, 
disturbances, narrative fragmentation or inconsistencies, disruptive actions, 
unconventional framings, and unresolved questions, is testament to the belief 
that an active and critical spectatorship, engaging in (at least semi-) 
autonomous thinking is still possible. If the viewing subject is simply not 
willing to put in any time, thought and effort upon experiencing the artwork, 
then there should be no expectation that the work give them some ready-to-
hand political message, moral, affirmation, or whatever else. Haneke’s 
marginalization of the spectating subject occurs, as noted previously, at the 
levels of both form and content. In taking up the coldness of the social world, 
Haneke’s work clinically cuts through the veil of our ‘second-nature’ situation, 
making the routinized behaviours of his interchangeable characters appear as 
emotionally empty and unfulfilling as they are in reality. The coldness of the 
                                               
99 As Wheatley notes, Haneke’s films do attract wider audiences and, in some cases (e.g. Funny Games), are 
even cunningly marketed in such a way as to play to mainstream genre definitions, if only to thoroughly 
undermine them within the final product (2009, pp. 86-87).   
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gaze is notable for the way in which it mirrors the viewer’s complicity in the 
perpetuation of the false whole, our general inaction and inertia, our default 
bystander position. Yet, coldness has its dialectical moment occur within the act 
of spectatorial recognition, whereupon the viewing subject is brought to an 
acute awareness of precisely this unavoidable coldness as it exists in the 
aesthetic object itself, in the objective social world and, of course, in ourselves. 
The eschewal of all love, warmth, solidarity, positivity, affirmation, and so forth 
(which Adorno also advocates in his critical theory), and the unflinching 
ingestion of coldness – the pharmakon of capitalist society – make Haneke’s films 
undeniably irritating, marginal, subversive and critical. Through a consciously 
dissatisfied and unhappy starting position and the (difficult yet necessary) 
rejection of all false positivity,100 the dialectic of bourgeois coldness, through the 
marginal subject, begins to move towards its own abolition. Denial or 
suppression of such coldness will surely not result in authentically loving and 
free relationships, but instead will likely reinforce the failings of the status quo. 
As a significant step towards enhancing critical understanding, one would 
perhaps do better to foreground coldness, to consciously bring its objective 
ubiquity to subjective awareness.  
 
For Haneke (and, indeed, Adorno), given the current inaccessibility of right 
answers (and right living), a responsible course of action would be to 
persistently raise critical questions and challenges towards that which presents 
itself as natural, good, unalterable, or just the way things are. Disrupting the 
smooth perpetuation and integration of the social order stands as the ethical 
core of the marginal subject. In Haneke’s case, this may mean that one 
                                               
100 Adorno is consistent and emphatic on the necessary rejection of present forms of happiness. For 
example, “thought’s position toward happiness would be the negation of all false happiness” (ND, p. 353); 
“Prescribed happiness looks exactly what it is [. . .] The admonitions to be happy [. . .] have about them the 
fury of the father berating his children for not rushing joyously downstairs when he comes home irritable 
from his office” (MM, §38, pp. 62-63); “In the false world all ήδονή [pleasure] is false. For the sake of 
happiness, happiness is renounced” (AT, p. 15).   
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(re)considers opinions, attitudes and reflections, not only in direct response to 
certain images and filmic artworks, but also in relation to one’s own experience 
of and relation to contemporary society as the latter objectively permeates our 
individual lives. Similarly, on my reading of Adorno, one remains faithful to 
the possibility of authentic love, happiness, togetherness, and warmth, precisely 
by remaining cold in response to their current ideological counterfeits. 
Maintaining one’s marginal proximity to the damaged social order allows for 
precisely those perspectives that “displace and estrange the world”, that show 
it to be “as indigent and distorted as it will appear one day in the messianic 
light” (MM, §153, p. 247). The hope is that soon the margins will have become 
so densely populated as to bring about a critically-minded majority capable of 
genuinely negating the status quo and once again opening up the future – our 
futures.  
 
SUMMARY 
 
The foregoing analysis has considered the two-level critique at work in both the 
critical theory of Adorno and the filmic work of Haneke. In the first half of the 
chapter, we examined the various threads of their social criticism, that is, the 
macro-level critique through which late capitalist society is portrayed in 
unflinchingly pejorative terms. Moreover, an attempt was made to argue for an 
anti-psychological reading of the work of Adorno and Haneke, respectively. It 
was demonstrated how their social critique tends towards imagery of a 
negative totality or false whole, which in turn brings about the aporetic position 
with which the chapter began, namely, that resistance to the distorted and 
deformed social world is both utterly necessary yet absolutely impossible. In 
order to rescue the indefatigable kernel of hope that lie at the heart of Adornian 
critical theory, as well as take into account the ostensible disappearance of a 
collective revolutionary agent, in the second half of the chapter I sought to 
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defend the resistive potential of marginal subjectivity. To this end, I considered 
the relevance and legitimacy of estrangement in constituting an integral part of 
marginal subjectivity, whereby the extant social world can come to be viewed 
and confronted in all its falsity and irrationality. Further toward the aims of 
marginality, the chapter ended with an exploration of, what I called, the 
dialectic of bourgeois coldness, and sought to indicate how this dialectic might 
function as an indispensible catalyst for critique in both Adorno’s theory and 
Haneke’s films. The very coldness demanded of individuals by social forces in 
order to guarantee one’s personal survival cannot but turn back upon itself and 
toward society, thus, provoking and providing the clinical and critical distance 
required of radical social critique. Such marginalization prefigures the 
undermining of the legitimacy of the status quo, and as such is invaluable to the 
urgent task of theorizing and enacting wholesale social transformation.  
Chapter IV 
The Dialectic of Nature and 
Humanity in Adorno and Tarkovsky 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Amid the fallout from the global financial crisis of 2008, it was inevitable that 
strategically adept ‘vulgar Marxists’ would begin rubbing their hands together 
in anticipation of a total overhaul of capitalism, brought about by the latter’s 
own contradictions, flawed mechanisms, false logics and tendencies towards 
self-destruction or implosion. The vulgar Marxist might triumphantly claim, 
‘Aha! This is how capitalism is unsustainable. It has shown itself to be so. Now 
is the time to overthrow it’. In my experience, variations on this theme regularly 
crop up at all manner of protests, conferences, seminars, art gatherings, social 
and political events and suchlike. Of course, the global economic situation is 
worthy of detailed and prolonged attention, and it does provide some ground 
for renewed social movements against the deleterious effects of capitalism. To 
this extent the current financial climate of ‘austerity’ may provoke interesting 
and critical responses from diverse groups of people. Yet, as we have seen 
many times in the past, the functionaries of capitalistic structures prove to be 
quite adept at bending and reforming in ways that can accommodate and adjust 
to major challenges and crises. As a result of such structural flexibility, I remain 
sceptical with regard to the extent to which one might view the present 
situation as pregnant with possibilities for radical change. Indeed, this 
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scepticism is what prompted my defence of marginality, critique and negativity 
in the previous chapter.   
 
There is, however, an even greater challenge facing existing modes of 
capitalism both locally and globally – one that will in all probability constitute 
an unavoidable catalyst for radical social transformation, since to ignore its 
dangers could result in nothing less than the complete eradication of the 
species. I refer here to the looming threat of major ecological catastrophe. As 
threats go, an intensifying ecological crisis, certainly when compared to the 
more ‘immediate’ phenomena associated with the financial crisis, seems like an 
abstract and distant one. It is hard to fathom within the normal boundaries and 
terms of our everyday existence. But a renewed and critical understanding of 
our existing practices in relation to the natural environment is of immense and 
growing importance. The social ecologist, Murray Bookchin (whose work will 
be explored in this chapter) sums up the current situation in the following stark 
terms: 
 
Our world, it would appear, will either undergo revolutionary changes, so 
far-reaching in character that humanity will totally transform its social 
relations and its very conception of life, or it will suffer an apocalypse that 
may well end humanity’s tenure on the planet (2005, p. 82)  
 
The relationship between humanity and nature has long since been problematic 
and difficult to adequately theorize. It is complex and unstable. But this 
complexity and instability means that it is open to change. In this chapter, I will 
offer an Adornian account of the dialectical relationship between human beings 
and nature. In doing so, I hope to show that it is possible and desirable to re-
conceptualize nature (and our place within it) in ways that avoid the 
hypostatization and dualistic thinking that underwrites not only the (anti-
humanistic) discourse of ‘deep ecology’, but also the (humanistic) discourse of 
‘social ecology’. I argue that neither of these dominant approaches to ecological 
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problems adequately conceptualizes the complex interrelationships between 
humanity and nature, and that the dialectical understanding as found in 
Adorno’s critical theory, and in Tarkovsky’s filmic work, offers a useful and 
suggestive contrast.   
 
I will begin by outlining some of the core tenets of two influential ecological 
discourses, namely, ‘deep ecology’ (1.1) and ‘social ecology’, respectively (1.2). 
As will become clear, despite sharing a profound concern with the ‘natural’ 
world, the discourses of deep ecology and social ecology have developed 
largely in a hostile and antagonistic relationship with one another. After 
rehearsing some of their central arguments, I will offer some criticisms of each 
discourse (1.3), before exploring Adorno’s complex invocations of nature in his 
critical theory (2). Having defended an Adornian understanding of the dialectic 
between humanity and nature, I will bring the chapter to a close by relating this 
reading to the aesthetics of Andrei Tarkovsky (3). My objective here is to offer 
an explication and critical defence of Adorno’s theory of nature in contrast to 
the somewhat limited and tension-filled discourses of deep ecology and social 
ecology, respectively.                   
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1. DOMINANT DISCOURSES: ‘DEEP’ ECOLOGY VERSUS ‘SOCIAL’ ECOLOGY 
 
Recent years have witnessed a notable resurgence of interest in the natural 
world and humanity’s place within it. Prompted by intensifying and 
unprecedented levels of dread towards an impending ecological catastrophe, 
the relations between the social and the natural have come under much 
scrutiny. Such concerns are not merely confined to the halls of academia either, 
as a variety of media vehicles, activists and ‘personalities’ have sought to raise 
awareness of the threats posed by and to our surrounding environment. The 
limited perspectives on the present situation fall into a persistent dichotomy 
with regard to the general direction of the threat faced: are humans jeopardizing 
the harmony inherent to the natural world, or are nature’s mutations 
threatening human ways of life? Should we reconnect or ‘return’ to nature, as is 
often said, or is it necessary to alienate ourselves from nature altogether?  
Marxist accounts of society remain intent on uncovering the ideological fictions 
of all manner of ‘naturalization’, and postmodern constructivism extends this 
critique by completely collapsing ‘nature’ into culture. Meanwhile, a 
rediscovery of an inextinguishable natural foundation has found expression in 
pro-nature discourses, which deploy nature as an ontological or material 
limitation to constructivist pronouncements of human superiority (see Soper, 
2005). Such questions, all too commonplace in the formation of contemporary 
attitudes, do not adequately acknowledge the complex mediation between 
human beings and nature.   
 
Despite significant efforts by ecological thinkers to theorize environmental 
crises, I believe that there remain major shortcomings in their fundamental 
conceptions of humanity and nature. Two of the most influential ecological 
discourses are that of ‘deep ecology’ and ‘social ecology’, respectively. Given 
their influence, in this section I will offer interpretations and criticisms of these 
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discourses with recourse to Adornian theory. As will become clear, there exist 
some significant divisions within these ecological discourses, and these 
disagreements have regrettably led to an impasse. It is my aim to demonstrate 
how Adorno’s critical theory may provide resources with which to overcome or 
at least better understand the reasons for such stagnation.    
 
1.1  Deep Ecology 
 
The discourse of deep ecology is not reducible to a unified and strictly definable 
list of agreed positions, as it draws upon a wide range of influences and 
traditions in the development of its diverse claims.101 Nevertheless, it is possible 
to delineate certain features of the deep ecology discourse which mark its 
differentiation from other ecological forms of thought (particularly that of social 
ecology). The term ‘deep ecology’ made its first appearance in 1973, when the 
Norwegian philosopher, Arne Naess, published a lecture summary in which he 
sought to establish a deeper ecological framework than the ‘shallow’ one 
popularized by reformists.102 In the summary, Naess sets out a number of 
foundational principles and larger objectives of the fledgling deep ecology 
movement. The first of these principles begins from a rejection of the “[hu]man-
in-environment image” in favour of the “relational, total-field image” (1973, p. 95). 
This latter image consists of organisms existing in a field or web of “intrinsic 
relations”: 
 
                                               
101 This is undoubtedly the case despite Naess’ original claim following his inauguration of the term ‘deep 
ecology’, namely, that the “seven points listed provide one unified framework for ecosophical systems” 
(1973, p. 99, my emphasis). 
102 The reformist or ‘shallow’ ecology is such that our existing socio-cultural values, behaviours, work 
patterns, and so on, are never put under any serious scrutiny. Instead, the economy, institutions, policies, 
science and technologies are amended in their development to recognise and react to environmental 
threats. Contemporary examples include: exemptions from congestion charges for hybrid vehicles; 
individual (and still voluntary) household recycling schemes; protection of certain sites of so-called 
‘outstanding natural beauty’ or regions of ‘wilderness’; offering reusable bags in supermarkets (again, at 
this time the use of non-plastic bags is, unfathomably, only voluntary). Such practices, for Naess, fail to 
address the root causes of ecological problems, and merely allow extant social life to continue unabated.          
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An intrinsic relation between two things A and B is such that the relation 
belongs to the definitions or basic constitutions of A and B, so that without 
the relation, A and B are no longer the same things (Naess, 1973, p. 95)    
 
This total-field image, then, takes into account the relative interdependence of 
ecological matter and species, such that none can singularly sustain its existence 
without relying upon at least some others in the ecosystem. The 
acknowledgement of ecological interdependency forms the basis of another key 
principle of deep ecology, namely, biospheric egalitarianism. This principle103 
holds that, given the inextricable connections between ecological things (in the 
most extended sense of the term), no single species can rightly claim moral 
priority: 
 
To the ecological field-worker, the equal right to live and blossom is an 
intuitively clear and obvious axiom [. . .] The attempt to ignore our 
dependence and to establish a master-slave role has contributed to the 
alienation of man from himself (Naess, 1973, p. 96, original emphasis)    
 
Not only, then, does the deep ecology discourse promote the notion of intrinsic 
relations, but it also upholds the belief in intrinsic value. The latter supports the 
relational, total-field image that breaks free of an enlightenment 
anthropocentricism that has so adversely affected the non-human world for 
millennia. This rejection of anthropocentrism also accounts for deep ecology’s 
active distancing from reformist (or technological) positions that would have us 
ignore the root causes of human-centred, ecologically unsound praxis, and 
instead guide techno-scientific work towards relieving some of the most 
damaging effects of human activity on the non-human world, thereby allowing 
us to sustain existing lifestyles with minimal disruption or change. The 
technophile believes in the infinite ingenuity of human inventiveness such that, 
when faced with new threats or challenges, science and technology can be 
                                               
103 Naess notes that biospheric egalitarianism can only be asserted “in principle” since “any realistic praxis 
necessitates some killing, exploitation, and suppression” (1973, p. 95). 
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rapidly developed and deployed to solve each and every ecological problem. 
Such a position is, of course, anathema to deep ecology advocates, since it 
remains wholly anthropocentric and reduces the entirety of non-human 
(animate and inanimate) matter to nothing but a series of (intrinsically) 
worthless objects, or, rather, objects that can accrue value only at the behest of 
dominant human subjects (i.e. omnipotent value-givers). The deep ecological 
position here runs the risk of lapsing into a kind of anti-technological 
romanticism.104 Indeed, it is hard to see how such a static conception of what 
constitutes nature – namely, an organic unified totality that is perfectly self-
regulating when left to its own devices – can avoid appealing to prelapsarian 
notions of a ‘return to nature’, that is, a better or purer (non-human) world 
which existed before our lamentable (techno-scientific) ‘Fall’. This is one of the 
central points of contention between the advocates of deep ecology and those of 
social ecology (I return to this issue in sections 1.2 and 1.3).    
 
A further and related tenet of deep ecology is that of an altered and heightened 
awareness of intrinsic relations and value in the biosphere. Naess later offers an 
argument for a reconstructed and enhanced ‘Self’, which he believes can go 
some way towards achieving the development of consciousness and selfhood 
necessary for addressing the ecological crises and redressing the environmental 
balance. This additional notion of a reconstructed Self is, for Naess, essential for 
ecology, since basing one’s hope for ecologically viable policies and practices on 
a flimsy kind of altruism or haphazard individual sacrifices is, in his words, 
“probably in the long run a treacherous basis for conservation” (1995, p. 17). 
Not only will it be unpredictable and fluctuating, subject to external constraints 
and mutable contributory factors, but it will also retain the existing 
                                               
104 Such an anti-technological position is not the exclusive preserve of deep ecologists. Recall that Herbert 
Marcuse remained, until very late in life, fundamentally opposed to technology on the grounds that it is 
detrimental to true societal relations, the pursuit of freedom, autonomy and cooperation. Martin 
Heidegger, however, is the philosopher more frequently and openly co-opted by the deep ecology cause.   
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understanding of relations between human being (as master) and non-human 
nature (as slave). Naess calls for a reconstructed, that is, ecological Self, which 
would extend to encompass – though not subsume – the wider cosmos in which 
it exists and subsists. Having taken such a step, self-interest, self-preservation 
and self-love actually become deepened to the extent that their enactment 
becomes actively conducive to the pressing task of ecological care and 
preservation. Naess refers to this as self-realization.105   
 
On Naess’ account of self-realization, then, no longer is the self an isolated, 
atomistic ego, preserved selfishly and antagonistically. Such a narrow 
conception of self leads to alienation affecting human/human and human/non-
human relations. Preservation of the ecological Self, however, becomes 
affirmation and realization of all that co-constitutes a Self’s being. Deep 
ecology’s vision of self-realization is one of progression, inasmuch as a self can 
begin identifying with other human beings (beyond friends and family, that is, 
to include the entire species), but then move further still to include other species 
and, indeed, the whole non-human cosmos. Through the realization of this 
reconstructed Self a new ethic of responsibility and care may develop towards 
ourselves (now understood in the more expansive terms of universal 
interrelatedness) and the natural world. Naess notes that the “requisite care 
flows naturally if the ‘self’ is widened and deepened so that protection of free 
Nature is felt and conceived as protection of ourselves” (1995, p. 26).  
 
A further basic principle of the deep ecology discourse, and one which is seen 
as complementary to the aim of self-realization, concerns the richness and 
diversity of life forms. The flourishing of the entire biosphere is measured in 
                                               
105 Devall and Sessions note that self-realization – in addition to biospheric egalitarianism – constitutes one 
of deep ecology’s “ultimate norms” (1985, p. 66). These norms are “not derivable from other principles or 
intuitions”, and are instead “arrived at by the deep questioning process [. . .] [and] cannot be validated, of 
course, by the methodology of modern science based on its usual mechanistic assumptions and its very 
narrow definition of data” (ibid.).   
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terms of the amount of complexity and diversity of life forms within it. 
Diversity in the biosphere is not merely valuable to the extent that it provides 
conditions conducive for greater flourishing of life forms. Rather, diversity is 
also deemed by deep ecologists to be intrinsically valuable. Potentialities of 
survival and of new forms of life emerging are enhanced through biospheric 
diversity. Holding that self-realization requires optimized diversity, complexity 
and symbiosis, deep ecologists thereby oppose any action that reduces the 
multiplicity of life forms (and the concept of ‘life’ here should be understood as 
extending to what biologists would classify as ‘nonliving’, that is, landscapes, 
rivers, ecosystems, and so forth). As Naess puts it, “’Live and let live’ is a more 
powerful ecological principle than ‘Either you or me’” (1973, p. 96). Having no 
superiority within the complex biosphere, humans are said to have “no right” 
to reduce the richness and diversity of life “except to satisfy vital needs” (Devall 
& Sessions, 1985, p. 70). Clearly, the deep ecology discourse is heavily loaded 
both normatively and politically. Indeed, its proponents are forthright in their 
demands that those who subscribe to the principles of deep ecology “have an 
obligation to try to implement the necessary changes” (ibid.). Yet, despite its 
potentially laudable motives, the deep ecology discourse is certainly not 
without its problems. I will draw attention to some of the most pertinent ones 
(in section 1.3), before proceeding to a discussion of Adorno’s dialectical 
conception of nature (in section 2).                          
   
1.2  Social Ecology 
 
The development and dissemination of the social ecology discourse can be 
largely attributed to the work of one man, Murray Bookchin (1921-2006). His 
voluminous output, coupled with his revolutionary activist stances and 
engagements over decades, has had a major influence on ecological theory and 
practice. The discourse of social ecology is Bookchin’s most notable legacy and 
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it stands as one of the earliest theoretical discourses to bring ecological concerns 
to wider public consciousness (certainly in the USA).106 In its subsequent 
development and refinement, social ecology can be understood as an important 
response, and critical opposition, to the discourse of deep ecology.   
 
The main aim of social ecology – as the name implies – is to focus on social and 
human forms of organization and interaction as a way of understanding and 
responding to the ecological crises with which we are confronted. Social 
ecology starts out from the concrete conviction that “nearly all of our present 
ecological problems originate in deep-seated social problems” (Bookchin, 2007, 
p. 19). The natural world, for social ecologists, should not be seen as a harsh, 
‘indifferent’, limited and homogenous realm of brute and blind determinism, 
but instead as a wellspring of heterogeneous symbiotic interrelations, 
spontaneity, fecundity and diversity. In contrast to the traditional Darwinian 
conception of evolution as essentially a sequence of competitive antagonisms 
between individual species amid a ‘survival of the fittest’,107 on the social 
ecology account, natural evolution is better construed as a process through 
which diverse species not only coexist but often mutually support each other’s 
flourishing (Bookchin, 1997, p. 40). The dynamic movement towards greater 
complexity and variety is, for social ecologists, what maintains an ecosystem’s 
integrity and unity. Ecosystems are stronger and more unified through 
diversification and mutual interdependence. As Bookchin puts it, “Ecological 
wholeness is not an immutable homogeneity but rather the very opposite – a 
dynamic unity of diversity” (2005, p. 88).     
                                               
106 Indeed, Bookchin’s Our Synthetic Environment, published in 1962 under the pseudonym ‘Lewis Herber’, 
predates Rachel Carson’s well-known and seminal work, Silent Spring (1962). Bookchin’s work reportedly 
received scant attention at the time of its publication, perhaps because, while both he and Carson argued 
against the use of pesticides, his work was politically far more radical and expansive in its critique of 
capitalism and advocacy of wholesale social transformation.  
107 This notion is, of course, frequently transposed into the societal realm and invoked in everyday 
parlance, particularly in reference to the quasi-mythical ‘market’ and the concomitant ‘grow or die’ 
mentality (anthropomorphically) imparted to it. 
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The social ecological view of nature itself, then, is not one of naive and passive 
reverence toward a static wilderness, in other words, that which is untouched 
by human hand (such as is the case in deep ecology). Instead, nature is seen as 
consisting in dynamic evolutionary progress and ever-increasing variegation. 
The natural world in its evolutionary development gives rise to greater forms of 
complexity, flexibility, and even, on Bookchin’s account, self-consciousness. The 
latter finds its highest expression, of course, in one of the unique and most 
sophisticated products of natural evolution: the species homo sapiens. As a result 
of natural evolution, human beings are endowed with unprecedented and 
unparalleled capacities to purposively intervene in and alter, what Bookchin 
calls, first nature. First nature refers to the biological and evolutionary roots of 
our existence. Out of this first (primeval, biological) nature arises a second 
nature. This second nature consists of increasingly complex social and cultural 
phenomena, forms of symbolic communication, interaction, innovation, 
institutions, production, and so on. In contrast to the deep ecology approach – 
which points to the grand capacity and propensity of human beings to 
(detrimentally) intervene in nature as the basis for defending an ecological 
position of non-interference – social ecology views the progressive development 
of second nature, and humanity’s enhanced ability to affect first nature, in a 
more positive light. The onset of second nature does not mark a lamentable 
glitch in natural evolution, whereby human beings have become nought but a 
damaging parasitic nuisance to the realm of first nature, but rather must be seen 
as part and parcel of nature as a whole: “The human species, in effect, is no less 
a product of natural evolution than blue-green algae” (Bookchin, 1999, p. 298); 
“Society itself [. . .] stems very much from nature [. . .] The emergence of society 
is a natural fact that has its origins in the biology of human socialization” 
(Bookchin, 1997, pp. 46-47). Social ecology, then, conceives of both the natural 
world (first nature) and society (second nature) as inextricably interlinked 
through evolution.             
142 
 
In addition to this re-coupling of nature and society, Bookchin makes a 
semantic distinction between ‘environmentalism’ and ‘ecology’. 
Environmentalism he takes to mean “a mechanistic, instrumental outlook that 
sees nature as a passive habitat composed of ‘objects’ such as animals, plants, 
minerals, and the like that must merely be rendered more serviceable for 
human use” (2005, p. 85). This rendering of environmentalism has something in 
common with mainstream interpretations of Marx, inasmuch as the idea 
prevails that nature constitutes nothing but the ‘raw material’ and resources for 
utilization by human beings in their labour and ongoing development.108 
Bookchin criticizes environmentalism on the basis that its limited ecological 
perspective allows for the perpetuation of the subordination of nature, 
unquestioningly, in order to merely minimize the environmental damage 
caused by existing social relations and behaviour.109 This is to be resisted 
because it fails to deal with the underlying issues that bring about such 
environmental destruction in the first place. On the social ecology account, 
these fundamental factors that bring about unnecessary ecological destruction 
are directly related to hierarchical social arrangements and gross inequalities in 
access to resources (both social and natural).   
 
In contrast to the limited purview of piecemeal environmentalism, ecology 
“deals with the dynamic balance of nature, with the interdependence of living 
and nonliving things” (Bookchin, 2005, p. 86). Given that human beings are a 
part of nature, ecological thought cannot simply put to one side, or universally 
condemn, humanity’s relations with other species and the wider biotic 
                                               
108 Marx’s (later) work is generally considered to have, what might be called, an ecological deficit, to the 
extent that his account of nature is said to be reductive and anthropocentric. For an important reappraisal 
and repudiation of such claims, see John Bellamy Foster’s Marx’s Ecology (2000). See also the set of essays 
collected by Ted Benton in The Greening of Marxism (1996). 
109 One might recall here the growing market in supposedly ‘environmentally friendly’ or ‘ethical’ 
consumer products and services that are on offer today, all of which merely help to promote a 
continuation of existing behaviours rather than challenging the fundamental structures within which they 
take place. Put differently, so-called ‘green capitalism’ simply functions to sustain the unsustainable. 
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environment. Indeed, it is precisely humanity’s sophisticated and highly 
developed forms of thought, rationality, communication, foresight, self-
consciousness, and so forth, which lend the species a unique and privileged 
ability to, at least in part, supplant mere instinctual actions. Such attentiveness 
to the interrelations between differentiated species is indicative of the holistic or 
organismic elements of the social ecology discourse, that is, its concern with 
wholeness. As I alluded to previously, for social ecologists, wholeness does not 
equate to oneness, that is to say, it does not consist in a homogenous totality 
within which individual parts are subsumed amid enforced uniformity. Rather, 
wholeness – in both natural and social evolution – at least on Bookchin’s 
(Hegelian-inflected) account, should be seen as moving inexorably towards 
unity in diversity. Evolution in its natural and social forms, then, consists of a 
multiplicity of life-forms unified by their co-determination and reciprocity. 
Unity in diversity is “not only the determinant of an ecosystem’s stability” and 
fecundity, but is also, as a principle, the basis of society’s actualization “in the 
form of richly articulated, mutualistic networks of people based on community, 
roundedness of personality, diversity of stimuli and activities, an increasing 
wealth of experiences, and a variety of tasks” (Bookchin, 1997, p. 42).           
 
According to the social ecology approach, what prevents the spontaneous 
development of such unity in diversity – at least at the social level – is hierarchy. 
True to his anarchist roots, and taking much influence from the ideas of Peter 
Kropotkin, Bookchin regards hierarchical structuring as the most formidable 
obstacle to achieving an ecological society. In this regard, while retaining an 
anti-capitalist position, social ecology cannot really be classed as a Marxist 
discourse as such, for it opposes capitalist societies not on the basis of class 
struggle and exploitation but on account of its inherently hierarchical status.   
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I do not wish to diminish the importance of class rule in explaining present-
day ecological problems, but class rule must be placed in the much larger 
context of hierarchy and domination as a whole (Bookchin, 2005, p. 28) 
 
Bookchin’s opposition to hierarchy stems from his anthropological studies of 
bygone communities that significantly predate the development of class society. 
The earliest ‘organic’ societies, Bookchin argues, were largely egalitarian and 
accepting of differences in individual members of the community, seeing in this 
diversity a complementarity and mutuality. Co-operation in non-hierarchical 
relations pertained in these organic societies, whereas, by contrast, the 
development of hierarchies in subsequent societies – through gerontocracy, 
patriarchy, shamanism, chiefdoms, and eventually state-like formations – has 
led to institutionalized relations between people characterized by “command 
and obedience” (ibid., p. 26). As a result, one of the clearest objectives of social 
ecology is the abolition of all hierarchy.110 This is believed to be the grounds for 
bringing about an ecological society. For Bookchin, it is not the case that an 
abstract ‘humanity’ dominates, plunders and abuses nature:   
 
One can no longer speak of ‘humanity’ the way one can speak of species of 
carnivores or herbivores [. . .] [T]o ignore the hierarchical and class 
divisions that second nature has produced [. . .] is to create the illusion of a 
commonality that humanity has by no means achieved (2005, p. 33) 
 
For the social ecologist, the “very notion of ‘dominating nature’ has its roots in 
the domination of human by human” (1991, p. 129). Domination itself, as a 
concept, is something that only exists when human beings come into 
hierarchical social contact with one another. As we noted at the outset of this 
section, social ecologists seek out the origin of environmental crises in the 
human-made structures and inequalities of existing society. Thus, for Bookchin 
and advocates of social ecology, the most urgent task for the fostering of an 
                                               
110 Bookchin is explicit in this aim: “it is crucial for students of society to fully understand these forms [of 
hierarchy] and to eliminate hierarchy per se, not simply replace one form of hierarchy with another” (2005, 
p. 27).  
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ecological society is the complete removal of hierarchy in all its forms, and a 
radical transformation of social (human/human) and natural (human/non-
human) relations. Anything less would be seen as falling hopelessly short of the 
mark. 
 
Before proceeding to examine an Adornian conception of nature in 
contradistinction to the discourses of deep ecology and social ecology, it will be 
worth our while to briefly highlight some theoretical antagonisms and 
weaknesses of these leading ecological discourses, since such divisions between 
the two have ostensibly resulted in an impasse.                
 
1.3  Limitations of the Dominant Discourses   
 
Despite the notable influence of deep ecology and social ecology, respectively, 
to the environmental movement over the past few decades, both discourses 
contain significant limitations. It will be useful to explore some of these 
theoretical shortcomings before considering how Adorno’s more dialectical 
conception of nature may offer valuable insights for the enhancement of 
contemporary ecological thought.     
 
As Horkheimer notes, it is a “typical fallacy of the era of rationalization” to 
debase reason and exalt raw nature (1947, p. 126). Precisely this exalting of 
nature is only too apparent in the discourse of deep ecology. The humanity-
nature dualism is not only posited undialectically, in the sense that there is no 
appreciation of the ongoing and complex mediation between human beings and 
the natural world, but it is also presented in a decidedly hierarchical fashion. The 
hierarchical ordering is self-defeating inasmuch as it places human beings in an 
unquestioning position of submission in relation to an all-powerful nature. 
Following Horkheimer’s observation, it appears that deep ecology conceives of 
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‘nature’ as a total, self-sustaining, organic system that is inherently valuable and 
good. Meanwhile, ‘humanity’ is seen as an undifferentiated and superfluous (if 
not outright malign) species, whose proclivity to reproduce and consume far 
beyond the ‘naturally given’ boundaries of its environment – often referred to, 
somewhat euphemistically, as the Earth’s ‘carrying capacity’ – serves to devalue 
and pollute the otherwise pristine natural world.   
 
The argument for ‘biospheric egalitarianism’, that is, the idea that all life-forms 
have an equal right to live and flourish, may well help to acknowledge the 
complex interconnections and mutual interdependence between different 
species and matter, but it also casts human beings as no more morally 
significant than, say, dung beetles or, indeed, the HIV virus. In hypostatizing 
‘nature’, deep ecology lapses into dubious and self-defeating positions whereby 
the expansive ways in which humanity can and does intervene in and alter the 
natural world are seen as a threat to a mythical, almost spiritual, order of 
nature. If fatal epidemics should break out, deep ecologists would struggle, 
within the existing tenets of their discourse, to justify any human intervention 
that would prevent the suffering and demise of millions of people. This is all 
the more baffling given that many people would argue that to speak of nature’s 
‘intrinsic’ value or rights presupposes the existence of one who bestows value 
and rights on things: in short, no thing can be valued in lieu of a thing that does 
the valuing (i.e. human beings). Bookchin articulates this point forcefully: 
 
For with the disappearance of human beings, value too would disappear, and 
the biosphere would be left with no basis for any ethical evaluation or 
discussion of ‘intrinsic worth’, much less ethical agents who can appreciate 
wondrous qualities (2005, pp. 39-40, original emphasis)  
 
It is probably misguided, then, to approach the world’s rapidly intensifying 
ecological and environmental problems from a single, narrativistic and notably 
anti-humanistic perspective, such as appears to be the case in the discourse of 
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deep ecology. The general impression one gets from the literature is that of a 
nature harmonious, pure, perfectly self-regulating and self-reproducing, while 
human beings subsequently intervene in nature, carelessly and selfishly 
plundering and abusing it.111 On this view, the course of development within 
the natural world would simply go about its way unfettered, continually 
flourishing and renewing itself, were it not for the pesky interference of human 
vanity. Following the approach of deep ecology, it becomes impossible to 
construe the existence of human beings on the planet as anything other than 
profoundly detrimental to the natural environment. The humble walk through 
a woodland area necessarily tramples and encroaches upon certain forms of 
plant life, insects, bacteria, and so forth. Moreover, in merely breathing we take 
in and use up valuable oxygen from the atmosphere, contaminating it upon 
release with a higher concentration of carbon dioxide. The deep ecological view 
– particularly through its adherence to biospheric egalitarianism – leads to 
untenable (and unpalatable) conclusions, such that only the most ardent 
misanthrope or irrationalist could maintain.112 Such an approach not only 
                                               
111 I use the pronoun ‘it’ in this instance, but many people when speaking of nature employ the highly 
evocative substitute ‘her’ (or even ‘Mother Nature’) in order to rhetorically impose a particular narrative. 
This, of course, owes much to the legacy of Romanticism, perhaps most notably in the work of Schelling: 
“it is what we call reason, whereby nature first completely returns into herself” (1978 [1800], p. 6). 
Towards different ends, Walter Benjamin approvingly invokes Fourier’s work when he imagines a new 
kind of labour, one that “far from exploiting nature, is capable of delivering her of the creations that lie 
dormant in her womb as potentials” (1996 [1940], p. 220). It is not possible to make further comment on 
such evocative turns of phrase here, but it is certainly an issue worthy of critical attention. 
112 Regrettably, within the discourse of deep ecology there are some highly regressive and reactionary 
elements. In an interview with Bill Devall from 1986, David Foreman (co-founder and former leader of 
Earth First!) explained how famine, poverty, environmental catastrophes and epidemics hitting the ‘Third 
World’ offered an opportunity to reset the natural balance and lower human population: “When I tell 
people how the worst thing we could do in Ethiopia is to give aid – the best thing would be to just let 
nature seek its own balance, to let the people there just starve . . . they think this is monstrous. But the 
alternative is that you go in and save these half-dead children who never will live a whole life. Their 
development will be stunted. And what’s going to happen in ten years’ time is that twice as many people 
will suffer and die” (Foreman & Devall, 1986, p. 43). Foreman later regretted and attempted to clarify these 
ethically abhorrent comments (see Foreman, 1991). Yet, putting ethics to one side, there are inconsistencies 
on this issue within the deep ecology discourse. For example, when Bill Devall and George Sessions 
discuss the need for a considerable decrease in human population, they focus not on the ‘Third World’ but 
on developed countries: “it is also absolutely crucial to curb population growth in the so-called developed 
(i.e. over-developed) industrial societies. Given the tremendous rate of consumption and waste production 
of individuals in these societies, they represent a much greater threat and impact on the biosphere per 
capita than individuals in Second and Third World countries” (1985, p. 72). 
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betrays an overly simplistic view of humanity’s active engagements with nature 
(which can be both negative and positive), but also overlooks nature’s 
unpredictable and often chaotic development and internal devastation.       
 
In addition to this limited view of nature and humanity within deep ecology, a 
paradox arises out of Naess’ notion of an ecological Self. Recall that Naess’ 
enhanced conception of the Self requires an increased awareness of one’s 
ecological existence, namely, as encompassing all of the natural world and its 
diverse interrelations that co-constitute us. Yet, deep ecologists also wish to 
preserve vast regions of wilderness, that is to say, areas in which no human 
activity has intervened. In doing so, deep ecologists ossify the split between 
humanity and nature. The result of these two key points within the deep 
ecological discourse is the following paradox: (1) the Self should be understood 
(holistically) as created and sustained through the unfathomably complex 
relations between diverse organic forms; yet, at the same time, (2) human 
beings should remove themselves from large areas of the natural world, so that 
the latter may flourish, uncontaminated by the work of human hands. Thus, the 
ecological Self should be both completely in nature – as an indispensible and 
mutually interdependent part of the biosphere in which it exists – and removed 
from nature – since human beings irrevocably disturb the balance in, and do 
great harm to, the natural environment. It seems problematic, if not impossible, 
to reconcile these dual objectives of the deep ecology discourse. The adherence 
to a biocentric perspective, as Bookchin notes, appears as “bluntly misanthropic 
and less an ecological principle than an argument against the human species 
itself as a life-form” (1995a, p. 116). The denigration of human beings that 
marks the culmination of deep ecological thought is one of the discourse’s most 
significant problems, and one which would appear to make Bookchin’s social 
ecology the more fruitful approach.               
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Social ecology is also not without its difficulties, however, and in the interest of 
fairness it is worth drawing attention to some of these problems before 
continuing. Perhaps the most curious discrepancy within Bookchin’s social 
ecology discourse is the way in which hierarchy – a major causal factor in the 
precipitation of ecological crises – appears to seep back in to the argument, in 
particular by way of an undialectical inversion. While deep ecology advocates 
the superiority of nature over and above humanity (the latter being primarily 
conceived of as merely an unexceptional species among millions of others), 
social ecology, in construing the sophisticated abilities and social arrangements 
of human beings, through powers of communication, thought, culture, 
interaction, and so on, as entirely natural outgrowths (‘second’ nature from 
‘first’ nature), reverses the original hierarchy, now positing humanity as a 
superior species over and above mere nature. Thus, in spite of his remarks 
eschewing the dualism of biocentrism versus anthropocentrism, Bookchin’s 
social ecology appears to slide into the latter. In its avowed belief in the species 
homo sapiens as an evolutionary vanguard, social ecology reaffirms the 
hierarchical division between humanity and nature, construing the latter as 
subordinate to the former.    
 
Related to this ostensible lapse into forms of hierarchy that are otherwise 
contrary to the discourse of social ecology, Bookchin’s thought exhibits a 
strongly teleological understanding of natural evolution, as an inexorable 
movement towards ever-increasing complexity, diversity and consciousness. 
Such a view is surely a case of wishful thinking on the part of social ecologists. 
In a decidedly Romantic and idealistic vein, Bookchin views humanity as 
constituting the profoundest manifestation of nature’s inherent fecundity and 
progressive flow toward self-consciousness.113 This is exemplary of the (explicit) 
                                               
113 In this view, Bookchin echoes the likes of Fichte and Schelling, both of whom saw the potential in 
subjective reason for rendering nature fully conscious of itself.   
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teleological and (implicit yet overtly denied) anthropocentric core of social 
ecology. In regards to teleology, Bookchin writes:  
 
Social ecology, in effect, recognizes that – like it or not – the future of life on 
this planet pivots on the future of society. It contends that evolution, both 
in first nature and in second, is not yet complete (2007, p. 47, my emphasis)   
 
Bookchin’s Hegelian teleology does not seem conducive to the ecological 
perspectives he otherwise advocates, since human beings are clearly seen as 
both the highest present achievement and future end of natural evolution. As 
someone who is relentlessly critical of the ways in which deep ecology 
hypostatizes nature, Bookchin should know better than to do precisely the same 
in the case of evolution. The latter is by definition an ongoing process, not a point 
of arrival. Evolution is a journey with no terminus, and it is human hubris to 
presume absolute knowledge of this process. Moreover, such teleological, 
Enlightenment-centred, progressive conceptions of both natural and social 
evolution seem to conflict somewhat with Bookchin’s frequent and appreciative 
backward-looking analyses of bygone social orders. In particular, he is quick to 
make use of examples from the supposedly non-hierarchical – or, at the least, 
benignly hierarchical – (pre-industrial) communities of the past as a way of 
criticizing capitalism’s hierarchy, domination, exploitation, division of labour, 
‘grow-or-die’ economies, and so forth. In addition, he elsewhere chastises 
teleological understandings of human history and development, highlighting 
the ways in which “notions of social law and teleology have been used to 
achieve a ruthless subjugation of the individual to suprahuman forces” 
(Bookchin, 2005, p. 88). Presumably, given the positive evaluations of such 
examples, particularly when considered in contrast to the universally damning 
verdicts on contemporary capitalist societies, Bookchin’s overarching belief in 
an unerringly positive progression (in both natural and social evolution) is in 
conflict with his own analyses. Again, what is needed is a more dialectical 
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understanding of progress, evolution, the domination of nature, and suchlike. 
This dialectical deficit in the preeminent discourses of deep ecology and social 
ecology is what prompts me to constellate these approaches with that of 
Adorno and Tarkovsky, with the aim of challenging the discourses’ 
shortcomings and supplementing their potential theoretical strengths.   
     
As a short prelude to my discussion of Adorno’s thinking on nature, I would 
like to recall some of Bookchin’s comments on the Frankfurt School. His 
remarks are somewhat erratic and, for the most part, derogatory. Yet, this was 
not always the case. For example, in the original edition of The Philosophy of 
Social Ecology, Bookchin includes some glowing references to the Frankfurt 
School theorists, particularly in relation to the latter’s staunch critique of 
positivism and instrumental reason. However, in the second edition, Bookchin 
explicitly admits having removed “favorable references to the Frankfurt School 
and Theodor Adorno” (1995a, p. ix), further claiming:  
 
I have come to regard much of Adorno’s work as intellectually 
irresponsible, wayward, and poorly theorized, despite the brilliance of his 
style (at times) and his often insightful epigrams (ibid.) 
 
What is more, Bookchin refers offhandedly to the Frankfurt School’s theories as 
fashionable “academic commodities” that have “fostered postmodern views” 
(1995a, p. 183). These rather cheap pot-shots, which are in no way out of step 
with the tone of the vast majority of Bookchin’s output, do not warrant a 
sustained scholarly rebuttal. In response to such remarks, it suffices to say that 
since critical theory contains self-reflexive arguments as to precisely the 
inevitable incorporation and commodification of revolutionary ideas and 
theories, the complaint that such theories have become fashionable 
commodities seems to further validate, rather than undermine, the claims of 
critical theory. The fault is surely with commodification and contemporary 
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academic practices under capitalism rather than the theoretical ideas 
themselves. Moreover, only a cursory reading of the Frankfurt School could 
conflate their theories with a kind of proto-postmodernism, although, in all 
fairness, Bookchin is not alone in this respect.114   
 
Proponents of both deep ecology and social ecology make reference (albeit 
passing) to Adorno’s thought, which is enough to at least suggest its relevance 
for ecological theory and practice. However, neither discourse adequately 
reflects upon the dialectical manoeuvres of Adorno’s understanding of 
humanity and nature. This lack of engagement with critical theory is 
regrettable, since it is my contention that Adorno’s thought offers much that 
might be of value for the ecological cause. To his critical theory we shall now 
turn.    
 
 
 
  
                                               
114 To an extent, Habermas also unjustifiably follows this accusatory line by conflating Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s work with a Nietzschean affirmation of anti- or post-modern irrationality (see Habermas, 
1987).          
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2. ADORNO’S CONCEPTION OF NATURE 
 
In this section, I will attempt to provide a reading of Adorno’s conception of 
nature. This is no simple task, for his invocations of ‘nature’ – like many other 
terms within his corpus – are diffuse and diverse. However, despite the 
differences in the surrounding context of each usage, I believe there is at least 
one important thread running through each invocation of the term, which may 
be termed the dialectical intertwinement of humanity and nature. This dialectic is at 
work in Adorno’s thought from an early speech he gave in 1932, through to the 
classic Dialectic of Enlightenment, right up to his most notable late works, 
Negative Dialectics and the posthumously published and incomplete Aesthetic 
Theory. I begin by examining Adorno’s understanding of ‘natural history’ (2.1), 
before analyzing the conception of nature (and the domination thereof) in 
relation to self-preservation (2.2). The latter constitutes a key feature of the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment which gives a quasi-anthropological account of natural 
history and the development of human reason that shares – in its concerns, if 
not in its conclusions – much with Bookchin’s social ecology. The section closes 
with an argument for the re-conceptualization of nature along Adornian lines 
(2.3). Ultimately I hope to show how Adorno’s dialectical conception of nature 
allows for a greater appreciation of the complex interrelations of human beings 
and their environment than is offered through the leading contemporary 
ecological discourses. 
 
2.1  On the Idea of Natural History 
 
As we have seen in the previous section, there is a tendency within ecological 
discourses towards dualistic thinking and undialectical conceptualization. Both 
deep ecology and social ecology rely upon certain hierarchical forms of thought 
that posit nature and humanity as two distinct categories, with each discourse 
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ultimately claiming priority for one side over the other. Since this 
hypostatization acts as an obstacle to an acknowledgement of the mediation 
between nature and humanity, it will be of value to consider how Adorno’s 
critical theory renders this mediation more explicit.   
 
In July of 1932, Adorno delivered a speech at the Frankfurt division of the 
Kantgesellschaft, entitled ‘The Idea of Natural History’, in which he presents an 
early glimpse of his notion of “dialectical nature” (INH, p. 117). Adorno 
explains in this speech that his use of the concept of nature seeks to dissolve 
that which most resembles ‘myth’, that is, the extent to which all being becomes 
mere ‘second nature’ and is comprehended as “fatefully arranged” and 
preordained (INH, p. 111). Nature and history, then, rather than consisting as 
ontologically stable categories, instead can function to demythologize the 
existing reality.115  
 
[T]he real intention here is to dialectically overcome the usual antithesis of 
nature and history. Therefore, wherever I operate with the concepts of 
nature and history, no ultimate definitions are meant, rather I am pursuing 
the intention of pushing these concepts to a point where they are mediated 
in their apparent difference (INH, p. 111)   
 
There can be no legitimate conception of nature without taking into account its 
partial definition, cultivation and mediation by real material (human) praxis. 
Equally, there is no history that exists independent of the natural, material, 
objective world in which all events must take place. As Buck-Morss notes, 
Adorno’s insistently dialectical position refuses “to grant either nature or 
history the status of an ontological first principle” (1977, p. 49). Or, in Adorno’s 
own terms:    
                                               
115 The notion of demythologization is, as one should expect from the likes of Adorno, also conceived of 
dialectically. Later, in Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer attempt to show how 
enlightenment’s persistence in destroying myth can become in itself a new form of mythology, an 
unquestioned, uncritical position (which, of course, undermines the original aims of enlightenment in the 
process). I discuss this important element of Adorno’s work further in subsequent sections. 
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Every exclusion of natural stasis from the historical dynamic leads to false 
absolutes, [while] every isolation of the historical dynamic from the 
unsurpassably natural elements in it leads to false spiritualism (INH, p. 
117)    
 
A more nuanced and dialectical configuration of the concepts of nature and 
history – towards an idea of ‘natural history’ [Naturgeschichte] – is thereby a 
necessary theoretical move in order to avoid the Scylla of a total historicization 
of nature and the Charybdis of a naturalization of history. In doing so, the 
existing material reality can be shown to be contingent, transitory, unessential, 
and, as such, open to transformation.   
 
This de-mythification of the present is closely linked with the notion of ‘second 
nature’, which, for Adorno (following Lukács), is a pejorative term for the 
reified forms of life under a naturalized social order. Second nature is to be 
criticized for its suppression of the historical conflicts, contingencies, 
movements, and so forth, of which the current state of affairs are a result. 
Clearly, this negative understanding of second nature is in stark contrast to the 
subsequent uses of the term in Bookchin’s account, whereby second nature 
constitutes an evolutionary outgrowth [Naturwüchsigkeit] of first (biological) 
nature. Adorno’s socially critical perspective and dialectical construal of 
‘natural history’ puts paid to the idea of an unwaveringly positive and 
progressive development of world history, as though the unfolding of historical 
events were merely reason coming ever more into its own over time.   
 
As mentioned in the previous section, this unerringly progressive position can 
be identified as the overt belief of Bookchin’s decidedly Hegelian flavoured 
discourse. Despite its professed ecological credentials, social ecology places 
human beings at the pinnacle of evolutionary development and as the motor 
force of history. This presents a possible problem for the ecological discourse, 
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for if the domination of nature is seen as damaging, irrational, unsustainable, 
and so on – as both Adorno and Bookchin argue – then it appears questionable 
for Bookchin to affirm the superiority of humanity and the necessity of even 
greater control and alteration of nature (both first and second). Bookchin views 
our capacities for adaptation of, not merely to, first nature, as naturally given 
and necessary. Thus, his solution to ecological crises is to more radically and 
purposively alter first and second nature so that both better serve the needs of 
humanity but in a way that will also be non-hierarchical and ecologically 
sound. This appears contradictory, for surely to intervene in such a significant 
manner in first nature presupposes the superiority of human beings and 
perpetuates the very domination of nature Bookchin elsewhere criticizes. The 
positing of humanity as the ultimate teleological agent of world history is a 
notable shortcoming in the discourse of social ecology, and it is one of the key 
points at which the dialectical subtlety of Adorno’s critical theory can act as a 
corrective.           
 
Adorno argues that the unchallenged valorization of human spirit (so prevalent 
in post-Kantian idealism and subsequently repeated in Bookchin’s social 
ecology) is damaging to the extent that it serves to intensify the division 
between humanity and nature, more specifically, the subordination of natural 
material and non-human life to the domineering powers of humanity. This is a 
recurring idea in Adorno’s work, which finds one of its most sustained 
expressions in Dialectic of Enlightenment, a quite eccentric text which perhaps 
more than most frequently induces a troubling combination of senses in the 
reader – ranging from bemusement and frustration to dizziness and profound 
wonder. In their quasi-historical account of the development of enlightenment, 
Adorno and Horkheimer argue that reason, which from its very beginnings 
aimed at liberating mankind from fear, has become almost wholly instrumental 
and has resulted in calamity and barbarism on an unimaginable scale. In 
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relation to nature, enlightenment ushers in an age of disenchantment 
[Entzauberung]. In a pre-enlightenment context, that is, in their mythic relations 
to nature, human beings conceived of themselves as being a part of nature, and 
ritually (and mimetically) related to and celebrated its mystery and mastery. 
The natural world at this past historical stage, Adorno and Horkheimer aver, 
invoked respect, worship even, as a sacred order radiating meaning, 
connection, harmony and awesome power.116 Yet, with the onset of 
enlightenment and the disproportionate value accorded to instrumental reason, 
human interactions with nature mutate into ones of domination and 
manipulation. Since enlightenment is synonymous with demythologization, the 
older attitudes towards nature, which produced mythic accounts of natural 
phenomena (and the causes thereof) in lieu of knowledge of them, are seen as 
immature and inadequate, for they do not address the causes of humankind’s 
primal fear: that of the unknown. Given that humanity imagines itself “free 
from fear when there is no longer anything unknown” (DE, p. 16), this 
determines to a large degree the course of enlightenment.   
 
Epistemological accumulation is part and parcel of the enlightened mindset, as 
is demythologization. Mixed in with these historical processes, whether 
intentionally or not, are elements of control and domination. Human subjects 
come to view nature as one more thing to be tamed and put in its place, namely, 
squarely in the service of human beings: “What men want to learn from nature 
is how to use it in order wholly to dominate it and other men” (DE, p. 4). The 
demythologization of nature leaves the latter devoid of the kind of intrinsic 
value that deep ecologists would subsequently make the focal point of their 
own critique. No longer is meaning seen to reside in the natural world. To the 
enlightenment understanding, everything is deemed intelligible, accessible, 
                                               
116 One might note the similarities between this holistic, pre-enlightenment conception of nature as pure 
and self-regulating, over and above human beings, and the deep ecology discourse which seeks to 
rejuvenate these ideas with minimal qualification. 
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malleable and, ultimately, controllable. In the rigidity of this worldview, 
enlightenment reverts to myth, leaving its own presuppositions, motivations, 
historical contingencies, and so forth, unquestioned and ritualistically repeated. 
In this, enlightenment lacks recognition of the co-determining facets of nature 
and history – the fact that both the natural world and our concrete historical 
praxis dialectically work in and through one another. Recognition of this 
natural-historical mediation is the first important point which Adornian theory 
brings to bear on existing ecological thought. Yet, the nature-history dualism is 
not the only one in need of deconstruction (if you will excuse the blatant 
anachronism). More persistent is the dualistic split between nature and 
humanity, which, on Adorno’s reading, has its origins in the drive for self-
preservation.     
 
2.2  Self-preservation and the Nature-Humanity Dualism 
 
The original catalyst for human beings’ attempts to tame nature lies within the 
drive of the species for self-preservation. Nature is seen as overpowering, 
unpredictable, fearsome, and as such a threat to our continued existence. Hence 
it must be controlled to the highest degree possible. Yet, the ironic twist that 
Adorno and Horkheimer note here is that the kind of self that is preserved 
through the subordination of nature to humanity is thoroughly deformed and 
diminished. Only after having imposed upon itself rigorous demands for 
renunciation is the self able to secure its own ‘preservation’, though, of course, 
in light of such drastic deformations, it makes more sense to speak of self-
destruction. The cost of self-imposed renunciation is disproportionately high, 
and is paid for by the subject’s annihilation of all that would be worth 
preserving in itself. The costly initial outlay never produces a fair return. In the 
act of renouncing we give away more than will be given back to us. Through 
such processes of renunciation, reason loses (or suppresses) its entwinement 
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with and dependence upon nature. Since the bourgeois or enlightened 
individual117 first invoked reason in order to subjugate nature, forgetting in the 
process the mimetic moment within reason itself (as discussed in Chapter II), 
the deleterious effects on our conceptions of life and self have been, on 
Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s account, catastrophic.           
 
As soon as man discards his awareness that he himself is [part of] nature, 
all the aims for which he keeps himself alive – social progress, the 
intensification of all his material and spiritual powers, even consciousness 
itself – are nullified, and the enthronement of the means as an end, which 
under late capitalism is tantamount to open insanity, is already perceptible 
in the prehistory of subjectivity (DE, p. 54)   
 
The relationship of humanity to nature is, of course, not merely one-way, 
namely, human subjects dominating natural objects. While it is important to 
acknowledge the fact that, as Schecter aptly puts it, humanity is a part of nature 
yet not reducible to or identical with nature (2005, p. 156), it is also necessary to 
go further and consider the possibility that nature itself is similarly irreducible 
to its human conceptualization. In fact, this recognition of irreducibility recalls 
an important point mentioned elsewhere in the thesis, specifically, Adorno’s 
argument for the “preponderance of the object” [Vorrang des Objekts] (ND, p. 
183).  
 
The idea of the preponderance of the object is absolutely essential to Adorno’s 
critical theory, and as such warrants our attention again. The thought here is 
representative of Adorno’s underlying materialism, which holds that the object 
– in this context, external/material nature – takes material precedence over the 
subject. This is the case since objectivity is also a part of the constitution of 
subjectivity, yet subjectivity is not to the same degree a necessary moment of 
                                               
117 Adorno and Horkheimer famously argue that Odysseus represents “the prototype of the bourgeois 
individual” (DE, p. 43), whose combination of cunning reason and renunciation is utilized in order to 
affirm his subjectivity.    
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objectivity. In other words, a subject contains an element of objectivity in its 
unavoidable physicality, its very thing-ness, while an object can exist without a 
subjective element. As Adorno puts it: 
 
An object can be conceived only by a subject but always remains something 
other than the subject, whereas a subject by its very nature is from the 
outset an object as well. Not even as an idea can we conceive a subject that 
is not an object; but we can conceive an object that is not a subject (ND, p. 
183)   
 
Human activity – both theoretically and practically – requires “something 
physical which consciousness does not exhaust, something conveyed to reason 
and qualitatively different from it” (ND, p. 229). Nature could be said to be a 
(partial) manifestation of this distinct otherness, since its objectivity routinely 
exceeds subjective attempts at achieving any complete conceptual ordering of it. 
Empirically, nature is not a fixed, chartable system. Rather, it is dynamic and 
constantly evolving. Meanwhile, conceptually, it eludes our grasp time and 
time again. Our knowledge of nature always remains, of necessity, incomplete. 
But the dichotomy of choices between dominating nature, on the one hand, or 
simply leaving it be, on the other, appears falsely posed, since neither option is 
easily achieved. To merely subordinate nature to the (socially determined) 
wants and desires of human beings is extremely problematic, as Adorno and 
Horkheimer fervently argue (and, on this point at least, deep ecologists would 
agree). Yet, equally problematic it would be to try to ignore, conceal or suppress 
humanity’s place, engagement and fundamental embeddedness in the natural 
world. Frequent recognition of this latter point is given by Adorno and 
Horkheimer, particularly in their references to humanity’s Naturverfallenheit.     
 
Dialectic of Enlightenment contains numerous references to the disenchantment 
of nature and while this has prompted some commentators and activists to 
appropriate such comments in support of the ecological cause – calling for a 
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kind of ‘return to nature’ – such appropriations can only be cursory and 
unconvincing at best, and downright misleading at worst. Of course, there are 
numerous points at which Adorno and Horkheimer discuss the manipulation 
and domination of nature [Naturbeherrschung] at some length. However, there 
are two notable discrepancies between their account of Naturbeherrschung and 
that of the dominant ecological discourses. The first is that Adorno and 
Horkheimer formulate their ideas at the utmost abstract philosophical plane. 
When they discuss the domination of nature, it is without reference to concrete, 
practical examples such as one would find in an anthropological account. Their 
primary concern is with the forms of thought and reason that give rise to certain 
exploitative relations between subjects and objects, in addition to those between 
subjects and other subjects. The second divergence can be seen in the fact that, 
while critical of human exploitation and disenchantment of the natural world, 
at no point do Adorno and Horkheimer advocate a simple re-enchantment of 
nature as such.118 To do so would be idealistic, unsophisticated and myopic, 
particularly in light of the ways in which organicist imagery and Romanticism 
have routinely been co-opted for the promotion of highly reactionary political 
goals, a fact of which the authors are only too aware.   
 
Taking both of these discrepancies into account – (i) the abstract criticism of 
thought forms conducive to domination, and (ii) the rejection of a simplistic re-
enchantment of nature – it would appear that Adorno is striving for a re-
conceptualization of nature (and humanity’s relation therewith) that neither 
hypostatizes humanity, on the one hand, nor nature, on the other. Indeed, 
Adorno has little patience with Romantic notions of a ‘return to nature’ that in 
ontologizing nature and deriding civilizatory progress seek to reinstate a 
                                               
118 This marks an important point within the dialectical conception of humanity and nature, which 
contrasts with the incessant inversion of hierarchies so representative of the deep and social ecology 
discourses, respectively. Indicative of this theoretical tug o’ war, witness the following book titles: Morris 
Berman’s The Reenchantment of the World (1981) and Murray Bookchin’s Re-enchanting Humanity (1995b).  
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(mostly imagined) condition of organic unity, harmony, oneness, and so on. The 
thought of a prelapsarian ‘natural’ state in which human beings were perfectly 
at one and reconciled with nature is a delusion, and a potentially dangerous one 
at that. Adorno is well aware of this and duly avoids falling into such a 
position. Not only is there ‘no way back’, so to speak, but, moreover, there is no 
place to which we might return in any case. The idea of the ‘origin’ is, on 
Adorno’s account, an ideological one that usually works in the service of the 
established order and those already in an ascendant position: 
 
The category of the root, the origin, is a category of dominion. It confirms 
that a man ranks first because he was there first; it confirms the autochthon 
against the newcomer, the settler against the migrant. The origin – 
seductive because it will not be appeased by the derivative, by ideology – is 
itself an ideological principle (ND, p. 155) 
 
Any re-conceptualization of nature, and humanity’s place within it, then, has to 
begin with an acceptance that there is no original instantiation of reconciliation 
which can be simply duplicated, reinstated or relied upon as a guide. The 
dynamic aspect of such a re-conceptualization lies in the fact that we have to 
work with the existing conceptual frameworks but not be entirely bound to 
them. In this respect, Adorno’s dialectical understanding of humanity-nature 
provides an important corrective to the leading ecological discourses which 
bind themselves to hypostatized categories – deep ecology to an ecocentric 
position that hypostatizes and exalts nature; social ecology to an anthropocentric 
position that hypostatizes and exalts humanity. Neither discourse gives much, 
if any, attention to the necessary mediation and co-determination of the human 
and the natural. This dialectical deficit constitutes the discourses’ most notable 
limitations.       
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2.3  Re-conceptualizing Nature 
 
At this stage, it is worthwhile further investigating this notion of a re-
conceptualization of nature and what it might entail. To begin with, such a re-
conceptualization should critically reflect upon the ways in which certain kinds 
of thinking and interacting (potentially or tendentially) foster relations of 
domination and instigate suffering. To this end, the important recurring theme 
of the non-identical within Adorno’s philosophy takes on a central role. 
Regardless of whether or not the term itself is explicitly deployed, one senses 
throughout much of his work an almost impossibly acute sensitivity towards all 
manner of suffering, exclusion, forced assimilation, reductions of difference or 
otherness, the exilic condition, and suchlike (or, in more general terms, what is 
‘left over’ from attempts to fully capture an object through conceptualization). 
The non-identical is Adorno’s choice of phrase to refer to the irreducible residue 
that eludes consciousness; it stands for the irreconcilable distance or 
epistemological gap that remains between concept and object. In this sense, 
while Adorno clearly takes much influence from Hegel in terms of his 
understanding of mediation, when it comes to epistemology and respecting the 
non-identical Adorno follows Kant in invoking the idea of a ‘block’ to our 
knowledge of the objective world. Indeed, in his lecture series, Kant’s Critique 
of Pure Reason, Adorno claims:  
 
This barrier [the block] prevents something which is deeply embedded in 
nature from behaving as if it were a transcendent category, utterly superior 
to nature. We may well say that the spirit that forgets that it is rooted in 
nature, and that consequently truly asserts its own absolute status, is 
committing an act of hubris that condemns it all the more to fall victim to 
its own roots in nature (KCPR, pp. 75-76)   
 
There is, however, an important difference between the Kantian block and the 
Adornian gap, as it were. Where the Kantian Ding-an-sich appears static and 
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wholly independent in its sheer unknowability, the Adornian object, by 
contrast, stores up historical meaning within it and so avoids becoming 
“hypostatized, magically transformed into an invariant” (SO, p. 246).119 As such, 
while a gap (or ‘chorismos’) will always pertain between subject and object, the 
extent of the separation will alter through the ongoing mediation between 
subject and object. Shifting subjective positions and contexts, as well as diverse 
and evolving meanings, uses and relations, are historically sedimented within 
the object. In light of this socio-historic compound of meanings, critical thought 
occurs: 
 
The history locked in the object can only be delivered by a knowledge 
mindful of the historic positional value of the object in its relation to other 
objects [. . .] Cognition of the object in its constellation is cognition of the 
process stored in the object (ND, p. 163)   
 
Adorno’s appreciation of and sensitivity towards the irreducible gap between 
subject and object, or the remainder that exceeds subjective identification, that 
is, the non-identical, are in some respects hardly surprising given his many 
years in exile during the period of Nazi rule in Germany. But it is not only the 
brutality of physical and human forms of suffering that Adorno so aptly 
examines and criticizes. He also extends his critical insight to include 
suffering120 of non-physical things (i.e. concepts and thought) and non-human 
material (i.e. natural objects). While there are perfectly good reasons why much 
attention is given to Adorno’s salient critiques of fascism and other forms of 
oppression and violence, I believe it will be useful to consider the ‘other side’, if 
you will, of Adorno’s critical theory, that is to say, the side which explores the 
potential damage and suffering inflicted upon non-physical and non-human 
objects, since it is arguable that both sides relate to and inform one another in a 
                                               
119 I made a similar distinction in Chapter I in the discussion of Benjamin’s and Adorno’s respective 
understandings of the object within a constellational arrangement. 
120 If the term ‘suffering’ appears inappropriate to the discussion of the non-physical and non-human, then 
perhaps ‘deformation’ or ‘domination’ may be substituted to make the same point in less evocative 
language. Nicholas Joll gives an interesting account of these latter terms (see Joll, 2010).     
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number of key ways. Moreover, such an understanding of this element of 
Adorno’s thinking will undoubtedly aid us in grasping his dialectical 
understanding of nature and humanity.   
 
The following passage provides a useful starting point for defending the 
position that Adorno’s critique of domination also applies to the non-physical 
and non-human realm: 
 
Myth turns into enlightenment, and nature into mere objectivity. Men pay 
for the increase of their power with alienation over that which they exercise 
their power. Enlightenment behaves toward things as a dictator toward 
men. He knows them in so far as he can manipulate them (DE, p. 9)   
 
The controversial dictator metaphor should not be read as mere hyperbole. 
Rather, it aptly exhibits the scope of Adorno’s concern for all manner of 
domination and suffering. Some may feel uneasy at this and deem it misguided, 
anti-humanistic, or simply inappropriate to accord the same level of attention to 
the manipulation and domination of, say, an inanimate natural object, on the 
one hand, and that of real, physical, living beings, on the other. Of course, in 
Adorno’s work ethical priority for human suffering is never in question. Yet, he 
is consistently wont to show just how an unbridled instrumental form of reason 
and conceptualization contributes to the perpetuation of suffering at both the 
human and non-human levels. The two elements cannot be disentangled, and, 
indeed, it is not farfetched to suggest that the ways in which we think about 
and interact with natural non-human objects are likely to have an impact on 
how we think about and interact with fellow human subjects. As such, it is 
clearly of ethical significance that we turn a critical eye to the modes of thought 
that predominate in a given time and place, as well as the suffering they might 
inflict.   
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What might it mean to say that natural objects ‘suffer’ in some sense?  Suffering 
could be said to play a pivotal role within Adorno’s conception of truth, as he 
powerfully asserts in Negative Dialectics: “The need to lend a voice to suffering is 
a condition of all truth” (ND, pp. 17-18). Of course, in the passage from which 
this quote is taken Adorno is specifically referring to the suffering of subjects. 
However, on the very next page his concern is more explicitly with objects:  
 
While doing violence to the object of its syntheses, our thinking heeds a 
potential that waits in the object, and it unconsciously obeys the idea of 
making amends to the pieces for what it has done (ND, p. 19)   
 
The uneasy sense of remorse that is aligned with this idea of ‘making amends’ 
betrays a strong ethical relation pertaining to thought and objects. It implies that 
in some way objects – though inanimate and always mediated – can be 
mediated in ways that are more or less damaging, stifling, domineering, and so 
forth, or in ways which are fundamentally or morally unjustifiable. Just as we 
always, to an extent, impose certain limitations upon subjects through the act of 
classification under general concepts, so we hasten the ignorance of sensuous 
particularities in relation to objects through the very same processes of 
identification. To speak of a tree qua tree implies the substitutability of one tree 
for any other. The particular objective instantiation becomes exemplary of a 
universal category. Such identitarian thinking – which Adorno refers to as “the 
mythological form of thought” (ND, p. 203) – plays an active role in instigating 
and perpetuating the domination of natural objects, as well as inhibiting what 
might be called an object’s spontaneous development.   
 
This last point is important to clarify, for it could prima facie lend itself to 
precisely the sort of re-enchantment of the natural world we have previously 
dismissed. To be clear, Adorno is highly critical of reactionary environmentalist 
projects that merely call for unreflective reverence and awe in light of natural 
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objects, since such actions fail to acknowledge the necessary mediation of 
nature and humanity, and, furthermore, can actually be used in the service of 
perpetuating the extant domination of nature.121 Adorno argues that “the 
question about nature as the absolute first, as the downright immediate” is 
delusive (ND, p. 359). Again, the issues here are around development and 
mediation. In thinking about natural objects in terms of development, we might 
say, following Jay Bernstein, that not only do our concepts of nature change 
over time, but that natural objects themselves change and develop in various 
ways (2001, p. 189). Indeed, Adorno denies the possibility of making any strict 
demarcation between human history, on the one hand, and natural history, on 
the other. To this end, he approvingly quotes Marx as follows: 
 
We know only a single science, the science of history. History can be 
considered from two sides, divided into the history of nature and the 
history of mankind. Yet there is no separating the two sides; as long as men 
exist, natural and human history will qualify each other (cited in ND, p. 
358)122 
 
What can be conceptualized as nature develops with time and on account of 
subjective and historical mediation, just as the history of subjectivity is 
mediated through and through by nature. Yet, in the instrumentally 
rationalized world of modernity, a mistaken causal link is inferred from this 
development of nature and humanity, to the effect that human relations (in 
their current state) are seen to manifest a kind of ‘second nature’ deriving from 
the first. Adorno and Horkheimer argue that this mythification of existing 
relations comes about through enlightened thinking, which requires a strictly 
imposed division of labour in order to practically and rationally control nature. 
                                               
121  Think of how national parks, zoos, bird sanctuaries, fenced-off hiking trails, and so on, appear to 
preserve the natural world ‘as it is’ but in actual fact routinely dominate nature, reducing it to the status of 
a museum piece for subjective contemplation. Moreover, that these ‘examples’ of ‘nature’ are preserved 
acts to conceal and perpetuate the domination of the natural world in every other realm of social activity: 
“Natural beauty is ideology where it serves to disguise mediatedness as immediacy [. . .] There is hardly 
anything left of it [nature] in organized tourism” (AT, pp. 89-90).   
122  This is a deleted passage that originally appeared in The German Ideology.   
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Without a strong hierarchical division of labour in place the control of nature 
would be less efficient and effective. As the motivation of our drive to control 
nature has its basis in self-preservation, to question the dominant enlightened 
methodology comes to be seen as irrational, naive, quaint or unreasonable: 
“Whoever resigns himself to life without any rational reference to self-
preservation would, according to the Enlightenment [. . .] regress to prehistory” 
(DE, p. 29). In this way, enlightenment reverts to mythology, becoming 
unquestioning and dogmatic in its beliefs, practices and thought-forms, while 
enlightened social relations take on a false sense of naturalness, respectability 
and rationality. In order to break or at least challenge this spell or ‘second 
nature’, thought should attempt to redirect our focus towards the mediation 
between nature and humanity with a view to shifting the motivational 
foundations upon which so much of our practical activity is based (i.e. self-
preservation). This does not mean ditching enlightenment thinking in toto, 
which some readings of Adorno might try to advocate as the logical conclusion 
of his arguments.123 But rather it calls to attention the need to enlighten 
enlightenment, to use critical thinking against thought itself,124 to re-inject into 
reason its most essential critical (and self-critical) faculties. In other words, to 
revitalize just those elements of reason which are often repressed in its 
instrumental application toward unquestioned ends.   
 
We have said so far that the dialectical relationship between humanity and 
nature should neither be overlooked nor swept aside, for it introduces the 
important idea that objects not only ‘suffer’ (in my extended use of the term) 
but also contain within them a complex history, meaning and redemptive 
potential. It is my view that Adorno’s critical thought may provide us with 
                                               
123 Indeed, this train of thought was propelled forward by Jürgen Habermas with the publication of The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1987).   
124 As Adorno later put it, philosophy “must strive, by way of the concept, to transcend the concept” (ND, 
p. 15).   
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ways in which to re-conceptualize nature that would take mediation and 
development into account while retaining an openness and respect in relation 
to the preponderance of the object. This re-conceptualization, in my view, 
provides a necessary point of contrast to and criticism of the dominant 
ecological discourses – deep ecology and social ecology – both of which fail to 
adequately theorize the ongoing mediation between nature and human beings 
on account of which neither concept, that is, neither ‘nature’ nor ‘humanity’, 
can be defined statically.   
 
I wish to now explore these issues further with reference to some of the 
enigmatic film works of Andrei Tarkovsky. It is my aim to show that, like 
Adorno’s critical theory, Tarkovsky’s filmic work presents us with a view of 
nature and humanity in which mutual constitution and dialectical mediation 
are essential and unavoidable. There is much in Tarkovsky’s work to promote 
and provoke a change in perspective, that is to say, a more open and non-
violent understanding of the world and human beings’ place within it. Such a 
perspectival shift can provide a timely and more nuanced corrective to the fixed 
dualistic premises of contemporary ecological thought.      
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3. REFLECTIONS ON TARKOVSKY’S DIALECTIC OF HUMANITY AND NATURE 
 
The complex interaction between nature and humanity is a recurrent theme 
throughout much of Adorno’s thought, as previously examined, but it also 
finds aesthetic expression in much of the filmic work of Andrei Tarkovsky. The 
desire to reignite our understanding and recognition of the mediation between 
humanity and nature is pivotal for both Adorno, the critical theorist, and 
Tarkovsky, the artist. On further reflection, their respective approaches to this 
issue appear to productively complement one another, as I will argue presently, 
since both, in their own form, offer critical perspectives on overly instrumental 
relations between human beings and the natural world. What is more, 
Tarkovsky’s films can be seen to avoid hypostatizing the dualistic split between 
humanity and nature, instead presenting the two as co-constituting, ever 
changing and irreducible. In this regard, his films follow Adorno’s lead in 
avoiding the dual threat of anthropocentrism, on the one hand, and 
ecocentrism, on the other.    
 
The extensive and varied use of imagery of the natural world in Tarkovsky’s 
oeuvre has a range of effects, and cannot, or rather should not, be read in an 
overly simplistic manner. It would be easy to fall into the same position that 
characterizes some readings of Adorno whereby one cursorily concludes from 
the evocative images of nature that Tarkovsky is merely an ecologically aware 
artist – or even a ‘deep ecologist’ avant la lettre – who sees in the natural world a 
kind of pure, untainted harmony and peace that has been lost or progressively 
destroyed throughout the modern age. Indeed, this is precisely how the critic, 
Michael Dempsey, views Tarkovsky’s work. In relation to the latter’s complex 
semi-autobiographical film, Mirror, Dempsey observes a “deep longing for a 
state of Eden-before-the-Fall innocence and bliss” located in “exquisite images 
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of natural flux and flow” (1981, p. 15).  Moreover, on Dempsey’s account, 
Tarkovsky’s films betray  
 
a powerfully infectious belief in the natural world as the embodiment of a 
primal peace which we can regain. This vision of lost harmony is what 
haunts every aspect of Tarkovsky’s work (1981, p. 13) 
 
This broadly positive appraisal of Tarkovsky’s supposed belief in the 
redemptive power of nature is given a far less positive rendering in the 
following comment from Fredric Jameson: 
 
The deepest contradiction in Tarkovsky is [that of] [. . .] a valorization of 
nature without human technology achieved by the highest technology of 
the photographic apparatus itself. No reflexivity acknowledges this second 
hidden presence, thus threatening to transform Tarkovskian nature-
mysticism into the sheerest ideology (1995, p. 100)125 
 
Moreover, Jameson reiterates the prelapsarian interpretation offered by 
Dempsey, complaining that the director has transported the action to “a kind of 
pre-adolescent realm without sex or desire, before the forbidden fruit or the 
fall” (ibid., p. 93). Such views appear to be intuitively plausible, given the 
recurrence of representations of nature within the Russian film-maker’s corpus. 
But, just as I believe that attempts to appropriate Adorno’s work for the 
ecological cause are (at least in part) misguided and reductive, so too must we 
take care not to impose an overly simplistic (naturalistic) narrative onto 
Tarkovsky’s films. The latter’s ideas about nature are, like Adorno’s, 
multifaceted and dialectical.  
 
In this section, I will offer a reading of Tarkovsky’s Stalker making use of the 
Adornian conception of nature presented hitherto, so as to explicate the manner 
                                               
125 In this chapter I will be addressing the criticisms directed toward Tarkovsky’s alleged ‘nature-
mysticism’. However, refer to Chapter II on ‘Mimesis’ for a refutation of the other part of Jameson’s 
critique, namely, the idea that Tarkovsky’s technique is non-reflexive and fails to acknowledge the ‘second 
presence’ (i.e. the photographic apparatus). In my view, this criticism is baseless and, somewhat 
surprisingly for a reader of Jameson’s calibre, cursory. 
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in which film can contribute to the re-conceptualization of nature and further 
illuminate the dialectical mediation between human beings and the natural 
world (3.1). Related to and following on from this, I will undertake more 
thematic interpretations of Tarkovsky’s work as a whole in relation to Adorno’s 
idea of the remembrance of nature in the subject (3.2). Once again, such 
readings will contribute to the elucidation of the humanity-nature dialectic in 
contrast to the limited perspectives provided by the existing ecological 
discourses.      
 
3.1  Reading Stalker with Adorno  
 
In one of his later and best known films, Stalker, Tarkovsky’s use of nature is 
more subtle and complex than either Dempsey’s or Jameson’s readings can 
accommodate. Loosely based on the novella, Roadside Picnic (first published in 
1972), by the Strugatsky brothers, Stalker is set within an unspecified time and 
location in the not-too-distant future. From the opening sequences of the film, 
we sense that the atmosphere and appearance of the post-industrial (and 
possibly post-catastrophic) setting is stark, bleak, colourless and fractured. Near 
to this unidentified place there exists a forbidden region referred to simply as 
‘the Zone’. On account of its relative inaccessibility, the Zone has become the 
basis for the development of magic-inflected gossip and local folklore. The 
Stalker acts as an illegal guide for people wishing to visit the Zone, which 
attracts attention from curious punters aware of the rumour that somewhere 
within this mysterious area is a room that is said to contain powers capable of 
realizing one’s innermost desires and wishes. In order to access the Zone one 
must – with the assistance of the Stalker – successfully navigate past the 
authorities, guardsmen and barbed wire that marshal the borders surrounding 
the forbidden region, in addition to avoiding the treacherous (yet invisible) 
dangers that will face them once in the Zone. The Stalker agrees to take two 
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men to the Zone: one simply referred to as ‘Scientist’, the other as ‘Writer’.126 
Their reasons for embarking upon the risky venture to the Zone vary somewhat 
but they are not unrelated. The Writer is a heavy drinker and frequently 
exhibits disillusionment (with the world, his life, his work), self-doubt and self-
contempt, a deep cynicism, as well as intolerance for all things metaphysical (at 
one key point, he says “No Gods, no goblins, no Bermuda Triangle”). Important 
to note here, however, is the impression that the Writer appears not at all 
comfortable in his radically cynical Weltanschauung, and in fact makes a habit of 
mocking the Scientist for the latter’s dogmatic rationalism. The Scientist is 
similarly beyond metaphysics intellectually but has very little doubt as to the 
suitability and efficacy of his staunch pragmatism, rationality and materialism. 
His interest in the Zone appears to be more in keeping with that of a debunking 
exercise on behalf of science. Indeed, only later in the film do we discover that 
the Scientist’s real motive for the visit is to plant a device that will destroy the 
Room once and for all.     
 
After successfully managing to circumvent the border controls (and evading the 
guards’ gunshots), the three men make their way towards the Zone on a small 
railroad trolley. After a dialogue-free four-minute collection of close-ups 
interspersed with glimpses of the scenery and background charting the group’s 
journey, the Stalker brings the trolley to a halt. Accompanying a cut to the Zone, 
the stark black and white tones of the film’s opening thirty-seven minutes give 
way to an abundance of colour. The layered greens of the foliage leap out at us 
after the extended use of black and white, affecting a distinct shift in mood and 
perspective. This shift may prima facie lend support to the interpretation that 
holds nature as ‘other’, in other words, an immediate haven of primal peace 
and tranquillity, an untainted repository of colours that are wholly absent from 
                                               
126 Tarkovsky has stated that both characters, while not merely intellectual ciphers, as it were, can be seen to 
represent prevalent personality types within the modern, enlightened world.   
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the urban (post-) industrial habitat of late modernity so aptly represented in the 
initial images of and scenes set within the border town. Yet, on a closer reading, 
the idea of nature-as-redemptive-other (or, as argued against previously, 
nature-as-non-identity) becomes problematic, and one notices the various 
subtleties that lie within Tarkovsky’s particular depiction of nature amid the 
Zone.   
 
The initial visceral reaction we experience upon first glimpsing the Zone is a 
result of the (newly introduced) colour, and not to the scenery being depicted on 
screen. It is the form of the representation rather than any specific representative 
content that brings about the strong reaction. Indeed, one could argue that the 
effects would have been replicated whatever the contents of the shot in 
question. From what is depicted of the Zone, it does not appear to be typically 
breathtaking or outstanding in its beauty, certainly if considered along the 
traditional (Romantic) trajectories of natural beauty within aesthetic theory. 
Rather, what is shown consists of a landscape that is ragged, overgrown, 
uneven, an assemblage of degeneration and regeneration. There are rusting 
vehicles (including jeeps and tanks) amid the shrubs, long grass and crumbling 
walls, as well as broken telephone terminals and disused observation posts. It is 
also quite possible that the Zone contains vestigial elements of radioactivity.127 
And, of course, there is the enigmatic dilapidated building (‘the Room’) that the 
three characters eventually discover with the hope that their desires will be 
realized. The composition of Tarkovsky’s arresting images – both beautiful and 
dissonant – aptly hold up Adorno’s claim that an artwork’s authenticity is 
guaranteed through its “[s]cars of damage and disruption”, through which “art 
desperately negates the closed confines of the ever-same; explosion is one of its 
invariants” (AT, p. 29). Thus, a more open world of meaning is disclosed, 
                                               
127 In the original story by the Strugatsky brothers, the Zones (plural) were brought about as a result of 
brief alien landings which left behind radioactive debris. Tarkovsky gives no clear indications as to the 
origins of the Zone in the film.       
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hinting towards what is routinely excluded from or not even acknowledged in 
established understandings of social ‘reality’ and ‘nature’. 
 
One of the most memorable scenes in the film consists of a long take dream 
sequence of the Stalker, in which the camera slowly and serenely tracks, or 
almost floats, above a shallow stream containing a number of objects. These 
include pieces of rusting metal (a spring, gun, tin boxes), some goldfish, a 
syringe, deteriorating photographs, a broken icon, coins, artillery, as well as 
other unidentifiable matter. Significantly, this scene is presented in sepia tones, 
evoking not only the obvious sense of remembrance and loss, but also 
(re)igniting a feeling of connectedness and socio-historical awareness. I would 
argue that in this shot we see Tarkovsky’s (and, for that matter, Adorno’s) 
dialectic of nature and humanity represented. As I noted earlier, there is a sense 
of ambiguity in the varied interactions of nature with humanity, inasmuch as 
they are neither wholly positive nor negative. The Stalker’s dream sequence 
subtly recalls this ambiguity as we see how the misty natural water in the 
stream has not been unaffected by human interaction, just as the human 
constructions immersed in the water have not remained unaltered. In some 
cases, the water has rusted and decayed the objects, while in other instances it 
has cleansed the various items, rejuvenating their colour, form and 
appearance.128  
 
The mediation is communicated through the physical interaction of the natural 
elements and manmade constructs over time. We cannot separate the natural 
world from our human activity, needs, wants and desires. These things 
                                               
128 In an interview, Tarkovsky made clear his fondness for the cinematic qualities of water: “Water lives, it 
has a depth, it moves, it changes, it can be as reflective as a mirror, one can drown within it, one can drink 
it, one can wash oneself with it, etc.” (Tarkovsky & Gianvito, 2006, p. 182). Similarly, the director’s use of 
fire is always to show its ambiguity. While it can provide light, warmth, succour and symbolic value, fire 
can also be a terrorizing cause of destruction (as seen in, for instance, the burning of the house in The 
Sacrifice, or the dacha ablaze in Mirror).    
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intertwine and evolve over time. This intertwinement and evolution recalls the 
idea of natural-history, the co-determination of nature and the historical, the 
former in the latter, and vice versa.   
 
Tarkovsky’s Stalker can be read as an extension of what I have called the re-
conceptualization of nature. Through its gentle and uncompromisingly slow 
pace, form, and unfolding imagery, the film allows us to view nature as 
something dynamic, mediated, enigmatic; something of which we are 
irreducibly a part, but to which we cannot be reduced. Tarkovsky’s work, like 
Adorno’s theory, refuses to fall into the simplistic dichotomy of nature (good 
and pure) and humanity (bad and impure). Nature as reflected in Tarkovsky’s 
lens is complex – a sign of life and death, decay and renewal, destruction and 
construction. Following an Adornian line, as with all conceptual thought, 
attempts to define ‘nature’ as this or that will be partial and incomplete as our 
concepts come up against the limits of their application in the overflowing 
objectivity of the material. This gap between thought and its object is nothing 
other than mediation. The foremost experience of such mediation may be said to 
consist in human beings’ relations with the natural environment that surrounds 
them. In our contemporary context, these relations are obscured or neglected as 
the forms of social life become increasingly reified. For Adorno, reification 
always entails a kind of forgetting. In the reification and domination of nature, 
the naturalness of human subjects is forgotten, while the utter contingency of 
the reifying social relations themselves is naturalized.    
 
3.2  The Remembrance of Nature 
 
In both Solaris and Stalker, Tarkovsky foregrounds the scientific obsession of an 
unencumbered ‘progress’ and enlightenment through his central characters. 
Solaris features a group of three scientists aboard a space-station, while Stalker 
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features a character simply referred to as ‘Scientist’ (or sometimes ‘Professor’, 
depending on the print). In both films, the scientific mindset appears as not 
only rational, methodical, unaffected by emotional, spiritual or religious 
sentiment, but also as unyielding, cold, anti-metaphysical and fearful of the 
unknown. Recall that, in Stalker, the Scientist plans to destroy the Room within 
the Zone, meanwhile one of the scientists in Solaris, Sartorius, explains to Kelvin 
that his ‘wife’, Hari, is just a synthetic copy created by the mysterious Ocean out 
of his own memories of her, and as such she could be destroyed.129 In both films, 
Tarkovsky reflects Adornian concerns, portraying the unquestioned 
enlightenment rationality as dangerous and, ultimately, detrimental to the very 
purposes for which it ostensibly developed, namely, self-preservation.   
 
In Stalker, what the Zone stands for may be best understood as the objective, 
natural conditions of existence, that is, the inescapable materiality in and of 
which our human lives are composed. The Stalker’s wariness of the 
environment’s powers and sensitivity may well be exaggerated, but it is borne 
out of a respect for the preponderance of nature. In doing so, the Stalker – like 
many of Tarkovsky’s characters – attests to, what Adorno refers to as, the 
‘remembrance of nature’ [Eingedenken der Natur] in the subject. As noted 
previously, humans are a part of nature, but not reducible to nature. By the same 
token, human beings cannot extricate themselves entirely from nature either. It 
is not possible for a human to be completely de-naturalized as such. While 
reason allows us to rise above basic natural instincts and create institutions, 
social orders, values, traditions, art, and so on, reason must also (if it is not to 
become reified or instrumental) allow for reflection on and recollection of our 
very naturalness. Human beings are neither ‘mere nature’ [blosse Natur] nor 
wholly other to nature; therein lies the necessity of mediation.  
                                               
129 Elsewhere, Sartorius reinstates the predominant scientific method: “Man was created by Nature in 
order to explore it. As he approaches Truth he is fated to Knowledge. All the rest is bullshit”. 
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As Adorno and Horkheimer write, critical, self-reflecting thought  
 
allows the distance [between humanity and nature] perpetuating injustice 
to be measured. By virtue of the remembrance of nature in the subject, in 
whose fulfilment the unacknowledged truth of all culture lies hidden, 
enlightenment is universally opposed to domination (DE, p. 40) 
 
Enlightenment, then, so often aligned with the scientific method of debunking 
myth and hastening the progression of humankind, is perhaps better geared 
towards achieving its overarching and commendable aim of universal 
emancipation by avoiding an unquestioning domination of the natural, non-
human world, and instead retaining a certain humility, self-awareness and 
openness to otherness. Absent the remembrance of nature in the subject, 
enlightenment reverts to its opposite – a new dogmatism, exalting the human 
being severed from nature for the purposes of uncritical ‘progress’.   
 
This dynamic between nature and humanity, as well as the remembrance of 
nature in the subject, are recurring motifs in the work of Tarkovsky. There are 
numerous moments in his films which reflect humanity’s urge to transcend its 
natural limitations, to escape from the brute matter of existence. One thinks of 
the opening dream sequence in Ivan’s Childhood, where the camera 
(representative of Ivan’s POV) soars through and eventually above the trees. 
Or, in Andrei Rublëv, the opening scene shows Yefim hanging on to a primitive 
hot air balloon in order to ‘fly’ above the crowds of people and animals. In 
Solaris, Kelvin is preparing to leave this earth entirely to conduct research on a 
space-station. Meanwhile, there are at least three levitation scenes in 
Tarkovsky’s oeuvre – in Solaris, Mirror, and The Sacrifice, respectively. Yet, while 
he is evidently not averse to acknowledging this all-too-human desire for 
transcendence, Tarkovsky never gives in to it, or, rather, he does not allow it to 
take precedence over the natural world. When characters experience significant 
moments of recognition, spiritual (re)awakening, reunion, and so forth, these 
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occur firmly within the material conditions of immanence. People look to the 
earth, not the skies, for epiphanic inspiration. Ivan’s dream flight ends and he is 
shown happily running along a path through the forest, shortly before waking 
up in the bleak, harsh and dark surroundings of his war-torn reality. Yefim’s 
balloon flight ends in a crash landing, a sharp return to earthly existence. When 
Kelvin goes to the space-station, he takes some soil with him in a box. Also, 
recall once again the Stalker’s dream sequence: despite the recitations of 
extracts from the Apocalypse during the scene, the central visual focus is 
material, namely, the various objects in, and elements of, the shallow stream. In 
this scene, as in many others, the natural and the humanly constructed 
inexorably intertwine.   
 
Tarkovsky’s overarching sensibility is towards our immanent world, and for all 
the spirituality imbued in his films, it is always to be found in reconciliation 
between human beings and nature, and not between humanity and God. Robert 
Bird shares in this view, when he writes: 
 
[Tarkovsky] treasured the security of standing firmly on the earth – in 
social and professional systems, in aesthetic and spiritual tradition, and in 
the spaces of home and nature (2008, pp. 222-223) 
 
This ‘materialist’ reading, I believe, offers a more interesting and relevant 
interpretive avenue than those afforded by predominant religious 
interpretations of his work – in particular, Stalker.130 As Mark Le Fanu notes, if 
Tarkovsky is “friendly to the idea of religion and miracles [. . .] the ethical 
significance of life is still to be found in the concrete ordeals of experience” 
(1987, p. 98). Furthermore, in Stalker, allusions to the supposed manifold 
dangers and mysterious powers within the mythically-charged ‘Zone’ turn out, 
                                               
130 Cf. Jameson’s uncharitable summation: “This novel [Roadside Picnic] Tarkovsky made over into the most 
lugubrious religious fable” whose protagonist exudes an intolerable “drearily suffering Christ-like 
solemnity” (1995, p. 92).  
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ultimately, to be unsubstantiated. Throughout the entire film nothing 
supernatural or beyond material explanation actually occurs.131   
 
This surprising negation of overt supernaturalism is true of Tarkovsky’s work 
as a whole. As is well highlighted in Chris Marker’s documentary on 
Tarkovsky, entitled One Day in the Life of Andrei Arsenevich, even the angles of 
the director’s shots are ordinarily constituted so as to produce a slight 
downward-looking perspective, as if from above the subject gazing toward the 
earth, rather than from below the subject looking towards the sky as was the 
standard mainstream technique of the time (Marker, 1999). Once again, the 
material rootedness of Tarkovsky’s figures in their natural world is 
communicated not only through the content of the frame but also via the formal 
construction of the shot. Throughout his oeuvre, Tarkovsky’s demanding 
approach to his projects is such that the actors are deprived of the usual 
supports – such as detailed character histories, psychological information, 
narrative progressions, not to mention the technical conventions of 
shots/reverse-shots and close-ups – which normally serve to foreground the 
character on screen and focus (and, in a sense, limit) the spectator’s 
concentration to certain ways of seeing.   
 
Utilizing the full scope of his cinematic eye, Tarkovsky will often seek to fully 
situate people in their objective surroundings, creating images with a coherence 
and density that not only recognizes but celebrates the inextricable mediation 
between humanity and nature. One can think here of Boriska in Andrei Rublëv, 
lying on his back amid the mud and pouring rain, taking the wet earth into his 
                                               
131 There is much debate over and ambiguity in the final scenes of the film which shows the Stalker’s 
previously disabled daughter appearing to walk across the room, before the camera pans out to reveal that 
she is actually sat upon her father’s shoulders. Shortly after this, she is shown sat at a table on which lay 
three glasses. She stares at them intently and, in an apparent feat of telekinesis, the glasses move. 
However, we shortly hear the rumblings of a passing freight train (in a reprise of the opening scene of the 
film in which a glass of water is disturbed by a train’s vibrations), thereby destabilizing any notions of the 
supernatural and leaving us uncertain as to the cause of the glasses’ movements.    
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hands and embracing it. Elsewhere in the same film, pagan couples take 
themselves deep into the foliage to copulate. In Stalker, the eponymous guide, 
on more than one occasion, almost sinks into the natural surroundings of the 
Zone, first lying face down on the boggy ground, and, again, among the tall 
overgrown grass. In the opening scene to Solaris, after a slow moving series of 
close-up shots of a pond, we first see Kelvin enveloped by the lush vegetation 
near to his family home. Notably, as he walks through the forest from left to 
right on screen, the camera gently pans in mimicry of Kelvin’s walk until our 
view of the protagonist is obscured briefly by a tree trunk in mid-shot. We 
expect Kelvin to duly re-enter the frame at the other side of the trunk, but 
instead a few extra seconds pass and he reappears much further to the right of 
screen and seemingly out of the bushes. This perhaps can be seen as reflecting 
the director’s tendency to reject the conventional positioning of the subject over 
against the objective surroundings. In this unexpected repositioning, Tarkovsky 
reminds us that the entire frame is made up of richly diverse and meaningful 
matter. Indeed, it is fair to say that landscapes in and of themselves play active 
roles in Tarkovsky’s films,132 while the actors (and the characters they portray) 
are usually treated as just another part of the landscape. In Mirror, as Synessios 
also notes, nature is “not a backdrop, but the protagonist” (2001, p. 65). Once 
more, then, the dialectic of nature and humanity is played out in Tarkovsky’s 
aesthetic form. In such works, human beings are neither extricated from nature 
and exalted as eternally superior, nor subsumed under an all-powerful and 
utterly external nature. Both nature and humanity feed into one another, each 
co-determining its other to the point at which their independence and isolation 
are replaced by interdependence and mediation. If ecological thinking today 
can be enhanced and released from its hierarchical inversions, dichotomous 
                                               
132 In Solaris, of course, this is more pronounced due to the creative powers of the Ocean, which apparently 
gives life to subconscious desires based within the memories of the space-station’s occupants. While the 
idea of this semi-conscious Ocean lends the film its ‘science-fiction’ credentials, at the same time it reminds 
us that our own world is itself unfathomably creative and life-giving.    
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thought patterns, and disciplinary impasse, the dialectical understanding as 
evidenced in Adorno’s critical theory and Tarkovsky’s films can go some 
considerable way towards achieving this end.          
 
SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter, I have examined two leading ecological discourses in deep 
ecology and social ecology, and found them wanting on a number of issues. The 
main problem was shown to consist in their limited acknowledgement of the 
mediation between humanity and nature, which leads both discourses to 
hypostatize categories and hierarchically posit one as superior to the other. I 
offered a reading of Adorno’s critical theory with particular attention given to 
his dialectical conception of nature, arguing that this may serve as a corrective 
to the shortcomings of deep ecology and social ecology. Throughout the 
chapter, I have tried to demonstrate how Adorno criticizes the instrumental 
forms which reason has taken, and the forms through which he argues for a 
critical awareness of the dialectical mediation between humanity and nature. 
Such a shift in attitudes toward ourselves, others and (both internal and 
external) nature, I argued, could be glimpsed in Adorno’s critical theory and 
certain moments within the filmic work of Andrei Tarkovsky. Central to both 
their respective approaches is a concern with the detrimental effects of an 
unbridled instrumental rationality on not only intersubjective relations between 
human beings, but also those relations between human subjects and natural 
objects. The pre-eminence of instrumental reason, powering forward under the 
ideological banner of legitimacy provided by the originary drive for human 
self-preservation, allows for an unparalleled domination of nature, which for 
Adorno cannot be neatly separated from its potential to transpose into the 
domination of some human beings over others. As such, it is the duty of critical 
thought to work against instrumentalization, both in the practical realm and its 
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theoretical counterpart. My contention is that Adornian theory and Tarkovsky’s 
films effectively illuminate the mediation of nature and humanity. In this effort, 
both work towards enhancing our interactions with and understandings of both 
inner and outer nature. 
   
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
To conclude this study of Adornian theory and film, I will offer brief reviews of 
the arguments presented, before remarking on the current social and political 
climate in and out of which the arguments have been formulated. In the first 
chapter, I sought to survey the terrain covered by some of the most prominent 
readings of Adorno and highlight the possible limitations such readings reveal. 
The primary shortcoming of existing commentary was found to consist in the 
search for, or active construction of, a single coherent ‘Adorno’, through which 
the various transitions, contradictions, tensions, and so on, were interpretively 
smoothed over or explained away. In contrast to such approaches, I argued for 
the necessity of maintaining the dialectical movement and forces within 
Adorno’s thought, focusing on particular concepts and themes in his work as 
opposed to erecting a monolithic theoretical edifice.   
 
The chapter then moved on to analyze and criticize the disciplinary divide 
between political economy and cultural studies, whose conflicting 
methodological approaches towards cultural objects were shown to be 
inadequate. While theorists of political economy routinely treat culture as 
epiphenomenal to the marketplace and overlook its symbolic value, those of 
cultural studies overemphasize the polysemic meanings, appropriations and 
experiences of cultural objects by diverse consumers giving insufficient 
attention to the significant influence of productive forces and ownership. The 
absence of any serious consideration of Adornian theory in both camps was 
shown to be regrettable, since his notion of dialectical cultural criticism offers a 
contrasting and more nuanced alternative to the prevailing techniques 
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deployed by both political economy, on the one hand, and cultural studies, on 
the other. By both participating and not participating in culture, the critical 
theoretical approach engages enough so as to understand the motivational, 
economic, productive and distributive factors that go into the making and 
dissemination of certain cultural artefacts, but not so much as to become 
affirmative or over-optimistic with regard to culture’s emancipatory or 
democratizing potential. Once again, this tension in Adorno’s cultural criticism 
– the dialectic of participation and non-participation – can be seen as productive 
rather than hampering, and as such, so I argued, should be upheld rather than 
resolved. 
 
The opening chapter closed with an examination of Adorno’s position on film, 
and an attempt to defend the applicability of his critical theory to filmic works. 
The ontologized (negative) conception of film evident throughout the vast 
majority of Adorno’s texts was shown to be one of the most notable lacunae in 
his oeuvre. Misconstruing the contingent cinematic forms that had developed in 
his lifetime as ontologically dictated by film per se, Adorno uncharacteristically 
failed to appreciate the social and political conditions that had brought about 
the development of film in such limited studio-led directions. Only in 1966 did 
Adorno officially moderate his views on film, and even then not without 
qualification (see TF). Nevertheless, I went on to argue that there is no reason to 
restrict the application of Adornian categories to only those aesthetic realms of 
which he overtly approved, particularly since critical theory – more so than 
other forms of thinking – maintains a resolute awareness of its own contextual 
embeddedness, entwinement and partiality. Thus, to rigidify a theoretical 
position, as an insect seized in amber, is to diminish its movement and 
potential. As such, it was deemed necessary to find new configurations for the 
chosen concepts within Adorno’s work, to reignite their critical spark, and film 
provided an appropriate means through which to do so, for not only were 
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Adornian concepts shown to be valuable in the interpretation and analysis of 
filmic artworks, but the latter were also found to helpfully illuminate the 
former.            
 
The second chapter of the thesis reconsidered and attempted to defend the 
intriguing if difficult concept of mimesis. I began with an analysis of the various 
deployments of mimesis in Adorno’s thought, with particular attention to 
Dialectic of Enlightenment. In that text, Adorno and Horkheimer offer a quasi-
anthropological account of the development of the subject and reason in 
relation to mimesis. The first phase of mimesis, the archaic, was characterized 
by the rigid imitation of brute nature in order for human beings to (nominally) 
escape nature’s unpredictable and uncontrollable threats. Archaic mimesis 
represents simple adaptation, whereas the second phase, the magical, marks a 
development in the emerging subject as ‘organized control’ (fledgling forms of 
rationality) show themselves in repeated rituals and sacrificial practices 
undertaken with the aim of adapting and bending (if not entirely controlling) 
nature toward particular human interests. The final and ongoing phase of 
mimesis has culminated in the latter’s suppression amid industrial modes of 
production that prohibit as violent regression any residue of mimetic 
comportment. Nature is rationally controlled and the natural foundation of the 
self is systematically forgotten. Self-preservation moves toward self-
renunciation as the absolute split between rationality and mimesis is 
hypostatized, with the former banishing the latter to a position of not mere 
irrelevance but pre-civilized savagery. 
 
In the next part of the chapter, this rigid division between rationality and 
mimesis was shown to be replicated (somewhat surprisingly) in the seminal 
and paradigm-shifting work of Jürgen Habermas, whose ‘communicative turn’ 
has contributed significantly to the banishment of mimesis from recent critical 
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theoretical discourse. For Habermas, the existing forms of reason and 
enlightenment are sufficient means through which subjects can effectively 
communicate and construct arguments. As such, by Habermas’ account, there is 
no need to have recourse to mystical, pre-rational (or irrational), ineffable 
concepts such as mimesis. These mere impulses, or ‘others’ of reason, wrongly 
divert our attention from the gradual and progressive unfolding of modernity 
and enlightenment which, for Habermas, remain valid if unfinished projects. In 
trying to fashion an Adornian response to the communicative paradigm of 
intersubjectivity, I went on to defend the ‘preponderance of the object’ as a 
crucial element of a critical materialism that rejects the positing of a 
transcendental subject over against objects. Adorno’s more modest construal of 
subjective powers of cognition points the way toward a greater reflexivity in 
consciousness, which is to say that in order to fully realize itself the subject 
should reconnect with and give itself over to the object. In so doing, the subject 
does not fall into the traps associated with hypostatizing itself qua subject, while 
the object remains freer from domination within such a relation. The survival of 
mimesis feeds into subjective experiences with nature and art, whereby non-
conceptual affinities arise between things (both produced, that is, as artifice, 
and natural).     
 
The final section of the chapter continued the defence of mimesis through 
analyses of Tarkovsky’s filmic work, which I argued displayed a distinctive 
mimetic method. In both form and content, Tarkovsky’s work enacts the kind of 
assimilation to the object that characterizes the non-violent practice of mimetic 
comportment. Rather than unreflectively embracing new technological 
innovations and ever increasing possibilities of the apparatus at his disposal, 
Tarkovsky instead follows the contours, tempi and rhythms of the filmed 
material itself. Yet, this is not to view the artist’s job as simple reproduction of 
‘reality’, since the cinematic image is the result also of rational construction by 
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the subject. The mimetic moment occurs amid the complex relations between 
the rational (subjective) arrangements of (objective) material, all the while 
retaining the priority of the latter. A result of such mimetic technique in film is a 
form of non-conceptual, non-linguistic, and, one could even say, constellational 
communication, which is neither irrational nor fully communicable via existing 
pragmatic-linguistic categories. The mimetic method was finally also shown to 
inhere in the act of viewing Tarkovsky’s films, inasmuch as one has to 
assimilate to the cultural object rather than impose subjective frameworks and 
conceptual systems onto the object. Through interpretation of Adorno’s theory 
and Tarkovsky’s films, my aim was to challenge the dominant Habermasian 
communicative paradigm and reconsider the critical potential within the 
concept of mimesis.                     
 
In the third chapter, I sought to defend a position of marginality as conducive 
to social critique through an analysis of Adorno’s theoretical work and 
Haneke’s filmic work. The first half of the chapter looked at the totalizing 
macro-level criticism that occurs in the renderings of late capitalist society 
found in both Adorno and Haneke. In contrast to many readings that put 
psychological categories on a par with social ones in the context of the 
development of critical theory, I argued for an anti-psychological interpretation 
of Adornian theory by emphasizing the prioritization of society (i.e. objective 
conditions) in his work. What became of psychoanalysis, for Adorno, was seen 
to be nothing but therapeutic practices that indefensibly aided the individual in 
adapting to and becoming increasingly ‘functional’ within a false social world: 
“In adjusting to the mad whole the cured patient becomes really sick” (SP1, p. 
78). This movement against the explanatory concepts of psychology and 
psychoanalysis was also found in the filmic works of Haneke, whose visions of 
anonymous capitalist societies, and unremarkable and interchangeable 
characters, testify to the predominance of objective social forces reducing 
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individuals to functional parts in a systemic machine. When certain characters 
in his films subvert societal forces in some way – usually through a violent 
transgression or senseless lashing out – Haneke refuses to offer the 
conventional psychological apparatuses with which viewers normally 
comprehend such events. When confronted with such shocking and unrelenting 
coldness on screen, the viewer is tempted to look towards individual biography 
or psychic abnormality in order to cognitively absorb the shock. Instead, the 
social criticism of Adorno and Haneke forces us to accept the systemic nature 
and causes of violence (not only physical but psychical, and against both the 
self and others). 
 
After defending an anti-psychological reading of Adorno and Haneke, I went 
on to note the ostensible disappearance of a collective revolutionary subject and 
how this features in Adorno’s critical theory. In contrast to traditional Marxist 
teleological trajectories, Adorno countenances no hope for substantive social 
transformation through the rousing of class-consciousness. Late capitalist 
society is materially reproduced through not only unification but also 
fragmentation, such that individuals are cast into the role of antagonistic atoms, 
each imbued with the inconsistencies, contradictions and tensions characteristic 
of the social world as a whole. Having noted this apparent lack of a collective 
subject, the chapter then turned to consider the possibility of a marginal 
subjectivity that might provide a critical distance from societal forces and 
facilitate critique of the latter. The first argument for a marginal position was 
made with regard to estrangement. My contention was that in order for one to 
adopt a critical standpoint in relation to existing society, it is necessary to 
become estranged from its prevailing norms, demands, behaviours, products, 
and so on. Estrangement was differentiated from alienation, since the latter 
invokes a notion of absolute otherness or externality, whereas estrangement 
denotes a gradual process through which something once familiar becomes de-
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familiarized. This distinction was shown to be crucial, for too great a distance 
from the social world negates the motivational forces that provoked recognition 
of the necessity of undertaking critique in the first place, while too great a 
proximity binds one to extant practices and forms of thought such that the 
potential for critical reflection is hugely diminished. Estrangement, then, is 
conducive to a marginal position whereby one is neither entirely inside nor 
outside society. The critical subjectivity advocated throughout the chapter is a 
liminal figure, like Simmel’s ‘Stranger’, whose social proximity is optimal for 
the possibility of effective critique. The marginal perspective, as neither wholly 
faithful nor completely alien to social phenomena, allows for the prospect of 
estranging our common, everyday surroundings, finding them to be no longer 
one’s own.   
 
The third chapter closed with an exploration of what I called conscious 
unhappiness and the dialectic of bourgeois coldness. The marginal subjectivity 
provides the conditions for recognizing and intimately knowing the socially 
produced and pre-approved forms of ‘happiness’, while retaining enough 
distance to be properly critical of them. In opposition to readings of Adorno 
that try to draw upon an ethic of care or love in opposition to the prescribed 
indifference and coldness of society, my argument held that both Adorno and 
Haneke can be said to utilize this socially induced coldness as a means of 
rigorously criticizing the ersatz comforts and false instances of love so prevalent 
amid the present. The coldness demanded for survival today not only 
inevitably turns in on itself, but also towards the hollow offerings of 
commodified catharsis that are meant to temper or restrict coldness to the 
market. I argued that running through the social critique of Adorno’s theory 
and Haneke’s filmic work one senses both the inescapability of coldness and the 
possibility of its dialectical overcoming [aufhebung] which would bring coldness 
to full “consciousness of itself, of the reasons why it arose” (EAA, p. 202).                   
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The final chapter examined the shortcomings in existing ecological discourses, 
and moved to defend an Adornian account of the dialectical mediation between 
humanity and nature. To make the argument, I began by looking at two 
prominent discourses in ecological thought, namely, deep ecology and social 
ecology. Recall that deep ecology adopts an ecocentric approach that counts 
biospheric equality as one of its primary tenets. The ‘self-realization’ advocated 
by Arne Naess (usually accredited as the founding thinker of deep ecology) 
entails an expanded notion of ‘Self’ that would encompass the unfathomable 
interrelations between the individual being and all the cosmos. As a result of 
this complex co-constitution and diversity of the biosphere, human beings are 
given no precedence in the deep ecology discourse. This culminates in one of its 
most unpalatable conclusions, namely, that due to its advocacy of biospheric 
egalitarianism deep ecology offers no justifiable grounds for human 
intervention to prevent, say, the breakout of a deadly virus. This irrational 
adherence to such an extreme and self-destructive ecocentric position was 
shown to be inverted in the discourse of social ecology. In contrast to deep 
ecology, social ecology (which Murray Bookchin is usually given as instituting) 
restores the species homo sapiens to the position of primacy within evolutionary 
progress. The results of this inversion – from an ecocentric to an 
anthropocentric perspective – were shown to be just as problematic, for while 
social ecology takes hierarchical relations to be the leading cause of 
domineering relations towards the natural world, hierarchy appears to slip back 
into the discourse in its placing of humanity at the pinnacle of evolutionary 
development. This argument was shown to lapse into an anthropocentric 
teleology whose falsity becomes only too apparent when one recalls the 
necessary incompleteness of evolution, the fact that it is a never-ending process.   
 
192 
 
In response to the noted shortcomings of both deep ecology and social ecology, 
respectively, the chapter then sought to offer an analysis of Adorno’s dialectical 
conception of nature. The first section looked at Adorno’s early speech on the 
idea of natural history, which argued for a more dialectical understanding of 
both categories in contrast to any position that would posit either one as an 
ontological first principle. For Adorno, nature is historical to the extent that it is 
comprehended and acted upon in concrete, contingent circumstances, yet, at the 
same time, this historical and material context cannot exist outside of nature: 
hence, the need for a more expansive conception of Naturgeschichte. Following 
on from this, I returned to the issue of self-preservation and considered its 
relation to the onset of the dualism between nature, on the one hand, and 
humanity, on the other. The instinct of self-preservation was shown to originate 
in the species’ fear of the unpredictable and uncontrollable threats posed by 
brute nature. This split between human being and nature finds expression in 
acts of self-preservation which ultimately turn into acts of self-renunciation, as 
that which would be worth saving in the first place is routinely destroyed or 
suppressed: “As soon as man discards his awareness that he himself is [a part 
of] nature, all the aims for which he keeps himself alive are nullified” (DE, p. 
54).   
 
My reading of the nature-humanity dualism brought our attention back to the 
materialist core in Adorno’s thinking, which can be found in, firstly, the thesis 
of the ‘preponderance of the object’, and, secondly, in respect of the ‘non-
identical’. These two elements of Adornian theory feed into the dialectical 
conception of nature, since the latter stands as not only the objective realm by 
which subjects are asymmetrically co-determined, but also as the irreducibly 
non-identical, that is, the material excess that cannot be fully exhausted by 
conceptual thought. Just as human beings are a part of nature but not reducible 
to nature, so nature must be understood as surpassing our paltry 
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conceptualizations, incapable as the latter prove to be in trying to adequately 
capture the dynamic movements, mutations and develops of the natural world, 
of which we are nevertheless a constituent part. This intertwinement of 
humanity and nature marks the properly dialectical perspective of which 
Adorno was, in my view, a leading proponent. 
 
The last section of the chapter was given to a consideration of Tarkovsky’s films 
in further support of the position outlined in my reading of Adorno. In contrast 
to prominent interpretations of Tarkovsky’s work, which locate in his imagery a 
valorization of nature as a lost place of primal peace, I argued that his films 
engage the dialectical mediation between humanity and nature in a manner 
which attests to their mutual determination. Through a reading of Stalker, 
highlighting the numerous scenes in which nature is portrayed with due 
appreciation of its diverse relations with humanly produced objects, I 
demonstrated how Tarkovsky’s form and content stands as an aesthetic 
complement to Adornian theory and the latter’s understanding of the natural 
world. Tarkovsky, like Adorno, refuses to fall into the simplistic dichotomy of 
nature (good and pure) and humanity (bad and impure). The nature reflected in 
Tarkovsky’s lens is complex, a sign of life and death, decay and renewal, 
destruction and construction. Maintaining and respecting the tensions and 
complexities within nature is to speak against domineering conceptualizations 
that serve to reify objects (both natural and artificial). Tarkovsky’s films exhibit 
a critique of unencumbered enlightenment and scientific rationality, combined 
with a repositioning of the objective world as taking precedence over humanity, 
while not reducing the latter to mere nature. Instead, I argued, Tarkovsky’s 
works recall the natural-history bound up in human existence. Remnants of 
such natural-history are scattered among, and sedimented in, the objects 
presented within the Tarkovsky’s expansive and mimetically-led cinematic 
frame, reminding the viewer of her much-maligned and suppressed origins in 
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nature. Human beings are neither mere nature nor wholly other to nature, and 
therein lies the basis of the inextricable mediation between them.              
 
Having recapped some of the major ideas put forward in each chapter, I wish to 
now bring the thesis to a close by commenting on the broader contemporary 
social and political conditions, as well as drawing out some overarching themes 
of the thesis which, although not made explicit until now, can be seen to 
connect and unite the chapters in all their diversity of subject matter.    
 
We live within an age and society in which it appears more ‘rational’ to 
conform and adapt to prevailing modes of behaviour than to rebel against 
them. The pervasiveness of this rationality of adaptation is such that it seeps 
into every area of the social world. Efficient marketing executives utilize their 
trawling demographic networks that leave no-one unprocessed, unidentified, 
uncategorized. Any activity, whether individual or communal, that is not 
directly and demonstrably quantifiable (usually in economic terms) is looked 
upon with suspicion, derision or bemusement. Individuals are now cast as 
isolated atoms, of which the ‘social’ is merely an agglomeration. Such 
perspectives significantly shape the recent discourses of politics, education, 
healthcare, employment, crime, economics, and more besides. The horizons of 
the contemporary political imagination are lamentably limited by the tacit (if 
not covertly coerced) consent of subjects for whom there seems to be no 
alternative to the way things are. Any attempted resistance or conscious 
maladjustment to the status quo will be confronted with, what we might term, 
diagnostic neutralization, whereby such ‘aberrant’ subjects are seen as merely 
suffering from some sort of pathology, abnormality, or an irrational and 
paranoiac aversion to something so ‘obviously’ benign. In order to be rid of 
such hindering pathologies, so the current ideology advises, one need only 
submit to the comfort and relief afforded by the endless procession of 
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commodities on offer. The “injunction to enjoy”, to adopt Žižek’s apposite 
phrase (2006, p. 310), is built in to the consumer mindset. To be overly 
concerned with massive (and rising) social inequalities – both at the national 
and international level – is to somehow fail as a consumer and to become 
voluntarily ostracized in the process. Thus, the irrational accumulation of 
evermore commodities of negligible value has become almost entirely 
rationalized.   
 
This deplorable state of affairs demands thoughtful and critical responses from 
those who remain not entirely engulfed by the irrational. Honouring my initial 
motivation of wanting to draw out the relevance and potential of Adorno’s 
work, in this thesis I have sought to contribute to these much needed critical 
responses to the woeful existent. My search for crucial insights has entailed 
revisiting, taking up and defending certain themes and concepts within 
Adornian theory. Undertaking such a task required rejecting the view that the 
relevance and potential of Adorno can be presumed from the outset on account 
of his standing as a major thinker of the twentieth century. As any critical 
theorist worthy of the name must acknowledge, ideas cannot be analyzed 
without due appreciation of the socio-historical context of their formulation. 
Yet, by the same token, ideas cannot be reduced to mere historical contingency, 
as if they were nothing but epiphenomena of particular epochs and events. To 
read Adorno today means neither transposing his ideas in toto as ready-made 
solutions or analytical frameworks for our contemporary society, nor casting 
and reifying them as outdated intellectual relics of a bygone era. Thought moves. 
The possibility and history stored up in certain concepts and objects changes 
over time, dependent upon their varying configurations and interrelations. 
Recognition of this latter point is what prompted my opting for a constellational 
method for this thesis. To the extent that it is feasible in such a project, I have 
tried to follow the contours of Adorno’s own work, since one of the main 
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advantages of his dialectical theory arises from the fact that it “does not exclude 
those forms of knowledge which do not follow rigorous rules of 
epistemological grounding” and the formal-pragmatic logics of rational 
argumentation (Hohendahl, 1995, p. 251). While Adorno is cognizant of the 
benefits of this minimally violent representation and openness unto objects, too 
many of his interpreters – both defenders and detractors – have tried to 
diminish its movement, tensions, paradoxes and contradictions, with a view to 
rendering a coherent and consistent body of thought (or thinker). Or, 
alternatively, if such coherence is deemed unobtainable, Adorno’s critical 
theory is cursorily dismissed as succumbing to irrationality and hyperbolic 
eschatology.   
 
It should be clear that, throughout this thesis, I have tried to avoid these dual 
pitfalls. Instead, my aim has been to reconsider Adornian theory and discern 
what is of most pertinence for us today. In order to achieve this end, it has been 
necessary to discard or, at the least, correct certain facets of Adorno’s thinking. 
In the first instance, it was essential to challenge the rather idiosyncratic and 
ontological aversion to film as an artistic medium exhibited in the vast majority 
of Adorno’s output. Not content with simply highlighting this lacuna in his 
work, I sought to utilize it as a catalyst for further illustrating the critical 
potential of the themes and ideas under consideration. My use of film has 
thereby worked simultaneously with and against Adorno. With him inasmuch 
as I deploy certain films in order to defend Adornian arguments; against him to 
the extent that my defence of film as authentic art stands in opposition to 
Adorno’s unduly negative pronouncements on the medium. Bringing the films 
of Tarkovsky and Haneke into constellations with Adornian theory has served 
two other overarching purposes. Firstly, it has shown how specific filmic 
artworks can assist an appreciation and redemptive critique of Adorno’s critical 
theory. And, secondly, it has drawn attention to and made use of the mostly 
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uncharted richness of Adornian theory for the analysis and interpretation of 
film.     
 
In addition to these aims, there is a common thread running through the thesis 
as a whole, despite the relative independence of the respective chapters. This 
thread has to do with shifting perspectives, a task whose urgency intensifies 
with every unsatisfactory election debate, every diminution of political will and 
honesty, every outburst of anti-intellectual media rhetoric, every threat to the 
hard-won rights that guarantee the basic liberties of every human being. The 
arguments presented in this thesis are in no way meant to provide an 
exhaustive model for achieving such perspectival changes. To suppose one 
could access some pure epistemological position free from influence and error 
would be sheer hubris. The arguments herein serve more as possible avenues 
toward attaining altered and, more importantly, critical perspectives. Through 
constellations objects are brought into new configurations and formations that 
modify our perception of each unique item as well as its multifarious 
intertwinement with others. The revisiting of the important if complex concept 
of mimesis contains within it a fresh awareness of the limitations of predominant 
epistemological rationales which assume that concepts neatly, accurately and 
exhaustively envelop their predicates. My advocacy of marginality is founded 
upon the belief that it is only at a remove from the heteronomy of the existent 
that the latter can be truly seen in a critical light. In the case of nature, a wider 
perspective is needed to appreciate the dialectical co-constitution of human 
beings and the natural world, a vision capable of going beyond the myopic 
dualisms of prevailing ecological thought. In each case – constellations, 
mimesis, marginality, and the nature-humanity dialectic – a distinct shift in 
perspective is called for as a prelude to, or rather as a primary stage in, an 
altered, improved, more rational praxis. Marx’s overused and abused eleventh 
thesis on Feuerbach must not lead to the forestalling or subordination of 
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interpretation to the demands of urgent action. Rather, the perspectival 
horizons of subjects living under oppressive conditions should be expanded to 
the point at which the preordained praxis insisted upon in contemporary 
society begins to appear wholly invalid, destructive, undesirable and 
unsustainable. From a sufficiently critical interpretation of and orientation 
towards the existent a new or reformed praxis emerges. It has been my aim 
throughout this thesis to demonstrate the crucial value and critical potential of 
Adornian theory and film to the future realization of such transformative ends. 
If you also feel compelled to resist the heteronomous forces of the present time, 
or at least obtain a more critical perspective on them, move toward the margins.             
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